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ABSTRACT
This  thesis  is  in  the  field  of  Industrial  Relations.  It  concerns  a  micro-level 
investigation  of  the  dynamics  of  public  sector  industrial  relations  in  post-
apartheid  South  Africa.  It  focuses  on  the  Tripartite  Alliance  between  the 
African  National  Congress  (ANC),  the  South  African  Communist  Party 
(SACP)  and  the  Congress  of  South  African  Trade  Unions  (COSATU)  and 
explores what the Alliance relationship has meant for the traditional roles of 
employees and their representatives on the one hand, and employers and their 
representatives on the other. The thesis examines the political, organisational 
and societal contradictions and implications for COSATU public sector union 
affiliates and their members in their relationship to the ANC as an ally (via the 
Alliance) and the context in which ANC members form part of management (in 
government). The South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) was 
used as an archetype of a COSATU public sector union affiliate that engages 
with the State as employer at the municipal level. It is a case study of Makana 
Local  Municipality  (Eastern  Cape Province,  South  Africa)  using  qualitative 
research  techniques  and content  analysis  to  derive  the  relevant  information. 
The author conducted a series of in-depth interviews of key informants and 
observations at Makana Local Municipality were done. Based on the empirical 
data obtained from the investigation, the thesis argues that the traditional roles 
in  the employment  relationship at  the workplace have been affected by the 
political  alliance.  Industrial  relations  roles  have  become increasingly  vague 
especially since many within local government share ANC/SACP memberships 
with  members  of  the  trade  union.  The  study also  highlights  that  within  an 
increasingly  globalising  post-apartheid  environment,  the  Alliance  provides 
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mixture of benefits and challenges for workplace negotiations and employment 
relations in ways that macro-level analyses of employer-employee relationships 
do not always capture.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
Labour  relations  in  South  Africa  have  undergone  profound  changes  over  the  last 
decade, primarily as a result of political, legislative and institutional changes with the 
advent  of  democracy.  Since  1994,  public  servants  in  particular  have  been granted 
individual  and collective  rights,  which were previously denied,  and have begun to 
engage in increasingly participatory processes with the State, their employer.  While 
these progressive changes had long been anticipated, they pose evident challenges for 
relations between the public sector union affiliates of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions federation (COSATU) and the State as employer.  COSATU has,  for 
over a decade, formed part of the Tripartite Alliance comprising the African National 
Congress  (ANC)  and  the  South  African  Communist  Party  (SACP).  Consequently, 
public sector union affiliates of COSATU have interacted with the ANC at two levels: 
firstly, in government as the majority party and part of management, and secondly as 
an ally.  
The  dominant  focus  in  Industrial  Relations  theory  has  been  on  explaining  the 
interaction between parties to employment relations in the private sector (Beaumont, 
1992). These theories, when applied to the public sector, appear to fall short of fully 
explaining and predicting the relationship between public sector unions and the State. 
In most countries,  labour movements  and political  parties have established specific 
relationships to serve their organisational interests. The political party has, in general, 
been the “principal instrument of labour” in the political sphere while the trade union 
has played an autonomous role (Marks, 1989). This aspect of political  ties adds to 
industrial  relations.  Orthodox  Industrial  Relations  theory  explains  the  interaction 
between players to the labour relationship as separate but mutually dependent (Fox, 
1974).  However,  questions  arise  concerning  how  to  best  explain  public  sector 
industrial  relations  in  South  Africa  using  an  orthodox  application,  as  employment 
relations hardly ever consist of distinct, separate union and management entities.
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1.2 Research objectives
This  research  investigates  the  impact  of  the  contradictory  situation  created  by  the 
Tripartite  Alliance  on industrial  relations  between  Makana Local  Municipality  and 
SAMWU. We hope the study contributes to the understanding of post-apartheid (1994-
2006) public sector industrial relations at South African municipalities and provides an 
understanding  of  the  political,  organisational  and  societal  implications  and 
complexities  for  industrial  relations  when  ANC  representatives  are  part  of 
management (in local government) and the ANC is an ally (outside the workplace).
I address the following research questions in the course of the research: 
1. How  do  managers  interpret  their  role  as  employers  as  opposed  to  party 
members who may belong to the same party branch as SAMWU members?
2. How  do  SAMWU  representatives  represent  municipal  workers  in  the 
bargaining arena (which is  adversarial  in nature) yet  maintain a cooperative 
relationship with the ANC via the Alliance?
3. Has  the  Alliance  changed  the  situation  for  SAMWU  to  mobilise  against 
municipalities?
4. What have been the effects of the political alliance of SAMWU with the ANC 
via COSATU on the ways in which shop-floor matters are dealt with? 
1.3 Research motivations
This  research  is  motivated  by  some  topical  observations.  Firstly,  public  sector 
industrial  relations  in  South  Africa  have,  in  the  main,  been  a  relatively  under-
researched area. Nevertheless, since the transition to democracy in 1994, the public 
sector appears to have become a broad area of concern. The public sector has been a 
target for reform in the economic restructuring strategies of government and with this 
there is evidence of a growing research interest. Most of this research, however, seems 
to  have  focused  on  macro-level  matters.  One  major  challenge  appears  to  be  the 
relationship between government and its employees and their representatives at a local 
level.  Both the young democratic  government and public sector unions seem to be 
relatively inexperienced in methods of participatory engagement with each other as the 
previous  labour  relations  system  was  very  authoritarian  (Posel,  2000).  Increased 
research into public sector industrial relations in South Africa can provide a clearer 
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understanding, via new ideas and information, which would contribute to improving 
maturity in the interaction between the State and unions. 
Secondly,  the  strike  activities  by  the  South  African  Municipal  Workers’  Union 
(SAMWU) (July 2002; 8 July 2005; 2 August 2005), the South African Democratic 
Teachers’ Union (SADTU) (16 September 2004), the National Education, Health and 
Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) (16 September 2004) and the Police and Prisons 
Civil  Rights  Union  (POPCRU)  (5  March  2004;  2  September  2004)  indicate  a 
significant level of dissatisfaction amongst public sector union affiliates of COSATU. 
While conflict may be deemed as a healthy, acceptable outcome of industrial relations 
(Hyman, 1989), the events themselves are a legitimate cause for concern when one 
considers that dissatisfied public sector workers have major repercussions for the well- 
being of the broader population. For instance, evidence from Statistics South Africa 
revealed that not all municipalities were operating at full capacity in terms of service 
delivery. It was found that out of 284 municipalities in the country 232 municipalities 
provided water,  178 municipalities  supplied electricity.  233 municipalities  provided 
sewerage  and  sanitation  and  226  municipalities  provided  solid  waste  management 
(Statistics South Africa, 2003). This essentially means that municipalities have had to 
deal with challenges of matching service delivery to service demand. One can expect 
that  a  frustrated  workforce  will  affect  the  quality  of  general  service  delivery  to 
communities. 
Thirdly,  research  by  the  Finance  and  Fiscal  Commission  (1997)  and  the  Unicity 
Commission (2000) revealed that intergovernmental transfers of funding from national 
to local government decreased by 85% in real terms between 1991 and 1997 and a 
further  55% between 1997 and 2000 (McDonald,  2002).  Research by the National 
Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI) further revealed that between 
1995  and  2001  approximately  191  076  (or  13.6%)  jobs  were  lost  in  major  state 
enterprises  and  the  public  service  through  retrenchment,  attrition  and  voluntary 
severance  (Naidoo,  2003).  McDonald  (2002)  argued  that  the  policy  instruments 
contained  in  the  neo-liberal  macroeconomic  policy  framework,  the  Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), were a major contributing factor to 
these job losses. One can expect that budget constraints may affect the prioritisation of 
responsibilities by local government. This in turn may warrant union intervention to 
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protect member and society interests in an increasingly complex political, economic 
and social environment (Pottie, 1998; McDonald, 2002). 
Dilemmas may arise for public sector union affiliates of COSATU when negotiating 
with government as the employer over conditions of service and wages. SAMWU, for 
example,  negotiates1 with  the  local  government  employer  association,  the  South 
African  Local  Government  Association  (SALGA),  over  wage  advancements.  Its 
Alliance partner in government, the ANC, through its backing of neo-liberal principles 
and the GEAR policy, has promoted cuts in public spending and speedy restructuring 
of state assets which has implications for employment and government budgets. In a 
proposal  named  An  alliance  for  socio-economic  transformation (COSATU,  1997) 
COSATU communicated a growing concern amongst its affiliate members that GEAR 
would  strip  away  the  ability  of  government  to  ensure  redistribution,  growth  and 
employment  creation.  GEAR did  not  meet  many  of  its  objectives  (Hassen,  2001). 
Nevertheless, its introduction signalled a shift by government to neo-liberal economic 
policy.  Affiliates  of  COSATU,  such  as  SAMWU,  have  opposed  the  neo-liberal 
direction pursued by government. This study contributes to the understanding of public 
sector industrial relations in light of such broader economic adjustments. 
Finally,  SAMWU is  known for  its  stance  against  GEAR and privatisation,  yet  its 
response to the ANC in government appears to be inconsistent. In July 2002, SAMWU 
staged  a  massive  strike  because  SALGA  signed  a  wage  agreement  with  the 
Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU) (SALB, 2002). Nonetheless, 
for  the  April  2004  national  elections  SAMWU  pledged  its  support  to  the  ANC 
manifesto  (SAMWU,  2003).  According  to  the  Independent  Electoral  Commission 
since 1994, the ANC has consistently won a majority vote at national, provincial and 
local government elections despite a decline in voter turnout. In 1994, the ANC won 
62.65%  (252  parliamentary  seats)  of  the  national  votes.  At  the  1995/96  local 
government elections, the ANC won 58.8% of the total votes. In 1999, the ANC won 
66.35% (266 seats) of the national election votes. In 2000, the ANC won 59.4% of the 
local government election votes. In 2004, the ANC won 69.69% of the national vote 
1 Local government negotiations take place at a national and provincial level in the South African Local 
Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) and in Local Labour Forums (LLFs) at a local level. These 
bargaining structures comprise nominated representatives of SALGA, SAMWU and the Independent 
Municipal and Allied Trade Union (IMATU).  
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(IEC, 2004). COSATU and its affiliates contributed significantly to these victories. In 
a press statement following the 2004 election results, COSATU proclaimed that it was 
“proud of the important role it played in achieving this victory” and thanked all its 
members, shop stewards, staff and office bearers for voting ANC (COSATU, 2004a). 
An  investigation  into  some  complexities  for  the  membership  of  SAMWU  can 
contribute  to  an  understanding  of  relations  between  unions  and  politics  in  post-
apartheid South Africa and under conditions of corporatism.
1.4 Definition of terms
The definitions adopted in the research include the following:
“Public sector” refers to “all institutions under public control where direct or indirect 
political control is exercised through appropriate legislation … [it]  includes a wide 
range of components:  national  and provincial  departments,  state-owned enterprises, 
and  local  authorities”  (Adler,  2000:3).  Definitions  of  the  public  sector  tend  to  be 
variable and this definition best describes the South African public sector.
“Public  sector  union”  refers  to  any  union  operating  within  the  public  sector  as 
previously defined.
“Public  service”  forms  part  of  the  broader  public  sector.  It  is  the  single  largest 
component of the public sector. It comprises national and provincial departments and 
agencies,  such  as  service  delivery  agencies  (for  example,  health  and  education), 
security agencies (such as the South African Police Service), administrative agencies 
and  statutory  agencies  (for  example,  the  Public  Service  Commission)  (Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995; Adler, 2000:5-6). 
“Alliance” refers to the coalition between the ANC, SACP and COSATU. The terms 
“Alliance” and “Tripartite Alliance” are used interchangeably from this point on to 
refer to the affiliation. Emphasis is given to the ANC and COSATU organisations in 
the analysis. The scope of the research does not allow for extensive coverage of the 
dynamics of the Alliance relationship and events between all the Alliance partners.
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“Black” – For the purposes of this research,  “Black” generically  refers to African, 
Coloured and Indian people (Employment Equity Act of 1998).
1.5 Research design and methodology
This research adopted qualitative research design and research methods. Combinations 
of primary and secondary methods of data collection were used to acquire the relevant 
information. These consisted of semi-structured interviews, observations and content 
analysis of newspapers, reports and journal articles. A single case study was used in 
undertaking an empirical investigation of the research questions. The case study was 
conducted at Makana Local Municipality2, a local municipality in the Eastern Cape 
Province.  The  subjects  were  drawn  primarily,  although  not  exclusively,  from that 
municipality. Figure 1 below is a map of the area of Makana Local Municipality. The 
interview sample included representatives and members of SAMWU, SALGA, ANC, 
the IMATU and the Democratic Alliance (DA). 
2 Makana  Local  Municipality  will  be  referred  to  as  Makana  Municipality  as  well  from this  point 
onwards.
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Figure   1  : Makana Local Municipality, Eastern Cape Province, South Africa  
Source: Makana Local Municipality (2005:2)
1.6 Ethical considerations
Ethics are an important consideration in social research (Mouton, 2001). The consent 
of the research participants was attained for interviews and all the respondents were 
assured of their anonymity. They were also given liberty to decline participation at any 
time in the research process. Pseudonyms have been given to the research respondents 
to protect their identities.
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1.7 Research limitations
The  selection  of  a  single  municipality  has  limitations  on  the  extent  to  which  the 
findings from this study can be generalised. Generalisations may only be possible for 
municipalities  with  similar  characteristics  as  Makana  Municipality.  Besides  the 
limitations, the research provides insight into contemporary issues within public sector 
municipal industrial relations in South Africa.   
1.8 Structure of dissertation
Chapter 1 is the introduction to the study. It discusses the context of the study and 
provides  the  motivations  for  pursuing  this  study.  A  rough  outline  of  the  research 
design and methodology used to address the research problem is incorporated.   
Chapter  2 is  a  review of  the  literature  on  conceptualising  industrial  relations  and 
Alliance  politics.  It  contains  the  theoretical  framework  that  informed the  study.  It 
provides an overview of developments in the field to help locate the research problem.
Chapter  3 gives  an account  of  the research  design and methodology employed.  It 
includes a description of the data capturing and data analysis methods.
 Chapter 4 focuses on SAMWU. It gives an overview of SAMWU then examines the 
evolving nature of the relationship between SAMWU and local government.
Chapter 5 provides background information to Makana Local Municipality. It begins 
with a brief history of the formation of the municipality then proceeds to highlight the 
post-apartheid characteristics of the municipality.
Chapter 6 discusses the dynamics of post-apartheid industrial relations incorporating 
the evidence gathered at the case study. The chapter illustrates how industrial relations 
are played out within an Alliance context.
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Chapter  7 is  the  conclusion  of  the  study.  The  research  findings  are  examined  in 
relation  to  research  questions.  Recommendations  regarding  further  research  are 
presented. 
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUALISING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a review of literature on theory developments of the field of 
Industrial Relations. Broadly speaking, orthodox theories on Industrial Relations were 
developed from studies in the private enterprise context. The studies focused on the 
role  of  management  and depicted  the  players  to  the  labour  relationship  as  distinct 
entities pursuing separate but mutually dependent interests, mainly through collective 
bargaining processes. Over time there were improvements to industrial relations theory 
and  developments  in  public  sector  industrial  relations.  The  review  of  industrial 
relations  theories  is  followed  by  literature  on  the  South  African  transition  to 
democracy and developments in South African industrial relations,
2.2 Early approaches to building Industrial Relations theory
Developments  in  Industrial  Relations have a  long history.  For the most part,  early 
writers focussed on institutions rather than social relations in industry (Hyman, 1975). 
Beatrice and Sidney Webb (1897 and 1920), for instance, contributed significantly to 
early developments on British trade unionism by contending that trade unions were a 
“continuous association of wage earners” primarily concerned with maintaining and 
improving conditions “of their employment”3 and functioned to enforce a “common 
rule” for trade in the shop via three processes–mutual insurance4, collective bargaining5 
and legal enactment6 (Webb, 1897). From the 1920s to the early 1950s, economics, 
3 The Webbs later altered the phrase “of their employment” to “of their working lives”.
4 Mutual  insurance  refers  to  “the  provision  of  a  fund  by  common  subscription  to  insure  against 
casualties,  to  provide  maintenance,  that  is  to  say,  in  cases  in  which  a  member  is  deprived  of  his 
livelihood by cause over which neither he nor the unions has any control” (Webb, 1897:247). 
5 Collective bargaining refers to the negotiation between organised employees and their employers over 
matters such as wages, rules and working conditions (Webb, 1897). 
6 Legal enactment refers to regulation and support for union activity via legislation (1897).
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politics and law began to influence the writing of many authors on Industrial Relations. 
In  the  United  States,  Commons  (1923)7 and  Perlman  (1928)8 offered  theoretical 
approaches for Industrial Relations from their analyses of trade unionism. Commons 
(1923) presented unions as emancipatory forces, dividing the power of one party (the 
employer) over the other (the worker), and Perlman (1928) argued that trade unions 
primarily  gave  attention  to  worker  interests  and  provided  workers  with  protection 
against the consequences of job shortage (in Blain and Gennard, 1970; Meltz, 1991). 
Dunlop (1944) similarly offered a model of the union as “an economic institution” by 
applying the economist theory of the firm to the trade union. Kerr (1948) displayed the 
limitations of a separate economic and political approach to trade unions as suggested 
by Dunlop (1944) and Ross (1948). Instead, Kerr (1948) proposed a combination of an 
economic and political approach for a better, more “realistic” analysis of trade unions.
From  the  early  1950s,  writers  began  to  shift  their  focus  away  from trade  unions 
towards  collective  bargaining  as  a  primary  mechanism  for  handling  employment 
matters  (Chamberlain  and  Kuhn  1951;  Cole,  1951).  Shifts  were  made  by  various 
authors,  for  instance,  Flanders  and  Clegg  (1954)  and  Dunlop  (1958),  towards 
developing  a  refined  Industrial  Relations  theory.  Dunlop  (1958)  was  the  first  to 
suggest that Industrial Relations be studied as a discipline in its own right, although his 
ideas did not represent any “real conceptual departure” from previous works (Lumley, 
1979). He suggested that the Industrial Relations System could be seen as a distinct 
type or sub-system, functioning within the wider total social system with overlaps in 
the economic and political subsystems. Dunlop (1958) postulated that “abstractions9” 
came together to ascertain “rules” (procedural and substantive) to regulate the actors at 
the workplace and work community. From his observations, external factors in wider 
society impacted on the environmental factors that impinged directly on the actors of 
the Industrial Relations System. Dunlop (1958:ix) concluded that the central task of his 
general  theory  was  to  explain  “why  particular  rules  are  established  in  particular 
7 Commons, J.R. 1923. Labour and administration. New York: Macmillan.
  
8 Perlman, S. 1928. A theory of the labour movement. New York: Macmillan.
9 These existed in the form of actors in the system (managers and their representatives; workers and their 
representatives; and governmental agencies that would deal with either manager or worker organisations 
or individual workers), environmental contexts of the system (locus and distribution of power in larger 
society, technological characteristics of the workplace and work community and market and budgetary 
constraints) and ideology (that is, a body of common ideas that define the role, place and function of 
others in the system) (Dunlop, 1958:16).
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Industrial Relations Systems and how and why they change in response to changes 
affecting  the  system”.  It  is  arguable  whether  he  portrayed  all  he  intended  of  the 
“abstractions”.
Hyman (1975:11) argued that by concentrating on how conflict  was contained and 
controlled rather than on the processes through which disagreements and disputes were 
generated,  Dunlop  (1958)  portrayed  the  various  institutions  and  procedures  as 
compatible and well integrated and conflict as “self-regulating”. Hyman (1975) argued 
that the Systems model would be better if it focused on the institutions involved in 
negotiations. He proposed that the Industrial Relations System be redefined to include 
the  “sources”  and  “consequences”  of  industrial  conflict  to  ultimately  describe 
Industrial Relations as “the study of processes of control over work relations” (Hyman, 
1975:12). According to Jackson (1982:22), the Systems approach would be valuable if 
it  integrated  “the  existence  of  contradictory  processes  and  forces  and  therefore 
treat[ed] instability and stability as of equal significance as ‘system outcomes’ ” (that 
is, rules).
Wood,  Wagner,  Armstrong,  Goodman  and  Davis  (1975)  composed  constructive 
amendments to Dunlop’s model. The essence of their conceptual framework was on 
the  Industrial  Relations  System  as  “a  rule-making  system”.  Within  the  Industrial 
Relations System, “actors” produced rules, via “rule-making processes”, at different 
levels and within a “contextual environment” (Wood et al., 1975:304). They argued 
that “an analytical distinction [could] be made between the system which ‘produces’ 
rules (that is, the Industrial Relations System) and the system which is ‘governed’ by 
such rules (that is, the production system)” (Wood et al., 1975:295). This distinction 
would  provide  a  framework  for  distinguishing  between  rules  (substantive  and 
procedural) that are an output of the Industrial Relations System to “govern” behaviour 
in the production system and rules (procedural) established for the “internal regulation 
of the conduct of the Industrial Relations System” (Salamon, 1992:46). 
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Between the 1960s and 1970s, the Oxford10 school approach emerged as a decisive 
contribution  to  understanding  Industrial  Relations.  Flanders  (1965)  was  the  most 
prominent  author.  His  main  assumption  was  that  Industrial  Relations  involved  the 
regulation of relations in industry via rule formulation (procedural11 and substantive12) 
in collective bargaining. The procedural rules regulated “the behaviour of the parties to 
the  collective  agreement”  (Flanders,  1965:11)  and  regulated  “the  making, 
interpretation and enforcement of … substantive rules” (Flanders, 1965:11). Flanders 
(1965:10) argued that “unstructured” relationships did not feature in the rule making 
process. They existed “outside the scope” of Industrial Relations. He maintained that 
Industrial  Relations  should  be  defined  as  “the  study  of  the  institutions  of  job 
regulation”  with  collective  bargaining  as  the  chief  institution  of  the  rule-making 
process  (Flanders,  1965:10-11).  Margerison  (1969)  argued  that  the  approach 
emphasised  the  consequences  of  industrial  disputes  rather  than  their  causes  and 
suggested that conflict be the basic concept that should form the basis of Industrial 
Relations study. 
From the 1970s, the use of frames of reference (Unitary, Pluralist and Radical) began 
to  dominate  discussions  on  Industrial  Relations  Systems.  The  Unitary  perspective 
depicted the enterprise as an integration of groups with shared interests and objectives, 
watched over by a single authority (management) in order to keep the organisation 
functional.  Essentially,  Industrial  Relations  were  assumed  to  be  “based  on  mutual 
cooperation and harmony of interest between management and managed within the 
enterprise”  (Farnham and  Pilmott,  1983:53).  The  Pluralist  perspective  arose  as  an 
alternative to the Unitary perspective with valuable contributions from Bakke (1946), 
Clegg (1975), Fox (1973 and 1974), Kerr (1954), Hyman (1978) and Kahn-Freund 
(1983).  The  Pluralist  approach  assumed  that  interest  groups  used  “proper”  or 
10 Refers to the works of Clegg, H. 1970. The system of Industrial Relations in Great Britain. Oxford: 
Blackwell; Bain, G.S. 1970. The growth of white-collar trade unionism. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Fox, 
A. and Flanders, A. 1969. “The reform of collective bargaining: from Donovan to Durkheim”. British 
Journal  of  Industrial  Relations  7  (2);  McCarthy,  W.  1966.  “The  role  of  shop  stewards  in  British 
Industrial  Relations”.  Royal  Commission  on  Trade  Unions  and  Employer’s  Associations,  Research 
Paper No. 1. 
11 Procedural rules refer to the methods to be used and the stages to be followed in the settlement of 
disputes or the amenities  and standing to be accorded to representatives  of parties  to an agreement 
(Flanders, 1965:11).
12 Substantive rules refer to wage rates, working hours and terms and conditions of work (Flanders, 
1965:11).
21
“legitimate” channels of influence and seldom resorted to coercion or sanctions against 
their elected rulers (Laffin, 1989). Pluralists were criticised for their concern with the 
outcomes of industrial conflict rather than sources of disputes (Hyman, 1972). 
The Radical perspective argued for a broadening of analysis to realise more than the 
needs of maintaining stability and containing conflict in the employment relationship. 
In his arguments against the Pluralist perspective (a shift in his stance), Fox (1973) 
questioned the Pluralist presentation of the owners and controllers of property as just 
another  group  among  many.  He  criticised  the  pluralists  for  neglecting  the 
“propertyless” and their subjugation, and pointed out that the “propertied” seldom have 
to make their power noticeable.  Their very power gave them the facilities to establish 
and maintain social attitudes and values “favourable” to their acceptance (Fox, 1973). 
Hyman (1975) argued that the organisation was reflective of wider society in that the 
productive system was privately owned and company policy was directed by profit. 
The  interests  of  labour  and  capital  conflicted  with  each  other  and,  unlike  in  the 
Pluralist  or  Unitary  approaches,  power  fundamentally  skewed  in  favour  of  the 
employer.  Hyman  (1975)  suggested  that  processes  of  conflict  generation  were 
therefore  important  in  studying  Industrial  Relations.  Both  Fox  (1973)  and  Hyman 
(1975) advanced that collective bargaining and compromise were inadequate as solid 
solutions  to  imbalance  and  emphasised  that  Industrial  Relations  should  rather  be 
located in the wider processes of social disproportion and class struggle13. 
From the 1980s, many frameworks on Industrial Relations followed a Strategic Choice 
framework,  as developed by Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1984 and 1994) in their 
investigation of United States Industrial Relations. The Strategic Choice framework 
emphasised that “industrial relations processes and outcomes [would be] determined 
by continuously evolving  interaction of  environmental  pressures and organisational 
responses”  (Kochan  et  al.,  1994:13)  along  with  strategic  choices  and  values  of 
managers,  union  leaders,  workers  and  public  policy  makers.  Turner  (1991:230) 
criticised the Strategic Choice analysis for neglecting the organisational cohesiveness 
13 Class struggle  was first  identified by Karl  Marx  as  the antagonism between the bourgeoisie  (the 
dominant class whose status came from possessing means of production or property) and proletariat or 
working class (the propertyless class that earns a living from selling its labour power) (Marx, 1867). In 
the Communist Manifesto (1848) Marx and Engels envisioned a worker revolution that would result in 
the  victory  of  socialism  (a  social  system  with  common  ownership  of  means  of  production  and 
distribution) over capitalism (an economic system in which means of production and distribution are 
privately owned).
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of the labour movement, the status of organised management or labour within society 
and  the  structure  of  the  political  economy.  In  response  to  the  Strategic  Choice 
suppositions, Turner (1991:2) emphasised two important variables to explain the level 
of  worker  interest  representation  in  response  to  existing  change  and  variations  in 
stability.  He  stressed,  firstly,  the  degree  to  which  unions  were  incorporated  into 
managerial  decision-making  processes  as  opposed  to  adversarial  unionism,  and 
secondly, the existence or absence of corporatist bargaining structures or laws which 
regulate and promote firm-level union participation from outside the firm. According 
to Turner (1991:27), the manner in which union influence was institutionalised in the 
Industrial Relations System was the fundamental variable in operation, not necessarily 
employer values or strategies. Edwards (2003) noted that strategies emerged as a result 
of  a  complex  progression  of  decisions  made  by  people  in  different  levels  of  the 
organisation  and  involved  “continual  reassessments  and  readjustments  of  position” 
Edwards (2003:160).  Strategies did not always develop after  discussions (Edwards, 
2003) as implied by Kochan et al. (1994).
2.3 Public Sector Industrial Relations
As public sector unionism has grown in strength across countries, authors have shown 
relative dissatisfaction with describing labour movements and Industrial Relations as a 
single entity (Troy, 1994). Troy (1994) notes that public and private movements and 
Industrial Relations have parallels but are distinct. To begin with, public sector unions 
can  be  conceptualised  differently  from  those  in  the  private  sector  (Troy,  1994). 
Freeman  (1986)  highlighted  the  political  dimension  of  public  sector  unions  as  a 
distinctive  feature.  Public  sector  unions  “can  affect  the  demand  for  [their]  labour 
through the political process, as well as affect wages and working conditions through 
collective  bargaining”  (Freeman,  1986:42).  Troy  (1994)  went  beyond  Freeman’s 
(1986) idea by adding that public sector unions used political activity to reorganise the 
national income from the private to the public sector of the economy. His extension led 
to a definition (adopted from the Webbs’ definition of a trade union) of a public sector 
union  as  “a  continuous  association  of  salaried  and  wage  employees  organised  to 
redistribute income from public employers  to their employees through political and 
economic means; and to redistribute income from the private to the public economy” 
(Troy, 1994:22).  
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Beaumont (1992:10) summarised some of the differences between public and private 
organisations as follows: 
1. market  information,  signals  and  incentives  are  relatively  absent  for  public 
sector organisations,  although they are subject  to much greater influence by 
external political and governmental institutions;
2. public  sector  organisations  are  exposed  to  more  external  scrutiny  and 
accountability than private sector organisations;
3. public sector organisations’ goals are numerous, intangible and conflicting;
4. public  sector  organisations  have  more  complicated,  formal  rules,  inflexible 
hierarchical arrangements and reporting requirements; and
5. public  sector  managers  have  less  autonomy  because  of  constraints  such  as 
public service rules.
As public and private sector organisations are subject to forces very different to each 
other, an extension of analysis from private to public spheres would leave out very 
important variables in the employment relationship (Beaumont, 1992). One can expect 
idiosyncratic aspects to Industrial Relations when the State acts as an employer. The 
“political  environment”  in  particular  shapes  the  nature  of  public  sector  Industrial 
Relations (Beaumont, 1992). Ferner (1985) noted that government itself is a political 
institution and this political nature would make the features of public sector Industrial 
Relations distinct.  He observed political  costs  and benefits of particular  courses of 
action and argued that: 
In the public enterprise … political calculations are an inherent rather than a 
contingent  characteristic,  reflecting  political  control  over  the  goals  and 
objectives  of  the  enterprises  and  over  their  financial  arrangements.  This 
[political] environment affects Industrial Relations both directly and indirectly 
(Ferner, 1985:68). 
The peculiarities of the public enterprise point to differences in Industrial Relations 
and  make  extensive  research  into  dynamic  processes  important  for  a  better 
understanding of public sector Industrial Relations. Growth in public sector unions in 
different countries have especially allowed for expansive analyses into varied public 
sector union issues. Public sector reforms have also contributed to growing attention 
on  the  public  sector.  These  reforms  have  been  prominent  because  of  the  scale, 
extensiveness and significance of the changes (Halligan, 2001). The reform processes 
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have, amongst other things, presented a number of challenges especially for labour 
relations.
In looking at British local government Industrial Relations, Laffin (1989) alluded to 
problems in establishing and maintaining adequate relationships between management 
and unions within the workplace at local government level. He focused on five primary 
approaches in his study of British local government Industrial  Relations: Pluralism, 
Corporatism, Fiscal Crisis, Social Action and the Marxist approach.
Using  the  Pluralist  perspective,  Laffin  (1989)  observed  that  public  service  unions 
existed as an interest group that had a somewhat “privileged position” (Wellington and 
Winter, 1971) as they could utilise political sanctions unavailable to other sectional 
interest  groups.  Institutions and rules  would be given much importance within this 
approach compared to other factors. 
The Corporatist approach considers the political system as a closed system in which 
hierarchically  ordered  strategic  economic  and  social  interest  groups  have  a  close 
working relationship with government policy makers (Schmitter, 1974; Panitch, 1977; 
Bramble and Kuhn, 1999). Laffin (1989:15) argued that consensus would be easier to 
maintain in the public than in the private sector because there is greater ideological 
consensus  and  less  conflict  in  the  public  sector.  For  corporatist  arrangements  to 
continue, material  concessions would have to be made on the part of the employer 
(medical benefits, pension, job security and so on). Laffin (1989:16) pointed to the 
presence  of  miniature  corporatist  arrangements  at  individual  local  authorities  in 
Britain.  These  provided  employees  with  the  option  of  better  involvement  in 
management decisions. 
The Fiscal Crisis approach describes unions as expressions of political disaffection. 
The approach emphasises differences between public and private sector workers which 
result  in  their  varied  responses  in  their  context.  The  planned  and  executed  fiscal 
restraint by governments and the resultant implications politicise and radicalise state 
workers on a broad range of interests. O’Connor (1973:249) indicated the effect of 
fiscal  restraint  as  increased  recognition  by unions  of  their  shared  aims with  other 
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groups, later coming to view them as “political equals, rather than as professional or 
State bureaucrats”.
The Social Action approach assumes that the determinants of industrial behaviour lie 
in larger society, outside the workplace. It presumes a greater scope of conflicts and 
interests than of a particular social class. Social actors pursue their goals according to 
their aims and principles in collectives rather than as individuals. In addition, meaning 
given by the actor  (subjectivity) is  taken as a starting point for explaining actions. 
Ultimately, “individual actors are seen as both actively shaping their society and, at the 
same time, deriving their values from their place in that society” (Laffin, 1989:11). 
The Marxist approach shares many similarities with the Social Action approach. This 
approach presents industrial behaviour as lying in the larger society and definitions 
given by actors as underlying class relationship (Laffin, 1989:12). Marxists counter the 
Social  Action  approach  arguing  that  meanings  would  have  to  be  reinterpreted 
(Goldthorpe, 1969).
Laffin  (1989)  primarily  used  four  of  the  above  approaches  (excluding  the  Social 
Action  approach)  in  his  work  and  derived  a  range  of  “strategies”  used  by  both 
management and unions to cope in the employment relationship. In his view of the 
strategies,  Laffin  (1989:19)  described  local  authorities  as  “negotiated  orders”. 
Adjustments  made  would  tend  to  be  mutual.  Both  partakers  of  the  employment 
relationship, that is local authority management and unions, applied the strategies.
Strategies used by management:
1. Incorporation  or  cooptation–management  tries  to  “minimise  the  differences 
between  the  unions  and  themselves  by  absorbing  unions  into  management 
structure and persuading union officials to accept the management definition of 
the rules of the game” (Laffin, 1989:36). This depends on the willingness of 
managers to sympathise with unions.
2. Collaboration–management gives “primacy to the interests of the union and is 
willing to bend the rules of the game in favour of the unions” (Laffin, 1989:36).
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3. Conciliation–management  combines  “recognition  of  the  legitimate  role  of 
unions as partners in bargaining with an emphasis on trust” (Laffin, 1989:36). 
This is not to suggest the absence of antagonism in conciliatory processes.
4. Confrontation–may  be  used  to  impose  management  will  on  unions  in 
bargaining and could endanger the possibility of trust between the two sides 
(Laffin, 1989).
Strategies applied to or used by unions:
1. Cooptation–“arises exclusively in local authorities where the organisational and 
ideological affinities present within the labour movement create opportunities 
for cooptation” (Laffin, 1989:62) between the union and management.
2. Collaboration–refers  to  the  “corporatist  situation  in  which  the  local  union 
organisation is virtually incorporated into the management  structure and the 
leadership accept the employer’s definition of the situation” (Laffin, 1989:61). 
From the employer’s view this would be cooptation.
3. Conciliation–although integrated into “joint problem solving”, unions perceive 
such forums as “means for institutionalising antagonistic cooperation”. They 
will  thus  within  this  strategy  “maintain  a  balance  between  the  extremes  of 
collaboration and confrontation” (Laffin, 1989:62).
4. Confrontation–this  strategy  may be  adopted but  this  does  not  only  refer  to 
industrial action. Unions often perceive this more as a protective than offensive 
strategy.  Industrial  action or threats  of action are used less to pursue union 
initiatives (Laffin, 19898:63).
When Beaumont (1992:12) presented an analysis  of British public sector Industrial 
Relations, he argued that “the precise mechanisms and means by which political forces 
influence public sector Industrial  Relations structure,  processes and outcomes [had] 
certainly not been identified and researched in sufficient depth and detail”. He argued 
that more discussion on the nature of the State as an employer  of labour is just as 
important as discussion on public sector Industrial Relations. Although his argument 
was for the British case, the same holds for the South African case. Before reviewing 
literature on industrial relations in South Africa, it is important to review literature that 
presents the South African context starting with the country’s transition to democracy.
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2.4 The transition to democracy in South Africa (1994-2000)    
The history of South Africa prior the 1990s was marked by a struggle process against 
racial  authoritarianism  within  society  and  managerial  authoritarianism  at  the 
workplace. When the ANC, SACP and other political organisations were unbanned in 
1990, this marked the beginning of change towards a democratic South Africa. Much 
of the literature on transitions to democracy in nations has provided either structural 
(for  example,  the  state,  policies  and  markets)  or  non-structural  (for  example, 
behaviours and decisions) explanations for these transitions. Lipset (1960) concluded 
that the possibility of democracy for a nation depended on its economic development. 
In contrast,  Rustow (1970) did not perceive a  simple cause and effect  relationship 
between  structural  factors  and  democracy.  The  model  he  generated  placed  more 
emphasis on circumstances, behaviour and decisions of elites,  administrators,  social 
and  political  movements  and  wider  society.  Generally  speaking,  transition  writers 
neglected the role of labour movements as essential actors in transitions. Valenzuela 
(1989:447) gave labour movements a “special place” among forces of civil society that 
react  to  initiate  the  transition  out  of  authoritarianism.  He  observed  that  their 
uniqueness  came  from  their  great  capacity  to  mobilise  effectively  and  efficiently 
through protests and demonstrations and directly disrupt the economy through work 
stoppages (Valenzuela, 1989). 
South Africa’s transition was a complex process that involved a number of social and 
political actors. In 1993, negotiations between the ANC and National Party (NP) for 
the Government of National Unity14 (GNU), a transition government, began. In 1994, 
South Africa the ANC won the first democratic elections. Scholars writing about South 
Africa’s  transition  to  democracy  took  various  viewpoints  in  their  analyses.  Some 
scholars used comparative studies of democratisation in other countries and presented 
South Africa’s situation (Joseph, 1997). Other scholars analysed the structural aspects 
of South Africa’s transitions and focused on the positive role of major political events 
(Adam and Moodley, 1993), political parties (Rantete and Giliomee, 1992) and pacts 
(Sisk, 1994; Sparks, 1995; Herbst, 1997; Rantete, 1998; Spitz, 2000). There were also 
significant contributions by writers on the role of popular movements and struggle in 
14 The GNU was headed by Nelson Mandela and consisted of members of the Inkatha Freedom Party, 
NP, women, different races and faith. Clause 88 allowed any party with twenty or more seats in the 
National Assembly to claim one or more cabinet portfolios and enter government. The NP left the GNU 
in 1996. The GNU existed until the 1999 national elections.
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the origin, progress and results of transitions (Ginsburg and Webster, 1995; Marais, 
1998; Webster and Adler, 1999). 
Soon after the 1994 elections,  many scholars debated the future shape of the post-
apartheid political economy as change progressed (Nattrass, 1994; Sender, 1994). The 
pressures of globalisation made it increasingly important to discuss how the country 
would redistribute resources and achieve sustained economic growth. Globalisation15 is 
a contested term and there is no universally accepted definition of this phenomenon. It 
can be broadly defined as the global integration of cultural, economic, religious, social 
and  political  systems  (Raskin,  Banuri,  Gallopin,  Gutman,  Hammond,  Kates  and 
Schwartz,  2002).  The  effects  of  globalisation  have  been  observed  in  financial, 
industrial,  economic,  informational,  political,  cultural,  social,  ecological,  and 
transportation areas of numerous countries. 
After the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa entered what Webster and 
Adler (1998:58) termed a “double transition”-simultaneously consolidating democracy 
and liberalising the economy. These processes were potentially contradictory however 
they argued that they were potentially reconcilable when there was a compromise to 
resolve  tensions  caused  by  economic  liberalisation  and  the  consolidating  of 
democracy. The double transition posed many challenges for unionised workers and 
the broader working class. Webster and Adler (1999) favoured institutionalised class 
compromise  and contended that  “a  class compromise  oriented towards growth and 
redistribution  [could]  better  provide  the  economic  foundations  for  sustainable 
democracy”. 
2.4.1 Corporatism, Co-determination and Class compromise
South Africa experienced a trend towards corporatist economic decision-making from 
the 1990s to engage domestic capital and the different political forces of the apartheid 
era. During the transition, scholars debated corporatism and co-determination and the 
class  compromise  created  by  these  mechanisms.  Corporatism  is  described  as  “a 
political  structure  within  advanced  capitalism  which  integrates  organised  socio-
15 The emergence and strength of contemporary globalisation in the second half of the twentieth century 
has been attributed to neoliberalism (defined on page 40 of thesis) but the two terms are different. With 
the internationalisation of capital and the state and growth of international labour markets, this created 
an environment within which globalisation grew (Conway and Heynen, 2006:25-28).
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economic producer groups through a system of representation and cooperative mutual 
interaction at the leadership level and mobilisation and social control at the mass level” 
(Panitch, 1981:24).  Baskin (1993) argued that South Africa experienced “bargained 
corporatism”16,  that  is,  “an  institutionalised  role  for  labour  and  capital  in  the 
formulation  and  regulation  of  economic  policy”  (Baskin,  1993:1).  The widespread 
bipartite and tripartite consultations prior, during and after 1994 elections allowed the 
labour movement to be a stakeholder in discussions and decision making on a number 
of issues and policies. Scholars such as Baskin (2000b) and Webster (2001) took a 
position that the continued participation of COSATU in the Alliance and the post-
apartheid  policy  reflected  “a  class  compromise,  in  which  pro-capitalist  macro-
economic policy and other policies are weighed up against labour’s achievements in 
terms  of  labour  legislation  (especially  the  Labour  Relations  Act)  and  corporatist 
institutions  (especially  NEDLAC)”  (Seekings  and Nattrass,  2002:2).  NEDLAC has 
bound labour to the institutionalised processes of class compromise with the State and 
capital. 
Class compromise can be described as “workers consent to capitalism because a crisis 
of capitalism is not in their immediate interest” (Neuhouser, 1993:101). According to 
Przeworski  (1985:165) “When profits  are too low, when capitalists  do not save or 
when they invest inefficiently, the rate of growth of product falls and the opportunity 
of anyone to improve material conditions falls with it. And under capitalism there are 
no ways to get out of a crisis other than to increase the rate of savings out of profits, 
increase  the  input/output  efficiency  or  production,  and/or  reduce  wages  (or  force 
savings, which is the same). The brunt of the cost becomes expressed either in terms of 
unemployment or a fall of wages. Unless one of these occurs, and quite likely both, the 
crisis  must  get  deeper  and  under  capitalism,  the  recovery  more  costly  to  wage-
earners”. Przeworski (1985) further argues that workers are not tricked into backing 
capitalist  democracy  by  compromising  with  the  capitalist  class.  They  have  real 
material  interests  in  capitalism  (wages  and  jobs)  that  can  be  successfully  pursued 
within democratic political structures (Przeworski, 1985). 
16 Baskin (2000a) later proposed the concept “concertation” to portray the extent to which the trend 
came  from  below  (union  demands).  Concertation  is  defined  as  “an  institutional  role  for  interest 
organisations  (mainly  economic)  in  the  formulation  and  implementation/regulation  of  state  policy” 
(Baskin, 2000a:48).
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Faced  with  pressures  from  workers  for  improved  wages,  jobs  and  better  living 
conditions  during  the  transition,  it  is  not  surprising  that  labour  analysts  accepted 
corporatist arrangements. Maree (1993) encouraged corporatist developments and was 
hopeful  that  these  would  facilitate  a  rise  in  the  standard  of  living  for  workers  by 
producing good economic performance and high levels of employment with low levels 
of inflation as seen in Europe. Webster and Adler (1995) argued that the freedoms 
created  by  corporatist  arrangements  could  be  used  strategically  to  “inject  more 
progressive content into the democratisation process and wrest important concessions 
from reformers and moderates alike”.  Critics of corporatism argued that corporatist 
mechanisms would weaken the working class, entrench capitalism and co-opt leaders 
of the working class (Vally, 1992; Callinicos, 1992; Harris, 1993).
As the corporatist trend continued, McKinley (2003) argued that the Alliance had also 
moved on to similar corporatist terrain and reflected a corporatist tripartite blend of the 
State, capital and labour.  The ANC incorporated the roles of the State and a broad-
based liberation political party, COSATU represented the organised working class and 
the SACP was the ideological keeper of the working class. McKinley (2003) criticised 
this  political  corporatism  for  compromising  the  working  class.  It  had  led  to  the 
persuasion of workers by the leadership of COSATU and the SACP that the unity of 
the Alliance was a crucial objective of working class struggle. Lenin’s arguments can 
explain  the  continued  favour  for  the  existence  of  the  Alliance  by  the  SACP  and 
COSATU. Lenin argued that the efforts of workers alone would achieve trade union 
consciousness17 which  was  limited  and  would  not  result  in  revolutionary  change. 
Socialist  consciousness  could  only  come  from  beyond  the  capitalist-worker  class 
struggle  via  a  revolutionary  party  which  expresses  working  class  consciousness18. 
Lenin argued that the “more rapidly our employers join together in all sorts of societies 
and syndicates, the more urgent does the need for this organization by trades become” 
(1902:198).  
17 Trade union consciousness is  “the conviction that  it  is  necessary to combine in unions,  fight  the 
employers,  and  strive  to  compel  the  government  to  pass  necessary  labour  legislation,  etc”  (Lenin, 
1902:13).
18 For Marxists,  working class consciousness is “the comprehending in struggle of the process through 
which the proletariat develops from its identity as formed by capitalism (the mass of exploited wage-
labourers, the class 'in itself') to the working class organised as a revolutionary force for the taking of 
power and the building of socialism (the class 'for itself')” (Slaughter, 1975:89).
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The continued existence of the Alliance ensured “the political  power and potential 
class positioning of its various leaderships while binding the most powerful political 
force  in  South  Africa,  the  organised  working  class,  to  institutionalised,  politically 
based class compromise and electoral loyalty” (McKinley,  2003). Habib and Taylor 
(1999:115) identified the growing influence of capital at the time and noted that “the 
ANC’s earlier strategic alliance with labour [was being] supplanted with the strategic 
alliance with capital”.  COSATU’s role became increasingly marginalised (Southall, 
2001a).  COSATU’s  paper  Advancing  Social  Transformation adopted  at  the  7th 
National  Congress  in  2000  reflected  accommodation  with  capital.  Ballard,  Habib, 
Valodia and Zuern (2005:620) have noted that over time COSATU’s influence on the 
ANC “has been steadily eroding”
Despite  the  dangers  of  corporatism,  labour  played  a  significant  strategic  role 
throughout the consultation processes via corporatist structures and made significant 
gains. Von Holdt (1993:47) identified the broad policies for macro-economic policy, 
industry  restructuring  and  workplace  reform  put  forward  by  unions  within  these 
structures  as  strategic  unionism.  This  type  of  unionism introduced  a  new type  of 
negotiation during the transition, one that allowed unions to deliberately partake in the 
transition. Labour influenced the transition and took opportunities to access the State 
and influence economic and social policy which had not been possible under apartheid. 
Baskin (2000a) notes that the consultations involving labour took four forms. Firstly, 
COSATU, the most organised component of labour, was able to consult informally 
with the ANC on major governmental decisions via the Alliance. Secondly, there were 
formal consultations with government, parliamentary standing committee and cabinet 
ministers. Thirdly, labour was consulted by governmental and civil society institutions 
on key issues. Fourthly, labour became grafted in more formal and institutionalised 
forms  of  decision-making  between  labour  and  capital,  for  example,  the  tripartist 
National Economic Forum (NEF) and National Manpower Commission (NMC) which 
merged in 1995 to form the corporatist National Economic Development and Labour 
Council  (NEDLAC)19.  Some  of  the  successes  labour  gained  through  consultation 
include, the Labour Relations Act of 1995, the recognition of worker rights under the 
Labour Relations section of the Constitution, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
19 The prime objective of NEDLAC is for organised labour and organised capital to reach consensus and 
conclude agreements on economic and social policy before they get to parliament. Former COSATU 
negotiations co-ordinator Jayendra Naidoo was its first executive director.
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of 1997 and the Employment and Equity Act of 1998 which included provision for 
affirmative  action.  These  accomplishments  have  improved  the  conditions  of 
employment for workers. 
The Labour Relations Act of 1996 introduced the rights and structures (bargaining 
councils  and  workplace  forums)  for  co-determination.  These  institutional  reforms 
introduced by the legislation shifted employment relations from being characterised by 
mistrust  to  being  characterised  by  cooperation.  Buhlungu  (1999)  noted  that  the 
emergence of co-determinist practices in South Africa was a contradictory process and 
that co-determinist  practices presented the labour movement with opportunities and 
challenges.  Opportunities  existed  to  force  back  the  frontier  of  managerial  control 
thereby gaining greater control of the workplace for workers but workers risked the 
institutionalisation of worker struggles and co-option of workers. In order to avoid the 
risks of codetermination, Buhlungu (1999) suggested that unions build their power by 
improving their institutional and structural capacities, increasing union financial self-
sufficiency,  improving  administrative  systems  and  developing  a  clear  strategy  on 
workplace  restructuring.  Critics  of  co-determination  such  as  Barchiesi  (1998)  and 
Lehulere  (1995)  argued  that  worker  participation  in  co-determinist  processes  and 
formations would lead to the institutionalisation of worker struggles and the co-option 
of workers. Lehulere (1995:42) argued 
Co-determination disarms workers because workers give up their right to strike 
on  issues  covered  by  co-determination  agreements.  Co-determination 
undermines the struggle for socialism because, instead of preparing workers for 
the struggle against capitalism, it promotes the idea that capitalism and workers 
have common interests. It therefore leads to the co-option of the working class. 
In their review of post-apartheid South African employment relations in the context of 
corporatism and co-determination since 1994, Donnelly and Dunn (2006:12) observed 
that “the various multilayered institutions and processes have not always developed as 
hoped. In part, this has been due to design flaws, in part, to the response of the parties 
involved”.  They noted the initial  benefits  of corporatism and co-determination  and 
emerging flaws. Business and labour element responses were argued to have ranged 
from cautious approval to complete opposition. Possibly as a consequence of distrust 
and disregard inherited from the apartheid era. They observed that there has been little 
evidence that employers have moved “decisively towards an articulated system that 
33
relies on full engagement with unions nationally and industrially, and legally backed 
employee participation in the workplace” (Donnelly and Dunn, 2006:21). 
NEDLAC, which presented opportunities for weaker groups in society to contribute to 
policy  also  created  a  danger  of  adversarialism  within  social  dialogue  and  “turf 
disputes”  between  NEDLAC  and  parliament  (Donnelly  and  Dunn,  2006:10). 
Consequently,  employer  and  union  representatives  have  displayed  ambivalence 
towards the NEDLAC process and even circumvented it when opportune. Donnelly 
and Dunn (2006) noted that COSATU affiliated unions have considered the Alliance 
route to the ANC as more productive than being bound by chamber decisions that 
might restrict future alternatives. They also noted that employers would withdraw from 
NEDLAC  processes  and  approach  government  informally  especially  concerning 
changes to macroeconomic policy. Generally speaking employment relations reform 
has  been rather  piecemeal  within the  context  of  corporatism and co-determination. 
Donnelly and Dunn (2006)  concluded that  South Africa had performed reasonably 
well  in  terms of  reforming  employment  relations  over  the  last  decade  despite  not 
tackling unemployment well. They proposed that the State’s support would be vital for 
future employment relations reforms. 
2.4.2 Transition to democracy and economic reform
The new government introduced new economic policies to address racial inequalities 
and unemployment from the apartheid era while participating in the global economy. 
Redistributive  policies  were  introduced  to  find  a  balance  between  addressing  the 
legacy of apartheid while participating in the global economy. The Reconstruction and 
Development  Programme  (RDP),  which  was  articulated  by  the  ANC  in  its  1994 
election manifesto, represented the initial policy agenda of government. The Alliance 
partners, mainly COSATU, had contributed to the drafting of the policy framework. 
The  RDP  aimed  at  linking  development  with  economic  growth  and  contained 
Keynesian principles which placed the State at the head of the development process 
(Hassen, 2004b). It was driven by the need to address to address historic inequalities 
and meet basic needs. The RDP was never fully implemented and from 1995, the new 
government began to refocus on state reform as part of its interventionist strategy. 
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In  July  1995,  the  new government  published  The Restructuring  of  State  Assets in 
which  the  state  sector  was  targeted  for  reform.  In  February  1996,  the  National 
Framework  Agreement  on  the  Restructuring  of  State  Assets  (NFA)  was  signed 
between  the  three  union  federations  (COSATU,  FEDUSA  and  NACTU)  and  the 
Government  of  National  Unity  (GNU)  represented  by  the  Ministry  of  Public 
Enterprises. This consultative agreement provided the plan for restructuring particular 
state assets (South Africa Forestry Company (SAFCOL), Telkom and Sun Air) within 
the  mandate  of  NEDLAC.  In  June  1996,  government  introduced  the  Growth, 
Employment  and  Redistribution  policy  (GEAR)  and  this  signalled  a  shift  by 
government  towards  neo-liberal  policy.  The  introduction  of  the  programme  was 
propelled by the need to stabilise economic growth. However, GEAR was reflective of 
neo-liberal principles in contrast to the RDP. GEAR proposed a reduction of the public 
sector based on the motivation that a large public sector would “crowd out” the private 
sector. It promoted the privatisation of state assets in order to raise funds for service 
delivery and debt reduction (Department of Finance, 1996). 
The reasons  for  the  introduction  of  GEAR were  debated by many scholars.  Some 
argued that it was a consequence of domestically entrenched structures of economic 
power (Swatuk, 1999), “elite pacting” (Bond, 2000), the “governmentalising” of the 
RDP  (Gotz,  2000)  and  the  effect  of  neo-liberal  discourse  of  the  “trans-national 
managerial  class”  (Kunnie,  2000).  Others  argued  that  it  was  linked  to  the  “petit-
bourgeois” character of the ANC and the externalised nature of the liberation struggle 
(McKinley,  1997).  GEAR  became  a  controversial  topic  between  labour  and 
government  and  between  the  Alliance  partners.  Intense  debates  often  reached  the 
public arena. 
In  1997,  COSATU  published  An  Alliance  Programme  for  Socio-Economic  
Transformation in which it argued that the RDP should remain the programme of the 
Alliance and strategies for its implementation found. COSATU pursued a number of 
campaigns  during  which it  predicted  what  it  perceived  as  the  inevitable  failure  of 
GEAR and the negative effects of the policy on workers. The SACP acknowledged 
that GEAR caused tensions between the Alliance partners. It encouraged debates on 
economic policy but appeared to take a cautious approach to confronting the ANC led 
government  on  GEAR while  it  acknowledged  that  GEAR corresponded  with  neo-
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liberal  orthodoxy  (McKinley,  2003).  Out  of  all  the  Alliance  partners,  the  ANC 
appeared optimistic that the direction chosen by government to pursue GEAR would 
produce social and economic benefits. Towards the 1999 elections, the ANC received 
the support of the SACP and COSATU despite the tensions caused by GEAR. When 
addressing the question “Why vote ANC?”, the SACP stated in an election publication 
that it had not “conveniently forgotten” about GEAR (SACP, 1999). Instead, it argued 
that  there  had  been  constructive  debate  within  the  Alliance  about  GEAR  and 
encouraged workers to “keep the macro-economic debate open” and support the RDP 
via supporting the ANC (SACP, 1999). By 2000 GEAR had not created the anticipated 
400  000  jobs,  achieved  6%  sustainable  annual  growth  or  created  100  000  new 
municipal level jobs associated with new infrastructure investment (Bond, 2000). It 
was argued to have been a  major contributing factor  to  job decreases  (McDonald, 
2002). According to Hassen (2001) and many others, GEAR had not successfully met 
its objectives. Nevertheless, some argue that GEAR created room for fiscal expansion 
from 2001 through its fiscal consolidation after it was introduced.
After the 1999 elections, various authors wrote on consolidating democracy in South 
Africa  (Lodge,  1999)  and  questioned whether  a  weakening  trade  union movement 
would reverse consolidation as labour seemed to be playing a less influential role in 
formulating government economic policy (Adler and Webster, 2000). Other authors 
recognised  and  wrote  on  tensions  within  the  Alliance  after  the  transition  period 
(Southall,  2001a:80-86;  Southall,  2001b;  Buhlungu,  1997:71-78;  Rees,  2002:83-84; 
Habib and Taylor, 1999:112-119; Southall and Wood, 1999:121-124). 
From 2001, the government has taken a more expansionary fiscal20 position because of 
optimism  about  the  country’s  economic  growth  projections.  The  programmes 
government has embarked on since 2001 are reflective of this. In 2003, government 
announced the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and in February 2006, the 
government  announced  the  Accelerated  Shared  Growth  Initiative  for  South  Africa 
(ASGI-SA).  The EPWP is  an  initiative  that  involves  producing work  and training 
opportunities for unemployed people using public expenditure in its first five years 
(that is, until 2008). It is a programme that 
20 Expansionary fiscal policy involves a reduction in taxes, an increase in government spending or a 
combination of both.
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cuts across all departments and spheres of government. Under the EPWP, all 
government bodies and parastatals are required to make a systematic effort to 
target the unskilled unemployed. They must formulate plans for utilising their 
budgets so as to draw significant numbers of the unemployed into productive 
work in such a way that workers gain skills while they work, so increasing their 
chances  of  getting  out  of  the  marginalised  pool  of  unemployed  people 
(Expanded Works Programme).
The ASGI aims to increase the economic growth of the country between 6% and 8% 
by 2014 in two phases. ASGI-SA has identified six sets of initiatives: infrastructure 
programmes, macroeconomic issues, sector investment strategies, skills and education 
initiatives,  second  economy  interventions  and  public  sector  administration  issues 
(South African National Government, 2006). The initiatives have not been extensively 
debated within the Tripartite Alliance although COSATU and SACP representatives 
have cautioned the ANC led government about the programmes. 
2.5 The Alliance and working class politics
Union-party alliances have been a common feature in many countries and South Africa 
has not been an exception (Webster, 2002). Historically, many trade unions in South 
Africa  strategically  linked  themselves  to  political  parties  as  well  as  community 
organisations  during  the  national  liberation  struggle  to  enhance  their  influence  in 
society. In the 1950s, a firm alliance between the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions  (SACTU)  and  the  ANC was  formed  via  the  Congress  Alliance21.  SACTU 
participated  in  numerous  political  campaigns  and was  a  clear  example  of  political 
unionism. Although SACTU was suppressed by government and forced underground, 
its activities created ties between union members and the ANC, familiarised unions 
with participation in political alliances and the growing conflict between national and 
working class  struggles.  By the 1980s,  working-class  politics  was characterised by 
radical social movement unionism as trade unions engaged in popular struggles (Von 
Holdt, 2005). 
Social movement unionism or political unionism “attempts to link production to wider 
political issues. It is a form of union organisation that facilitates an active engagement 
in  factory-based,  production  politics  and  in  community  and  state  power  issues.  It 
engages in alliances in order to establish relationship with political organisations on a 
21 Congress Alliance organisations included the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the 
South African Coloured People’s Organisation (SACPO), the South African Congress of Democrats 
(SACOD) and SACTU.
37
systematic basis” (Lambert and Webster, 1988:21). Workers in the workplace forged 
alliances  with working-class communities  to  fight against  apartheid oppression and 
capitalist  exploitation.  The  main  intention  was  to  escape  the  same  drawbacks  to 
longevity experienced by labour in history, namely apartheid oppression and capitalist 
exploitation (Pillay, 2006:169). In 1983 the populist United Democratic Front (UDF) 
was  formed  comprising  a  range  of  many  local  anti-apartheid  organisations  that 
emerged after the Soweto uprising in 1976. Controversy around the UDF began and 
unions had to decide whether to join or not join this political movement. Some small 
community based unions unaffiliated to FOSATU joined the UDF immediately but 
FOSATU, the General Workers Union and the Food and Canning Workers Union did 
not. 
A  workerist  and  populist  division  became  apparent.  Workerist  unions  refused  to 
affiliate to the UDF but made it clear that they were not withdrawing from political 
action or opposed to the movement. The General Workers Union, for instance, argued 
that  unions  were  influential  because  they  represented  the  views  and  mandate  of 
members in contrast to many community organisations that did not have or need such a 
mandate because they represented generalised interest groups. The General Workers 
Union also argued that it was a single class organisation while the UDF was a multi-
class and affiliating to the UDF would be difficult (Plaut, 1992). The Municipal and 
General  Workers  Union,  for  example,  held  a  populist  perspective  and  became  an 
affiliate of the UDF. The union argued that the nature of apartheid was discriminatory 
not only to workers but a broad range of people. Therefore it was the “duty” of the 
union “to be part  of the struggle for freedom and justice”  (Municipal  and General 
Workers Union, 1983). 
Following a series of discussions within the labour movement, COSATU was founded 
in  1985.  Soon  after  the  formation  of  COSATU,  intense  debate  within  the  labour 
movement surfaced over how to best relate to the ANC and its allies and a Worker 
Charter (Plaut, 1992). Strong ties of solidarity formed between COSATU, ANC and 
SACP  members  through  the  liberation  struggle  (Buhlungu  and  Psoulis,  1999). 
Buhlungu  and  Psoulis  (1999:121)  noted  that  the  liberation  struggle  had  two 
dimensions: the individual and collective. “Individuals involved in this struggle shared 
a  commitment  to  liberation  and freedom … But  the resistance  was simultaneously 
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about the collective affirmation of new values namely democracy and non-racialism” 
(Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999:121). They further noted that a distinct “us” and “them” 
culture developed to distinguish those that contributed to the struggle (us) and those 
perceived  as  anti-liberation  (them).  Participants  of  the  struggle  shared  common 
interests  and  strong  bonds  of  solidarity  developed  within  and  among  the  struggle 
partners in the Tripartite Alliance (Buhlungu and Psoulis, 1999). The historic bonds of 
solidarity where carried into the transition process.
After the ANC, SACP and PAC were unbanned in 1990 unions were undecided as to 
which political path to follow if any. Tensions and debates over continuing alliances 
continued to grow. Plaut (1992:399) highlighted that “the unions were faced with a 
dilemma,  as  a  number of officials  became increasingly active within the emerging 
political parties,  using time and resources to build the movements  they supported”. 
Wilton Mkwayi, a trade unionist, an ANC leader and commander of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe stated “We used to say when organising people, that you cannot be a good trade 
unionist if you do not belong to the ANC, and as a worker, you cannot be a good ANC 
member if you do not belong to a trade union. So, there was a link there” (SALB, 
1989:24). This wearing of “two hats” (union and political) as it were, caused a range of 
difficulties between and within unions. During that time, Jeremy Cronin, a Communist 
Party leader, argued that the country was “in a complicated transition period, whose 
outcome [was] far from clear … the most critical organisational task [was] to build a 
powerful, mass-based, democratic and fighting ANC” (Cronin, 1991). 
COSATU union affiliates maintained their support for the ANC despite the uncertainty 
of the transition. A number of critical debates over the Alliance took place before the 
1994  democratic  elections.  In  1993  the  National  Union  of  Metalworkers  (NUM) 
resolved  at  its  Congress  that  once  an  Interim Government  of  National  Unity  was 
established, it should not pursue a formal alliance with the ANC (Mayekiso, 1993: 21). 
The South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union, (SACTWU), the third largest 
union at  the time,  also took a similar  position in a  report  to  its  Congress  (SALB, 
1993:21-23). Its leadership recommended an end to alliance politics from the 28th April 
1994. They feared that the union movement would be reduced to being a labour wing 
of  government,  that  democratic  practices  would  be  “lobbyist”  and  that  the  labour 
movement would be split over which political party to ally with. That same year the 
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ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance in response to this culminating anxiety released a paper 
stating their joint strategy to maintain the Tripartite Alliance as a formal coalition. Part 
of the document read as follows: 
An  ANC  cut  loose  from  independent  working  class  formations…would 
become ever more susceptible to the pressure of governmental office, and to 
the influence of non-popular strata, inside its ranks and beyond…A trade union 
movement  that confines itself to meeting the ANC only as ‘the government 
across the negotiating table’ risks falling into narrow, economist unionism…An 
SACP ‘going it alone’ risks becoming a grievance party, a marginalised force. 
(SALB, 1993:22).
This  affirmation  seemed  to  transiently  dispel  discussions  around  discontinuing  the 
Alliance.  Despite  the  ambivalence  amongst  affiliates,  COSATU  continued  in  the 
Alliance and selected 20 of its leaders to be included in the 1994 national elections. 
These  leaders  included  Jay  Naidoo  (general  secretary,  COSATU),  Alec  Erwin 
(education secretary, NUMSA), Marcel Golding (assistant general secretary, NUM), 
Moses Mayekiso (general secretary, NUM) and Thabadiawa (Sydney) Mufamadi (first 
vice-president,  POTWA).  One  imminent  question  that  stood  to  be  answered  was 
whether these people could exert a working class bias in the new parliament (Von 
Holdt, 1993:19). 
After 1994, shifts by the ANC led government towards neo-liberal economic policy 
resulted in more apparent tensions between the Alliance partners. In 1997 COSATU 
released  An  Alliance  Programme  for  Socio-Economic  Transformation in  which 
COSATU leaders  acknowledged  that  there  was  “a  general  demobilisation  … most 
activists [were] no longer sure what the strategic objectives [were] … [and] there [was] 
very little participation and involvement in decision and policy making … the Alliance 
itself [had] no programme” (COSATU, 1997:3). Ironically, then general secretary of 
COSATU, Sam Shilowa emphasized that “The Alliance remains relevant…As long as 
progressive forces have a clear agenda, there is no possibility of the Alliance withering 
away” (Shilowa,  1997:73).  Gostner  and  Buhlungu  (1996:44)  observed  that  the 
Alliance  had  been  a  “strategic  resource”  in  attaining  significant  changes  (social, 
political and legislative) for the working class. 
As South Africa experienced a trend towards corporatism and institutionalised class 
struggle,  Southall  and Wood (1999:80)  argued that  the  way to continue  extending 
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worker rights and pro-poor policies was for COSATU to remain in the Alliance, using 
mass  action,  parliamentary  lobbying  and forming coalitions  with  other  progressive 
forces. The ANC government would then be kept accountable and the threat of capital 
interests overtaking subdued. Gostner and Buhlungu (1996) suggested the allies put up 
with the tensions and discover new methods of strengthening the partnership especially 
at local levels, which had proven to be the weakest. Habib and Taylor (1999) identified 
the Alliance as a possible threat to democracy.  They argued for a fracturing of the 
Alliance  to  enhance  the  prospects  of  democratic  consolidation  (Habib  and Taylor, 
1999:118).  Speaking  in  his  own  capacity,  Phahla,  a  CEPPWAWU  shop  steward, 
argued that the Alliance had lost its relevance (Rees, 2002). McKinley (2003) argued 
that the Alliance weakened COSATU’s ability to fully engage in the working class 
struggles.  Habib  and Taylor  (2001:59)  held  that  “the  Tripartite  Alliance  ha[d]  not 
enabled COSATU and the SACP to imprint a developmentalist political economy on 
the post-apartheid ANC government. They should therefore now consider establishing 
an independent political force capable of advancing such a goal”. 
Tensions  seemed  to  peak  in  2002  when  President  Mbeki  criticised  “ultra-leftists” 
(Mbeki,  2002) in COSATU and the SACP prior a  two-day anti-privatisation strike 
planned by COSATU. Mbeki argued that they wanted “to transform [the] continuing 
national  democratic  struggle  into  an  offensive  for  the  victory  of  the  socialist 
revolution” (Mbeki,  2002).  Despite  the tensions in 2002, COSATU and the SACP 
went on to support the ANC at national elections in 2004 and remained in the Alliance. 
Some COSATU leaders publicly acknowledged that an ANC-led Alliance was relevant 
for  the  labour  movement  (Mantashe,  2003a  and  2003b).  COSATU’s  post-2004 
election CEC political discussion paper viewed the election victory of the ANC as a 
“working class victory” (COSATU, 2004a). From 2004, there was a renewed effort to 
mend the Alliance relationship. COSATU has begun a series of meetings to ensure 
productive relationships with government at all levels. COSATU recognised that the 
Alliance  was  “central”  to  transformation  and  should  be  strengthened  to  drive  the 
process (COSATU, 2004b) and the SACP noted that the Alliance would commit to 
workers  and  the  poor  (Cronin,  2004).  The  “perceived  shift  in  the  ANC  and  the 
government has boosted hopes within COSATU and the SACP that a working-class 
politics can indeed be pursued within the context of the Tripartite Alliance” (Pillay, 
2006:183). After an Alliance summit, COSATU president Willie Madisha declared the 
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unity of the Alliance partners and stated that “The Alliance is crucial because it brings 
together progressive forces from across society” (Sunday Independent, 2005:8). In a 
publication titled the Alliance programme of action 2005, the Alliance maintained that 
the ANC should govern on the basis of a broad mandate detailed in the RDP and ANC 
election manifesto and that the policies and programmes of the Alliance be aimed at 
giving expression to the RDP and election manifesto objectives (ANC homepage). 
2.6 Contemporary COSATU Worker Challenges and Political Attitudes
In 1994 and 1998 surveys were conducted among COSATU workers in the Gauteng, 
KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape and Western Cape provinces on their political attitudes. 
These surveys became known as the Taking Democracy Seriously surveys22 and they 
revealed a high level of support for the ANC and the Alliance. Despite the introduction 
of neo-liberal economic policies by government and the accommodation of capital by 
labour  most  COSATU workers  believed that  the  Alliance should continue to  exist 
(Psoulis,  1999; Satgar and Jardin, 1999). According to Satgar and Jardin (1999:10) 
82% of members surveyed supported the Alliance in 1994 and in 1998 70% felt the 
Alliance was the best way to safeguard worker interests in government.  
The publication Trade Unions and Democracy: COSATU workers’ political attitudes  
in South Africa presents a recent study on the contemporary challenges for the working 
class post-apartheid and identifies the political attitudes of COSATU workers. It was 
the  third  stage  of  a  time-series  study  of  COSATU  workers’  attitude  towards 
parliamentary democracy and is also known as the  2004 COSATU Worker Survey 23. 
The survey revealed that COSATU members had generally become more critical over 
the last decade. Within the publication Trade Unions and Democracy, authors discuss 
pertinent issues. Amongst these, the growing informalisation of work (Webster, 2006), 
black  economic  empowerment  (Southall  and  Tangri,  2006)  and  union  and 
parliamentary  democracy  (Cherry  and  Southall,  2006)  are  noteworthy.  Generally 
speaking, these contemporary issues have had a bearing on the criticisms of COSATU 
workers. 
22 These were the first two surveys of a time series study of COSATU workers attitudes towards 
parliamentary democracy.
23 This survey was the third phase of a times series study of COSATU workers attitudes towards 
parliamentary democracy.
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Webster (2006) highlighted the challenges created for the working class because of the 
liberalisation  of  the  economy and the  informalisation  of  work.  These  factors  have 
impacted employment and the labour movement. The restructuring of work to reduce 
labour costs has led to several retrenchments and the subcontracting of various jobs. 
This has led to new forms of informal work by people to gain an income. Webster 
(2006:23)  described  the  employment  status  of  most  of  the  new  working  poor  as 
“transitional”,  that  is,  moving  from  employment  and  self-employment  into 
unemployment. Casual and low paid jobs and self-employment have increased. With 
this, Webster (2006:23) argued that a “crisis of representation for organised labour” 
has developed. As Webster (2006:23) noted “trade union rights do not exist for the 
new working  poor,  so  the  new labour  relations  system does  not  represent  them”. 
COSATU has attempted to respond to this  crisis  by adopting recommendations  to 
organise  flexible  workers  and  some  unions  have  made  attempts  to  organise  these 
workers (Webster, 2006). 
Southall and Tangri (2006) discussed the different approaches the ANC and COSATU 
have to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). While the ANC has embraced the need 
for  skills  development,  it  has  centred  BEE on the  formation  of  “a  capital-owning 
‘patriotic’ black bourgeoisie and black capture of control of the commanding heights 
of the economy” (Southall and Tangri, 2006:138). COSATU on the other hand has 
held  a  more  radical  vision  of  empowerment,  one  which  focuses  less  on  black 
capitalism and more on “a collectivised economy in which working class concerns 
predominate” (Buhlungu, 2006:17). In considering the findings of the 2004 COSATU 
Worker Survey,  Southall  and Tangri (2006) noted that COSATU workers and their 
leaders  prioritised  skills  development  over  ownership  of  capital.  The  difference 
between COSATU and the ANC’s vision of BEE has caused some suspicion within 
COSATU  and  the  Alliance  about  the  ANC’s  approach.  As  opportunities  for 
empowerment  have  increased,  government  and  unions  have  become  increasingly 
willing to invest strategically in developmental projects and encourage empowerment. 
The commercial ventures of the government have involved the awarding of tenders 
and contracts  to persons.  With the ANC as the majority  party,  the introduction of 
commercial interests within government has caused some contradictions. For example, 
according to Financial Mail (2007:3), in Kimberley,  Mr. Motsamai Rantho and Mr. 
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Tshego Motaung (former civil  servants) were at  some point business partners with 
ANC  provincial  chairman  Mr.  John  Block.  Many  ANC  members  have  become 
involved in business  and the ANC has  been alleged to deploy “ANC comrades to 
business”  (Financial  Mail,  2007:3).  In  an  organisational  report  at  the  2005  ANC 
National General Council Mr. Motlanthe warned that the increasing participation of 
ANC members in business was affecting the party and relations within the Alliance 
(Financial Mail, 2007:3). 
Unions have not  been immune to accummulationist  tendencies.  After 1994, unions 
including  COSATU  affiliates  (for  example,  SACTWU,  SARHWU  and  NUMSA) 
began exploring company investments as an additional strategy to attain worker and 
union economic empowerment for social development. Union investment companies 
brought with them difficulties for working class solidarity. Union investments aimed to 
benefit  workers  based  on  good  returns.  However,  good  returns  are  attainable  if 
companies  are  profitable.  Given  the  growing  influence  of  neoliberal  strategies  to 
improve the competitive advantage of companies to increase profit, measures such as 
sub-contracting  and  down-sizing  would  be  included.  Neoliberalism  is  a  complex 
ideology and political project and it has had varied outcomes in countries where it has 
been  implemented.  Defining  the  term  is  not  a  straightforward  process  because  it 
represents  “a  complex  assemblage  of  ideological  commitments,  discursive 
representations  and  institutional  practices,  all  propagated  by  highly  specific  class 
alliances  and  organised  at  multiple  geographical  scales”  (McCarthy  and  Prudham, 
2004: 275). Neoliberalism is generally accepted as a political movement that supports 
economic liberalism as  a  way of  encouraging economic  development  and assuring 
political  freedom.  The neoliberal  package includes  reducing  taxes  and government 
spending; removing tariffs and other obstacles to trade; lessening regulations of labour 
markets, financial markets and the environment; and directing macroeconomic policies 
to control inflation rather than accelerate the growth of jobs (Pollin, 2003:53). These 
measures  are  argued  to  often  have  a  negative  effect  on  worker  benefits  and  job 
security. The South African Labour Bulletin (1996) noted:
Through the investment companies,  unions are becoming intimately tied up 
with company management…unionism is not about making money. It is about 
social issues, about worker solidarity at plant, industry and national levels to 
improve living and working conditions. Commercial values tend to squeeze out 
union values.
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Following the  findings  of  the  2004 COSATU Worker  Survey,  Southall  and Tangri 
(2006)  noted  that  most  union  investment  companies  that  have  linked  up  with 
established and empowerment capital have been struggling. A major concern has been 
how  union  investment  finance  is  becoming  enmeshed  with  established  corporate 
capital and how this has assisted former trade unionists become very wealthy (Southall 
and Tangri, 2006). Southall and Tangri (2006) proposed that union investments need a 
clear political strategy and policy guidelines to play a meaningful role in improving the 
lives of workers. 
After examining COSATU worker attitudes in the context of improved unity within 
the  Alliance,  Cherry  and  Southall  (2006)  revealed  that  the  political  attitudes  of 
COSATU workers had remained largely constant over the first decade of democracy. 
There had only been marginal changes since the 1994 and 1998  Taking Democracy 
Seriously surveys (Cherry and Southall, 2006). COSATU workers remained largely 
supportive of the ANC and Alliance. In the previous 1994 and 1998 surveys, 75% of 
COSATU  workers  surveyed  expressed  their  preference  of  the  ANC  for  national 
elections. In 2004, 74% of COSATU workers indicated that they intended on voting 
for the ANC in the 2004 elections (Cherry and Southall, 2006). Support for the ANC 
according to province24:  North West province (98%), Gauteng (81%), Eastern Cape 
(79%),  Western  Cape  (59%)  and  KwaZulu  Natal  (61%).  Worker  reasons  for 
supporting the ANC strongly mirrored COSATU leadership reasons for supporting the 
ANC in the 2004 elections. 76% of workers surveyed from different sectors believed 
that the ANC had worker interests in mind. The survey revealed that there had been a 
decline in worker confidence in the ANC as a party compared to 91% in 1994 and 80% 
in  1999.  However  no  other  party  had strongly  attracted  COSATU workers’  votes. 
Cherry and Southall (2006:82) noted that: 
While three-quarters of COSATU workers continue to identify with the ANC, 
they are not offering it a free hand…they retain their doubts about either the 
capacity or will of political parties to represent their cause, and they continue to 
insist that they need trade unions to protect their interests.
The  2004  survey  revealed  that  COSATU  worker  support  for  the  Alliance  has 
decreased noticeably over the years. 66% surveyed in 2004 suggested that the Alliance 
was the best way to safeguard worker interests in Parliament compared to 82% in 1994 
24 The lower voting preference in the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal provinces could be attributed to 
the loss of ANC control in the 1994 and 1999 elections.
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and 70% in 1998. 18% in 2004 felt that COSATU should not be politically aligned 
compared to 15% in 1994 and 14% in 1998. “This perhaps reflects the tensions around 
policy debates filtering down to shop-floor level, and the criticisms of the Alliance by 
COSATU leadership similarly being reflected in worker attitudes” (Cherry, 2006:155). 
Cherry  and  Southall  (2006:79)  argued  that  the  figures  indicated  growing 
disenchantment with COSATU’s intimate relationship with the ANC as the party has 
increasingly marginalised the federation. Also, some noted that former trade unionist 
MPs had not significantly advanced worker interests using their “two hats” (unionist 
and  political).  The  2004 survey  questioned  workers  on  whether  COSATU and  its 
affiliates  should send representatives  to national  parliament  and whether  COSATU 
should send representatives to provincial parliaments and/or local government. Despite 
the problematic relationship between former trade unionist MPs and COSATU, 88% 
responded positively to the former question and 86% responded positively to the latter. 
Workers  did  not  perceive  an  alternative  means  of  getting  their  leadership  into 
government  (Cherry  and  Southall,  2006:87).  By  and  large,  COSATU  workers 
continued to see the Alliance as facilitating worker interests in Parliament, provincial 
assemblies and local councils. Although COSATU workers displayed a high level of 
support  for  the ANC and Tripartite  Alliance in the context  of  socio-economic and 
political  complexities,  “they  simultaneously  retain[ed]  firm  beliefs  that  electoral 
support  should be conditional  upon those bodies delivering on their  promises,  that 
democracy should be participatory, that parties and unions should be accountable to 
their members,  and that the ANC should represent both national and working class 
interests” (Buhlungu et al, 2006:204).
Overall the 2004 survey findings “indicated slowly changing perceptions of the ANC 
as a ruling party, and how COSATU as an organisation should relate to it” (Buhlungu, 
Southall  and Webster,  2006:204).  Most  COSATU workers  preferred  the ANC and 
believed  that  there  is  and  should  be  an  “organic  family  relationship”  between 
COSATU and the ANC and most believed that the two organisations shared interests 
and values bound by their mutual experience (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206). Ultimately, 
“for  the  moment  COSATU  workers  incline  strongly  to  the  view  that  the 
ANC/COSATU relationship is natural to the South African landscape and is worth 
maintaining, even if … the ANC’s domination of COSATU is becoming increasingly 
abusive” (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206).
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2.7 Industrial Relations in the South African Public Sector
According to Buhlungu (2003:186) “the labour movement  confronts a dramatically 
altered political economy. It has had, consequently, to revise notions of ‘the enemy’ 
and  ‘the  oppressor’  and  to  modify  its  attitude  to  both  the  State  and  employers” 
(Buhlungu, 2003:186). Post-apartheid South African Industrial Relations exist within a 
complex  transforming  political  and  economic  context.  The  public  sector  has 
experienced the most changes. The South African public sector was, for the most part, 
a hidden sector (Friedman, 1987) and research into public sector Industrial Relations 
was  not  as  extensive  as  that  on  the  private  sector.  Until  the  1980s,  public  sector 
research  analysed  institutional  matters,  such  as  growth  or  decline  of  public  sector 
employment or public services (Commission for Administration, 1982; Department of 
Manpower reports).  The historic relationship between the State and public servants 
operated within a highly totalitarian environment,  which impacted generally on the 
writings on public sector Industrial Relations. Golding (1985a:40) quoted a Regional 
Director of the Commission for Administration (CFA) speaking on State affairs at the 
time as stating “In the State information is confidential not secret”. Golding (1985a) 
clarifies  that  this  statement  summed  up  the  problems  in  obtaining  comprehensive 
information on internal State strategies in respect of its employees during that period. 
The existing literature can nonetheless be divided between different periods, because 
significant episodes in history affected the attention afforded to the public sector.  
From the  1980s  frustrated  public  servants  became less  tolerant  of  the  methods  of 
management used by the State. Literature on public sector Industrial Relations from 
the 1980s to the early 1990s records massive strike activity  in the railway, postal, 
education, municipal and health sectors and a very volatile relationship between the 
State and public sector unions (Roux, 1989; Golding, 1985b; Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies 1989 and 1990; Roux, 1990; Bethlehem and Labour Bulletin correspondent, 
1991; Vadi, 1993; Labour Research Service, 1991; Keet, 1992; Cooper, 1990; Pillay, 
1990). Public sector union affiliates of COSATU, such as the South African Railway 
and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU), the Post Offices and Telecommunications 
Workers  Association  (POTWA)  and  the  National  Education,  Health  and  Allied 
Workers  Union (NEHAWU) were  the  most  organised  and led  the  majority  of  the 
strikes. Most of the strikes centred on trade union recognition, wages and conditions of 
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service. Although employers often responded harshly or blatantly refused to negotiate 
with these unions, which were largely Black unions, public servants used the “new 
political space” to organise themselves and take advantage of the new situation that 
would see some political, economic and social demands heeded (Roux, 1990). 
Debates around the new challenges for the public sector intensified as shifts in macro 
and  micro  economic  policy  occurred.  Writing  after  the  introduction  of  the  GEAR 
policy, Rix and Jardine (1996) argued that the privatisation of State assets would not 
provide the “radical change” needed in the South Africa public sector. Rix and Jardine 
believe  “the  corporate  sector  [could]  only  be  trusted  to  provide  advice  aimed  at 
advancing its own interests” (1996:78). With the introduction of proposals for public 
sector cutbacks, the future of the relationship between public sector unions and the 
State was uncertain. Collins (1995:19) noted that the cutbacks had “the potential to 
create  severe  discord  between  government  and  the  public  sector  union”.  Collins’ 
(1995) observation on labour relations during that period was that government would 
need to end unilateral decisions and public sector unions would need to devote their 
time  and  resources  to  equipping  themselves  to  deal  with  critical  issues.  Dexter 
(1994:34) emphasised that “unions in the public service [would] have to change from a 
purely oppositional role to one of a sophisticated strategy of challenging, supporting or 
ignoring the new government where necessary”.
Literature on the South African public sector and public sector unions has focused on a 
spectrum  of  matters,  with  an  ostensible  focus  being  on  matters  concerning  the 
restructuring of State assets. Public service reform and its effects, in particular, have 
been a major point of contention (Naidoo, 2005). Nonetheless, neo-liberal plans have 
persisted, and continued to strain relations between the State and public servants. The 
restructuring of the public sector changed workplace dynamics (SALB, 2003; Keet, 
1999)  and  there  has  been  evidence  of  growing  interest  in  investigations  into 
understanding public sector Industrial Relations at varying levels in a South African 
context. Adler et al. (2000) address pertinent contemporary matters affecting public 
sector  labour  relations,  at  national  and provincial  state  departments.  These  matters 
include labour relations during the apartheid era (Posel, 2000), the constraints to public 
service  unionism  (Macun  and  Psoulis,  2000),  changing  labour  relations  in  the 
education sector (Garson, 2000) and public service bargaining (Baskin, 2000a). 
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With reference to the education sector, Garson (2000) noted that the domestic political 
terrain presented new challenges for teacher unions and the way they organise and 
relate to each other.  SADTU, for example, the biggest teachers’ union, has had its 
affiliation  to  COSATU  questioned.  Garson  (2000)  discovered  that  relationships 
between former SADTU officials in government and SADTU had increased suspicions 
that the union was “cuddling up to government” and that “the closer its officials are to 
the  corridors  of  power,  the  less  interest  they  have  in  ordinary  teachers’  working 
conditions”  (Garson,  2000:226).  SADTU  and  other  public  sector  affiliates  of 
COSATU face the challenge of shifts of former comrades in labour to government. 
The sharp distinction between government and labour is now vague, especially when 
one considers the Alliance and the interconnectedness of relationships that developed 
in history. In an article on the controversy around a restructuring agreement signed in 
2000  between  public  service  unions  and  government,  SALB (2003)  observed  that 
relations between the public service unions and the new government were “difficult”. 
The observations highlighted, for instance, that “the leadership of the COSATU unions 
found themselves on the other side of the table to their former comrades” (SALB, 
2003:9), comrades with whom they shared a history.
In September 2004, more than 700 000 public service workers went on strike again, 
but not before the state declared a formal dispute at the PSCBC after several meetings 
over salary increases. Hassen (2004a:56) noted two prospects of such a rare action for 
unions.  Firstly,  they could legally go on strike action and secondly, they had little 
alternative  for  resolving the  dispute.  The unions  claimed  that  the  declaration  of  a 
dispute by the State was an apparent act of bad faith. They went on a one day strike to 
show their frustration with the 5.5% pay increase offer by the State (Mtolo, 2004:54). 
The dispute was resolved with a wage agreement and new salary scales being set for 
workers (PSCBC, 2004). After observing the September 2004 public service workers 
strike and the wage negotiation process, Mtolo (2004:55) suggested:
If the leadership of a COSATU affiliate prefers an arm’s length relationship 
with the ANC while the other prefers a closer one, it is likely that the former 
will hold back and not go out on strike. This is not so much because of support 
for the ruling party, but rather concerns that the latter might convince members 
that the final agreement will not be significantly different from what was on the 
table before the strike. This could affect future union elections, as members 
will lose confidence in the ruling union leadership.
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Mtolo  (2004:55)  added that  “one  would  be  stupid  in  failing  to  speculate  how the 
relationship  [employment]  is  managed  between  Alliance  members  … the  Alliance 
does play a role in facilitating an agreement”. According to her observation, the public 
service strike bore “no reflection on the nature and intensity of the relationship with 
the Alliance” but did indicate that it was “about the internal relationships within the 
trade union parties, the power relations and survival strategies for those in, or aspiring 
towards future [union] leadership” (Mtolo, 2004:56).
2.8 Conclusion
The maintenance of industrial peace to ensure steady productivity has been a chief 
objective  within  industry  whether  in  the  private  or  public  sphere.  Without  sound 
Industrial Relations and procedures through which consensus on pivotal decisions is 
attained, the workplace as we know it would have a significantly different expression. 
Various authors have contributed to the field of Industrial Relations by attempting to 
understand  the  “labour  problem”  and  the  nature  of  employment  relations  at  the 
workplace  (Barbash,  1993a:68-75  and  Barbash,  1993b).  While  these  contributions 
have been influential to contributing to conceptualising Industrial Relations, they have 
focused on the private sector. The unique experience of the public sector needs to be 
taken into account as noted by Beaumont (1992). With regard to the South African 
case, the transition to democracy brought about significant changes to the political, 
economic  and  social  spheres.  Research  on  South  African  public  sector  Industrial 
Relations has yet to reach great depth. Given that Industrial Relations theory depicts 
management and labour entities as separate entities and South Africa’s case reveals 
that  the  Alliance  has  linked  part  management  and  part  of  labour,  research  into 
contemporary  South  African  public  sector  Industrial  Relations  is  necessary.  This 
research  makes  a  contribution  to  understanding local  level  public  sector  Industrial 
Relations in South Africa, which has a unique form and pressures associated with the 
Alliance. Given the increasingly complex nature of the environment that public sector 
unions find themselves in, it would be valuable to investigate this area. 
The following chapter provides coverage on the methodology used in this research.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This  chapter  details  the  research  methods  employed  during  the  study.  Different 
methods  were  used  at  different  stages  of  the  research.  The  aims  of  the  research, 
research design, data collection techniques, data analysis  techniques and limitations 
and sources of error in the research elaborated.
3.2 Aims of this research
According  to  Yin  (1994)  there  are  three  possible  classifications  of  research: 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Exploratory research is designed to “explore” 
a phenomenon. It aims to gather as much information as possible on a specific problem 
on which knowledge is inconclusive or not well known. Interviews tend to be best 
suited  for  this  classification.  Descriptive  research  is  intended  to  describe  various 
phenomena from which empirical generalisations are developed. It is better suited for a 
clearly  structured  problem  where  there  is  no  intention  to  investigate  cause-effect 
relations. Explanatory research is aimed at developing a precise theory that can be used 
to explain empirical generalisations. Yin (1994) specifies that a study is explanatory 
when it focuses on cause-effect relationships.
This  study  was  primarily  exploratory.  It  aimed  to  understand  the  post-apartheid 
industrial relations situation for public sector union SAMWU at a case study in the 
context of its affiliation to the Alliance. According to Yin (1989), defining the research 
question is  perhaps the most critical  step to be taken in a research study.  For this 
reason, the research questions addressed in the course of the study were specified as 
follows:
1. How  do  managers  interpret  their  role  as  employers  as  opposed  to  party 
members who may belong to the same party branch as SAMWU members?
2. How  do  SAMWU  representatives  represent  municipal  workers  in  the 
bargaining arena (which is  adversarial  in nature) yet  maintain a cooperative 
relationship with the ANC via the Alliance?
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3. Has  the  Alliance  changed  the  situation  for  SAMWU  to  mobilise  against 
municipalities?
4. What have been the effects of the political alliance of SAMWU with the ANC 
via COSATU on the ways in which shop-floor matters are dealt with?
3.3 Research design
The research design serves as a plan for how the research would be conducted.  It 
“situates the researcher in the empirical world and connects the research questions to 
the  data”  (Punch,  1998:66).  The plan,  so  to  speak,  includes a  strategy,  conceptual 
framework, who or what will be studied and the tools and the procedures used for 
collecting  and  analysing  the  collected  data  (Punch,  1998).  I  opted  for  qualitative 
research design. This research design attempts to provide an in-depth description of 
situations and an understanding of behaviour via exploratory and descriptive means. It 
is  especially  designed  to  document  matters  while  focusing  on  a  primary  unit  of 
analysis (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).
3.4 Research methodology
Qualitative research design necessitated qualitative research methods for the study. It 
is  widely  accepted  that  some  of  these  types  of  methods  provide  a  “deeper 
understanding” of social phenomenon (Silverman, 2000; Punch, 1998; Mouton, 2001) 
and are relatively flexible, done over an extended period of time and occur in natural 
interactions  (Silverman,  2000;  Marshall  and  Rossman,  1999).  Another  attractive 
feature of qualitative  research methods is  that  they tend to allow the researcher  to 
“document  the world from the point of view of the people studied” (Hammersley, 
1992:165). 
Two main research methods have been used: 1) content analysis and 2) a case study.
3.4.1 Content analysis
Content  analysis  research  methodology  is  defined  as  a  systematic  procedure  “for 
analysing textual material,  no matter where this material  comes from ranging from 
media products to interview data” (Flick, 1998:192-3). It tends to allow for the vast 
accumulation  of  information  and  is  useful  for  examining  patterns  in  documents. 
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Documentary sources of data are a rich source of data used in social research. They 
include  textual  evidence  as  well  as  audio  and  visual  evidence.  When  used  in 
conjunction with other methods, documentary data can be very useful in augmenting 
interviews  and  observations  (Punch,  1998).  Documentary  data  can  add  to  the 
development of a better understanding of the setting or group studied (Marshall and 
Rossman, 1999). 
While there may appear to be an absence of problems with collecting documentary 
data,  there  are  limitations.  Firstly,  “documentary  reality  does  not  consist  of 
descriptions of the social world that can be used directly as evidence about it.  One 
cannot  assume  that  documentary  accounts  are  ‘accurate’  portrayals  in  that  sense. 
Rather, they construct their own kinds of reality” (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004:73). One 
would need to discount whether the accounts are precise depictions and rather question 
the form and function of the texts (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004).
Frankfort-Nachimas and Nachimas (2000:298) give three main applications of content 
analysis:  “to  describe  the  attributes  of  the  message;  to  make  inferences  about  the 
sender of the message and to make inferences about the effects of the message on 
recipients”. Krippendorf (1980) highlights six questions which need to be tackled in 
content analysis: 
1. Which data is analysed?
2. How are the data defined?
3. Which population are they drawn from?
4. What is the context relative to which the data are analysed?
5. What are the boundaries of the analysis?
6. What is the target of the assumptions?
I sourced union documents, newspapers, annual reports, on-line data, meeting agendas 
and statements from official websites. These were filed and made ready for analysis. 
As the research was exploratory, categorisation of the data was not entirely systematic. 
Content  analysis  can be less  fitting  when the research  question is  open-ended and 
explorative  and  when  an  on-going  rather  than  step-by-step  process  of  analysis  is 
planned.  One  way  of  dealing  with  this  is  to  combine  content  analysis  with  other 
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qualitative  methods  such  as  conversation  analysis  or  discourse  analysis  (Mayring, 
2000).
3.4.2 The case study and justification of a single case
In a case study, a program, group, individual or event can be studied comprehensively 
for  a  certain  period  of  time.  It  is  especially  appropriate  when  little  is  known  or 
understood of the situation (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). If it can be assumed that “every 
person, group, organisation, or event is unique–unlike any other in its detail–then, the 
case study becomes a suitable vehicle for depicting that uniqueness” (Murray Thomas, 
2003:35). The case study often uses a mixture of methods: the use of informants for 
current and historical data; straightforward interviewing; personal observation; and the 
tracing and study of relevant documents and records (Cosley and Lury, 1987). 
Site selection
The site  selected for primary data collection was Makana Local  Municipality.  The 
selection of the site was primarily based on two key factors: firstly, a public sector 
union affiliate of COSATU and secondly, the presence of branches of the Alliance 
partners (COSATU, ANC and SACP) in the area. This information was determined 
after  preliminary  investigations  which  were  done  by searching  the  local  telephone 
directory and then telephoning these branches to confirm their operation. 
Research subjects
The selection of the research subjects was purposive. I wanted to access, although not 
exclusively, key municipality informants to provide information on the complexities of 
industrial  relations. The research subjects  were drawn primarily from, although not 
limited to, the Local Labour Forum (LLF). The LLF is a formal bargaining structure 
established at municipalities via an Organisational Rights agreement signed between 
SALGA, as the local government employer association, and two unions, SAMWU and 
the  Independent  Municipal  Allied  and  Trade  Union  (IMATU).  The  forum 
institutionalises  engagement  between  representatives  of  the  State  and  municipal 
unions. Members from SAMWU were fundamental to the study thus constituted the 
greatest proportion of research participants. 
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Even  with  noteworthy  advantages,  there  are  problems  with  adopting  a  case  study 
approach. In the situation of a single case being selected,  any generalisations must 
await support from further research (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001). It would be “risky” to 
apply it to other cases (Murray Thomas, 2003). Bryman (1988:88) questions “How do 
we  know  …  how  representative  case  study  findings  are  of  all  members  of  the 
population from which the case was selected?”. 
3.5 Data collection techniques
According to Cosley and Lury (1987) the case study method usually uses a mixture of 
methods (more than one), including the use of informants for past and current details, 
personal observation and the study of relevant documents. Yin (1989), on the other 
hand, suggests that a case study use as many methods as possible. Three techniques 
were used for the study.
3.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews
Interviews are a common feature of qualitative research methodology and there are a 
variety of possible  forms and array of uses.  One may conduct individual  or group 
interviews, structured, unstructured or semi-structured interviews to access people’s 
perceptions,  meanings,  definitions and constructions of reality (Punch,  1998).  They 
can be done face-to-face and one-to-one, in written form with the researcher sending 
typed questions and receiving typed responses via a computer network, telephonically 
and through simultaneous video transmission (Murray Thomas, 2003). 
The limitations of interviews are that they take up a lot of time since they require 
meetings (Murray Thomas, 2003),  they take a  great  deal  of time to transcribe and 
analyse  (Blaxter,  Hughes  and  Tight,  1996),  the  researcher  receives  different 
information  from different  people  and may not  always  be  able  to  make  interview 
comparisons (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001) and the subjects may be reluctant with sharing 
what the interviewer hopes to explore (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).
I used individual semi-structured interviews as a primary data collection method. The 
planned period of interviewing was mid-March to mid-April 2005. After deciding the 
form the interview would take, I drew up a semi-structured interview schedule for the 
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categories  of  the  subjects  to  interview.  These  categories  comprised  the  research 
subjects  at  Makana  Local  Municipality  and  a  few from outside  the  Makana  area. 
Subjects  were  selected  using  purposive  sampling.  Purposive  sampling  is  a  type  of 
sampling  in  which  subjects  that  fit  a  study are  selected  based  on  the  researcher’s 
assessment. Members of Makana Municipality bargaining structures and members of 
key organisations of the study (ANC, SACP, SAMWU, SALGA and SALGBC) were 
selected.
After the schedule was drawn up, I then moved to a process of identifying specific 
subjects  to  interview. The process of identification involved searching organisation 
websites and conducting telephonic enquiries to find the people who were best suited 
to provide responses to the questions. The result of the process of enquiry was a list of 
contacts  that  were  reached  for  interviews.  The  case  study  was  based  on  Makana 
Municipality  and  most  of  the  subjects  were  from  Grahamstown.  National 
representatives of SAMWU were included for a holistic perspective of issues. Time 
and resources did not allow for an analysis for the other key organisations at those 
levels as well. 
After  the  particular  subjects  were  selected,  it  was  possible  to  begin  the  thorough 
interview  process.  Some  of  the  interviews  were  undertaken  in  person  in  personal 
offices and others were conducted over the telephone during working hours. In each 
case, the subject received a briefing of the purpose of the research where the interview 
information would be used, and was made aware of their anonymity in the research. 
Most of the interviews were tape-recorded to enable the researcher to easily refer back 
to the data. In view of this, consent for the tape-recording was sought from the subject 
before the interview was conducted. These steps were taken to maintain good ethics 
which are so highly esteemed in social science research (Punch, 1998:281).
The  estimated  time  frame  of  one  month  of  interviewing  was  reconsidered  as  the 
research  unfolded.  The  interview process  was  extended  to  early  July  2005.  Many 
interviews  were  postponed  because  of  busy  schedules.  Most  of  the  interviews 
(personal and telephonic) were conducted at places of work and during working hours, 
which  may  have  constrained  responses.  Some  subjects  eventually  declined  being 
interviewed  because  of  unavailability.  This  necessitated  replacements  and  even 
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abandonment  of  some  of  the  subjects.  Some  unrecorded  interviews  were  done 
intermittently with SAMWU members and representatives. Notes were taken of these. 
After the interview process was completed the interviews were then transcribed for 
analysis.  Interviews were conducted again between July 2007 and August  2007 to 
augment the interview data obtained in 2005.
3.5.2 Observation
Observation entails the “systematic” noting and recording of behaviours, events and 
objects  in  their  natural  social  setting.  It  incorporates  “listening”  and  “looking” 
(Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Punch (1998) differentiates between “structured” and 
“unstructured”  observations.  In  the  former,  the  researcher  uses  a  detailed,  pre-
developed observation schedule to develop predetermined categories and classification 
and in the latter, the researcher makes observations in an open-ended manner as events 
naturally  occur  (Punch,  1998).  Conducting  observations  tends  to  be  very  flexible, 
allowing the researcher to “easily shift focus as new data come to light” (Leedy and 
Ormrod, 2001:158). 
Observations can, nonetheless, be problematic. They tend to be potentially very time 
consuming (Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996). A major disadvantage is that written 
notes may not capture the “richness” of what is being observed (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2001). The presence of a video or tape recorder may very well alter behaviour or even 
be  undependable,  and  this  leads  to  errors  in  interpretation.  I  followed  the 
“unstructured” method of observation to observe subjects during the interview process, 
SAMWU members at two strikes (July 2005) and two SAMWU general meetings at 
the site (August and November 2005). Field notes were taken at these events in as 
detailed manner as possible and transferred into a journal.
3.6 Data analysis
Data analysis serves the purpose of making sense of the data collected. Different forms 
of data have different kinds of analysis appropriate for them. Kinds of data may be 
distinguished  as  either  qualitative  (words)  or  quantitative  (numbers)  and  therefore 
would be analysed with those distinctions in mind (Blaxter et al., 1996). 
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A host of issues arise in analysing different kinds of qualitative data. With interviews 
one would have to define, for instance, whether the aims of the analysis are “realist” 
(that is, describe the reality of people’s lives) or “narrativist” (that is, to access the 
narratives through which people describe their worlds) (Silverman, 2000:136). With 
field notes, one would have to note what is seen and heard but also his or her own 
behaviour  and  treatment  by  the  subjects.  Texts  would  need  precise  intentions,  for 
example, to establish a set of categories and then calculate the number of instances that 
belong to each category (content analysis) or to understand the subject’s categories and 
appreciate  how these are used in particular  activities  (Silverman,  2000).  Analysing 
interviews  needs  consideration  of  the  interactive  context  within  which  they  occur 
(Blaxter et al., 1996).
Meaning  of  qualitative  data  (verbal  and  non-verbal)  may  be  drawn  using  content 
analysis  and/or  discourse  analysis.  Content  analysis  “is  a  detailed  and  systematic 
examination  of  the  contents  of  a  particular  body  of  material  for  the  purpose  of 
identifying patterns, themes, or biases … [It is] typically performed on forms of human 
communication” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2001:155) including newspapers, television, and 
transcripts of conversations. This type of analysis involves a great deal of planning. 
Discourse analysis “emphasises the way versions of the world, of society, events and 
inner psychological worlds, are produced in discourse … this leads to a concern with 
participants’  constructions and how they are accomplished and undermined … and 
leads to a recognition of the constructed and contingent nature of researchers’ own 
versions  of  the  world”  (Potter,  2004:202).  Discourse  analysis  differs  from content 
analysis in the manner it defines the content variables. The content variables are not 
predetermined and fixed they develop during the interpretation of the collected records 
and are changed during the analysis. Also, the unit of analysis differs in length from 
single utterances to whole conversations possibly spanning more than a single meeting 
(Truex, 1996).  Both content and discourse analysis were selected for the study. 
The voluminous amount of information I gathered from the interviews, field notes, 
texts and transcripts were synthesised to make sense of the data, therefore qualitative 
data analysis techniques were applied. The following steps were taken:
1. The  details  about  the  case  were  organised  in  chronological  order  (where 
needed). 
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2. Information  from  the  categories  of  meaningful  groups  were  identified  and 
clustered. This information included that from formal and informal interviews.
3. Information  from  single  instances  was  noted,  namely  a  strike  involving 
SAMWU and IMATU (July 2005) and two SAMWU general meetings (August 
and November 2005).
4. The data and their interpretations were scrutinized for underlying themes and 
patterns. 
5. An overall portrait of the case was constructed (chapter 8 of the thesis) and 
conclusions drawn (chapter 9 of the thesis).
(Creswell, 1998; Stake, 1995; Leedy and Ormrod, 2001) 
3.7 Limitations and sources of error
A number of limitations were attached to this study that affects the quality of the data. 
To  begin  with,  the  findings  cannot  be  generalised  beyond  the  single  case.  The 
occurrences at Makana Municipality were specific to Makana. Moreover, the problems 
encountered  during  the  data  collection  process  may  have resulted  in  inaccurate  or 
inadequate information.  This is particularly true where intermittent  interviews were 
made which were not always recorded immediately. The sample of participants was 
small therefore one can expect gaps in the evidence given the nature of the research.
The next chapter gives an account of the South African Municipal Workers’ Union.
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CHAPTER  FOUR
THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPAL WORKERS UNION
4.1 Introduction
This  chapter  outlines  the  emergence  and  growth  of  SAMWU  and  evaluates  its 
organisational strength and character pre-1994 and post-1994. The chapter begins by 
giving  an  account  of  historical  achievements  and  then  presents  SAMWU’s 
organisational developments post 1994. 
4.2 Background to SAMWU
SAMWU  was  launched  on  24-25  October  1987  out  of  an  amalgamation  of  five 
COSATU affiliates: the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), the 
General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), the Municipal Workers Union of South 
Africa  (MWUSA),  the  South  African  Allied  Workers  Union  (SAAWU)  and  the 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). At the time of the launch, SAMWU 
had a paid-up membership of 14 892. Bringing the five unions together had not been 
an  easy  process,  especially  within  a  rapidly  changing  political  environment.  Each 
union had different organisational expressions and political traditions and this resulted 
in  numerous  disagreements  between  the  different  unions  during  this  stage  of  the 
liberation struggle. GAWU, MWUSA and SAAWU were general unions shaped by the 
widespread  trade  union militancy  of  the  early  1980s,  while  CTMWA and TGWU 
shared  commitment  to  strengthening  trade  union  structures  (Ernstzen,  1991). 
CTMWA,  once  a  conservative  staff  association,  was  a  core  organisation  in  the 
launching  of  SAMWU.  Although  CTMWA had  not  aligned  itself  with  nationalist 
politics or the UDF, at the formation of SAMWU it was blended with unions that were 
(Barchiesi, 2001).
SAMWU  merged  with  other  local  government  unions  in  different  regions  in  the 
country. These regionally based unions were part of the 1980s revival of Black worker 
militancy in the municipal sector, mainly in Johannesburg and Eastern Cape areas, and 
were inclined towards the ANC-aligned UDF (Barchiesi, 2001:398). In the Transvaal, 
the Union of Pretoria Municipal (UPM) became part of the Pretoria Area Council of 
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SAMWU.  In  the  Cape  Province,  the  Eastern  Cape  Local  Authorities  Association 
(ECLAA)  was  taken  into  the  Port  Elizabeth  Area  Council  of  SAMWU.  The 
Vredenburg-Saldanha Werkersvereniging joined the West Coast Area Council and the 
Munisipale Werkersvereniging merged with the Boland branch. The Durban Integrated 
Employees’ Society (DIMES) also joined with SAMWU (Ernstzen, 1991). The overall 
result  of  the  mergers  was  a  “peculiar  mix”  of  radical  community  unionism  and 
radicalised established unionism (Barchiesi, 2001:398). SAMWU participated in many 
workers’  campaigns  led  by  COSATU,  for  example,  the  anti-Labour  Relations  Act 
Campaign25, the Living Wage Campaign26 and the Workers’ Charter Campaign27.
SAMWU  also  participated  in  political  struggles,  for  example,  SAMWU  staged  a 
month long strike in Lingelethu West (Khayelitsha) from 14 November-14 December 
1990 demanding the resignation of councillors. Gabriels (1991:37) noted that it was 
particularly significant that the strikes supporting political demands were backed by 
the ANC. The ANC coordinated activities  with COSATU and COSATU affiliates. 
This  resulted  in  the  formation  of  ties  of  solidarity  between  SAMWU  and  ANC 
members. Also, many SAMWU members became ANC members. When commenting 
on  the  early  progress  of  SAMWU,  then  Secretary  General  of  SAMWU Mr.  John 
Ernstzen noted that the participation of SAMWU in COSATU national level structures 
(the National Executive Council, Central Executive Council and National Congress) 
had been good (Ernstzen, 1991). A spin-off of SAMWU’s involvement in COSATU 
structures  was  closer  interaction  with  the  ANC.  ANC representatives  would  often 
present at COSATU discussions and meetings and SAMWU influenced its political 
ally this way. 
25 The Anti-LRA campaign by COSATU was launched after government proposed amendments to the 
LRA in 1987. These amendments included: restrictions on the right to strike, reversal on the gains of the 
union movement such as job security and negotiated retrenchments, complicated strike procedures and 
punitive measures for strike action (Seftel, 1995). 
26 The  Living  Wage  Campaign  was  formally launched  in  1987.  The  instruments  used  to  mobilise, 
coordinate and broadcast the campaign were mass regional rallies, local, regional and national structures 
and mass media. Early key demands included: a living wage for all workers, a forty hour week, job 
security, six months maternity leave, March 21 and June 16 as paid public holidays, the right to decent 
education and training and an end to the hostel system (Rees, 1995).
27 COSATU embarked on the Workers’ Charter campaign to draw up a Charter that would “articulate 
the basic rights of workers” and “be guaranteed by the constitution of a people’s government”. It was 
presented as an alternative to the Freedom Charter and was hoped to reflect the requests of the “broadest 
section of the oppressed and exploited masses” of the country (Seftel, 1995).
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4.3 SAMWU pre-1994 campaigns
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, working class struggles escalated. Strike action 
escalated at  all  three state  levels due to dissatisfaction with worker wages,  lack of 
union recognition and poor conditions of employment (Golding, 1985b:57). COSATU 
embarked on a number of campaigns to enhance the organisational strength of unions 
and to oppose the apartheid system.  SAMWU participated in these as a COSATU 
affiliate but also launched its own campaigns. It adopted social movement unionism as 
a  response  to  political  authoritarianism  and  to  respond  “to  the  union’s  need  to 
articulate a discursive strategy and a moral standing based on its members’ specific 
location  as  workers  and community  residents,  and as  producers  and consumers  of 
services” (Barchiesi, 2007:56)
4.3.1 Local government restructuring
SAMWU advocated the desegregation of residential areas and services at all levels. 
One of its objectives had been “One Non-Racial City, One Non-Racial Municipality” 
(Ernstzen, 1991:33). Both political and economic privileges were based on and Black 
areas were left with few resources or equal chance of improvement. Local government 
structures developed under the Group Areas Act No.40 of 1950 were used by the NP 
government to entrench apartheid. The Act provided for municipal establishments with 
very few constructive consultative and management systems to deal with problems of 
disparity  (Botes,  Brynard,  Fourie  and  Roux,  1995).  SAMWU  deemed  these 
establishments as ineffective mechanisms for democratically distributing services and 
launched  its  own  campaigns  advocating  changes.  SAMWU  proposed  that  interim 
structures be organised in each local community pending a new national outcome after 
the 1994 national elections. Furthermore, SAMWU established a research group on 
local  government  restructuring  to  recommend  solutions  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
existing  ineffective  local  government  structures.  At  its  Third  National  Congress 
(1991),  SAMWU resolved to embark on an education programme on public sector 
restructuring  and  to  cooperate  with  civic  allies  involved  in  discussions  with  local 
authorities (Gabriels, 1991).
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4.3.2 Anti-Privatisation
SAMWU launched its own Anti-Privatisation Campaign in 1988 in response to the 
public  sector  privatisation  plans  of  the  NP  government.  In  1987,  the  government 
formed  a  Government  Privatisation  Unit  and  announced  its  intention  to  begin  the 
process of privatisation with the commercialising of the large state-owned enterprises, 
namely Eskom, Telkom. Government also introduced a job freeze to the public sector, 
a  process  of  natural  attrition  whereby  resigned,  retired  or  deceased  public  sector 
workers were not replaced, and managerial autonomy in the public sector (Rix and 
Jardine, 1996; Van Driel, 2003). These introductions had a negative effect on public 
sector workers.
SAMWU  recognised  that  it  needed  to  coordinate  its  efforts  in  order  to  intercept 
government’s  privatisation  plans.  At  its  2nd  National  Congress  (1989),  SAMWU 
noted: 
We  need  to  unite  like  never  before  –  not  only  in  SAMWU  but  with  our 
comrades  in  POTWA,  SARHWU  and  NEHAWU  to  work  out  a  national 
programme of action against privatisation. And because privatisation is a threat 
to the interests of the whole working class COSATU needs to be part of that 
campaign (SAMWU, 1989 in Ernstzen, 1991:33).
Ernstzen (1991) noted that the efforts of SAMWU against privatisation had not been 
very coordinated and effective. The process of restructuring state enterprises continued 
after the 1994 elections. Post-1994, the Anti-privatisation campaign has grown to be a 
dominant  campaign of SAMWU. SAMWU has committed “to oppose privatisation 
and to fight for the direct provision of all the basic necessities of life by the state at all 
its levels” (SAMWU constitution).
4.4 SAMWU structures post-1994
SAMWU  refined  its  objectives,  principles  and  practices  to  guide  its  actions  and 
activities after the end of the apartheid era. SAMWU has drawn most of its strength 
from shop-floor  activity  and community-oriented trade unionism (Barcheisi,  2007). 
Some of the post-1994 objectives of SAMWU are to cooperate with or form alliances 
with any community organisation,  social  movement  or political  party nationally  or 
internationally if this will advance the interests of members and to oppose privatisation 
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and to fight for the direct provision of all the basic necessities of life by the State at all 
its  levels  (SAMWU constitution:4-5).  Shifts  in  government  policy  post  1994 have 
created  opportunities  for  SAMWU to  revive  and  form relationships  with  different 
social movements. It has formed relationships with social movements, for example, the 
Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Anti-privatisation (Lier and Stokke, 
2006).
SAMWU’s objectives, principles and practices have been shaped by its history and 
have evolved with the changing political, economic and social environment. They have 
influenced  SAMWU’s  approach  to  local  government  changes  post-apartheid. 
SAMWU is  the  largest  and only  local  government  union within  COSATU and is 
presently  one  of  the  most  vocal  and  significant  local  government  workers’ 
organisations in the country.  The total membership of SAMWU28 in 2005 was 116 
632. Table 4.1 is a provincial break-down of the union’s membership.
Table 4.   5  : SAMWU membership as at July 2005  
Province SAMWU 
membership
Eastern Cape 13 175
Free State 9 286
Gauteng 35 436
KwaZulu–Natal 16 627
Mpumalanga 6 684
North West 6 513
Northern Cape 4 029
Northern Province 5 677
Western Cape 19 205
Total membership 116  632
Source: SAMWU membership statistics (2005)
Membership  is  open to  workers  directly  or  indirectly  employed  in  local  authority. 
Workers  eligible  for  membership  include  those  providing  services  in  electricity 
generation  and distribution,  health  and  social  services,  libraries,  cultural  and other 
community  services,  parks  and  recreation,  public  administrative  services  in 
municipalities  and  local  authorities,  public  transportation  and  traffic  control,  road 
construction and storm water drainage, scientific and technical services, solid waste 
28 See Appendix I for SAMWU membership according to metropolitan municipalities.
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management and environmental services, telecommunication and information services 
and water and sanitation (SAMWU constitution: 5).
Table 4.   5   SAMWU national leadership as at 2005 
Position Name
President Mr. Petrus Mashishi
1st Vice President Mr. Xolile Nxu
2nd Vice President Mr. Nyameka Mafani
Treasurer Mr. Sam Maloka
General Secretary Mr. Roger Ronnie
Deputy General 
Secretary
Mr. Andile Sihlahla
Source: SAMWU homepage
SAMWU  has  organisational  structures  that  exist  at  national,  provincial  and  local 
levels. Having structures at these levels has improved the organisational strength of 
SAMWU. Four structures exist at a national level. The National Congress (NC) is the 
supreme governing  body of  the  union.  Its  key  functions  are  to  adopt  general  and 
specific policy and guidelines to govern union affairs. The President, first and second 
Vice Presidents, National Treasurer, General Secretary and Deputy General Secretary 
are amongst the members elected to the body. Meetings take place at least once in 
three years and it is there that SAMWU resolutions or constitutional amendments are 
made. 
The Central Executive Committee (CEC) is the highest governing body between the 
NC. It consists of elected National and Provincial office bearers, elected by NC and PC 
respectively, who meet at least twice a year. Some of its key functions are to negotiate 
on,  reach  agreement,  declare  disputes  and  attempt  to  resolve  such  disputes  with 
employers or any other bodies and determine rules in terms of which lower structures 
may  do  so;  to  coordinate  and  supervise  the  activities  or  decisions  of  provincial 
structures; to suspend any union structure that fails to comply with the constitution or 
acts contrary to the interests of the union; to make rulings on any organisational matter 
which enhances the development of the union; and to take whatever steps it considers 
necessary for the proper administration and control of union finances. 
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The National  Executive  Committee  (NEC) is  made up of  all  the National  Worker 
Office  bearers  (including  the  General  Secretary  and  Deputy  General  Secretary  ex 
officio) and the Provincial Chairperson and Provincial Secretary (ex officio). Meetings 
are held at least four times a year between meetings of the CEC and may be convened 
at any time decided by the National Office bearers. Its powers and functions include 
coordinating and overseeing the implementation of union policy as determined by the 
NC and CEC; monitoring the implementation and development of union structures and 
campaigns; and making recommendations on policy issues to be decided upon by the 
CEC. The National Gender Committee exists for the same purposes as the Provincial 
Gender Committee although at a national level (SAMWU constitution: 18-23). The 
most experienced leaders of SAMWU participate in these structures. All these office 
bearers  hold  a  term  of  three  years  which  has  contributed  to  the  retention  of  an 
experienced leadership.
The structures at a provincial level are responsible for the affairs of the union in the 
province and their powers to determine policy are subject to amendment or reversal by 
the Central Executive Committee (CEC) and National Congress (NC) (national level 
structures).  There are three provincial  bodies.  The Provincial  Congress  (PC) is  the 
highest policy making body of the union within a province. Its primary function is to 
develop policy and provide mandates for the province for debate. All policy decisions 
are made by written resolution duly proposed, seconded and voted upon. PC meetings 
are meant to take place at least once a year. 
The Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) coordinates and supervises the activities 
of branches within the province. It is responsible for the provincial affairs of the union 
and  the  implementation  of  the  policies  and  programmes  of  the  union  within  the 
province. It may amend, reverse or prohibit any decision or activity of a branch or its 
sub-structures which it considers being contrary to the union or membership interests 
or which does not comply with adopted policy.  Its financial responsibilities include 
opening and operating bank accounts in the name of the province; preparing a budget 
for approval by the CEC for the province and all its branches; and maintaining and 
administering consolidated books of accounts for all provincial and branch accounts 
within  the  province.  It  facilitates  disciplinary  processes  by  appointing  a  standing 
Disciplinary Sub-Committee  in  terms of the disciplinary procedure of SAMWU. It 
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may  ratify  or  substitute  any  decision  by  Disciplinary  Committees  after  appeal 
procedures are exhausted. PEC meetings are expected to take place at least every three 
months.
The Provincial Gender Committee (PGC) exists to raise gender awareness among men 
and women in the union; to ensure all union activities and programmes are gender-
sensitive; and to ensure that gender related issues are taken up by the union as part of 
the broader working class struggle (SAMWU constitution: 14-17).
At the local level, the constitution of SAMWU guides the election of shop stewards 
and the setting up of Shop Steward Committees that operate as direct channels to the 
membership.  The  responsibilities  of  shop  stewards  and  Shop Steward  Committees 
include running the affairs of the union in the area of jurisdiction and implementing 
duly agreed policies and campaigns of the union (SAMWU constitution:10-11). The 
post-1994  structures  of  SAMWU previously  mentioned  have  enabled  SAMWU to 
coordinate and mobilise action around a number of pertinent matters. The relationship 
between SAMWU and government has not, however, been without complexities. The 
nature of the relationship has largely been influenced by the changing post-apartheid 
national context.
4.5 An evolving local government
Challenges for SAMWU increased as local government evolved. By the early 1990s, 
the  inevitability  of  change  was  eminent  but  the  prospects  of  the  future  for  local 
government vague. Debates over labour issues in particular, amongst other events of 
the time, dominated discussion tables as new methods of employer-employee relations 
had to be examined. The transformation process for local government required new 
systems of governance in place of the former ineffective ones. The Local Government 
Transition Act No. 209 of 1993 (LGTA) was an important piece of legislation that 
supported local government changes and moulded a new system of local government 
labour  relations.  The  LGTA  came  about  after  discussions  within  the  Local 
Government  Negotiating Forum (LGNF)29.  The LGTA mapped out three phases of 
29 The LGNF was formed in 1992 as a spin-off of discussions between representatives of twenty-six 
political  groups  at  Kempton  Park.  It  influenced  the  basic  framework  for  the  Local  Government 
Transition Act. The forum mainly consisted of political representatives from the NP and the ANC.
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local government transition (pre-interim, interim and final) and set out the vision for 
the new developmental local government system (White Paper on Local Government, 
1998).
The  pre-interim  phase  prescribed  the  establishment  of  local  negotiation  forums  to 
negotiate the appointment of temporary councils which would regulate until the 1995 
municipal elections.  These temporary councils were a mixture of representatives of 
different  groups,  including the previous municipal  government  establishment  (as  it 
existed before the end of apartheid) and previously inhibited groups,  such as trade 
unions. COSATU locals in particular played a role in community struggles against 
illegitimate local governments (COSATU, 2000) and continued to be involved in the 
transitional  process.  Many of  the  COSATU locals  were  made up  of  public  sector 
workers  who  were  organised  into  NEHAWU,  POTWA  and  SAMWU  (The  Shop 
steward, 1995). COSATU locals later nominated a considerable proportion of these 
public  sector  workers  as  candidates  to  the  proportional  representation  list30 of  the 
ANC. This helped extend the influence of labour in the transformation process.
The  interim phase  was  delayed  and  the  pre-interim mechanisms  were  extended  to 
August 1996, when KwaZulu-Natal province and Cape Town did not participate in the 
1995  municipal  elections.  This  was  a  result  of  problems  experienced  with  the 
registration of voters and candidates in the areas and disagreements over municipality 
boundaries  (Swift,  2004).  Despite  the  setback,  the  interim  phase  did  eventually 
commence after the municipal elections in 1995-1996. The elections held during that 
period were for the following municipal types:
• Transitional  Metropolitan  Councils  and  Transitional  Metropolitan 
Substructures;
• Transitional Local Councils;
• Transitional Representative and Rural Councils;
• District Councils; and
• Remaining Areas
(Local Government Transition Amendment Act No. 61 of 1995).
30 The ANC proportional representation list consisted of candidates who would be involved in local 
councils after the first municipal election in 1995.
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The delineation of outer boundaries of these areas and of wards was determined at a 
provincial level and each province had a different size and number of councils. Each 
province  operated  within  a  framework  provided  by  the  LGTA.  These  temporary 
arrangements  lasted  until  the  new  local  government  system  was  designed  and 
legislated in 200031. The provisions for local government, in terms of responsibilities 
and demarcations, were particularly significant for this phase. Chapter 7 of the new 
South African constitution deals with the provisions and divisions of the present local 
government. All municipalities are provided with the right to govern local government 
affairs  of  their  communities,  subject  to  national  and  provincial  government.  In 
addition,  the  executive  and  legislative  authority  of  any  municipality  rests  with  its 
Municipal Council (South African constitution, 1996: section 151; Municipal Systems 
Act,  2000:  section  2).  Municipalities  have  the  responsibilities  of  structuring  and 
managing their  administration,  budgeting and planning processes;  promoting social 
development  of  their  communities;  and  participating  in  national  and  provincial 
development  programmes  (South  African  constitution,  1996:  section  153).  South 
African municipalities were divided into three categories32, each with different roles. 
COSATU  was  very  involved  in  the  interim  phase  and  played  a  major  role  in 
supporting the municipal  electoral  effort  of the ANC. Many COSATU leaders and 
affiliate leaders (including leaders of SAMWU) were elected to serve as community 
councillors  on  transitional  local  councils33 (COSATU,  2000).  These  elected  ANC 
representatives expected to receive support from COSATU members while changes to 
local government were being made. In some instances, SAMWU members and leaders 
became involved in national decision-making bodies during this phase. For example, 
31The boundaries of some wards were being finalised at the time of writing. 
32 Category A–refers to municipalities that have exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority 
in  their  area.  These  cover  the  six  metropolitan  municipalities:  Tshwane,  Johannesburg,  Ekurhuleni, 
Ethekwini, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela
Category B–refers to municipalities that share municipal executive and legislative authority in the area 
with a category C municipality within whose area it falls. There are 284 local municipalities in category 
B.
Category C–refers to municipalities that have municipal executive and legislative authority in an area 
that includes more than one municipality. There are forty seven district areas or municipalities in this 
category (South African constitution, 1996, section 155).
33 Transitional  councils  included  a  local  government  co-ordinating  committee,  a  transitional  local 
council and a transitional metropolitan council. These were divided between transitional local councils 
for non-metropolitan areas of local government and transitional metropolitan councils for metropolitan 
areas of local government (Local Government Transitional Act, 1993). 
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Mr. John Ernstzen34 became a chief negotiator for the Department of Public Service 
and Administration.
When describing the employment relationship at the Grahamstown Transitional Local 
Council35 (1995-2000), Mr. Tom Litteley36, a DA councillor, noted that “White people” 
were considered an “enemy”. He reminisced:
when  there  was  local  bargaining  and  the  senior  officials,  who  guided  and 
advised the councillors about the employer’s position, were White, some ANC 
councillors  happily  leaked  the  employer’s  position  to unions  in  advance of 
negotiations,  but  with  national  collective  bargaining,  this  has  stopped 
(Interview: Tom Litteley).
A Makana  Municipality  SAMWU member  in  Grahamstown,  Ms.  Nancy Noluza37, 
recalled a similar history whereby ANC councillors and labour would discuss matters 
together  with  a  common  purpose  during  the  transitional  phase  (Interview:  Nancy 
Noluza). 
The interim phase saw the drawing up of the Labour Relations Act (1995), the new 
South African Constitution (1996), the formation of SALGA (1996), the Green Paper 
on local  government  (1997),  the formation of  843 transitional  municipalities  when 
White  and  Black  areas  merged,  the  White  Paper  on  local  government  (1998),  the 
Municipal Demarcation Act (1998)38 and the Municipal Structures Act (1998)39. At the 
end  of  the  interim  phase,  COSATU recognised  “the  main  achievement  … of  the 
interim  phase  [as]  the  de-racialisation  of  local  governments  by  creating  unified 
municipalities supported by a single tax base in urban and rural areas. This laid the 
basis to address the disparities inherited from apartheid” (COSATU, 2000). On the 
34 John Ernstzen is presently the Deputy Chairperson of the Public Service Commission.
35 This was later dissolved to form Makana Local Municipality.
36 Pseudo name.
37 Pseudo name.
38 The Municipal  Demarcation Act  (1997)–situates the framework for the demarcation of  municipal 
boundaries for an integrated, practical and non-racial municipality.
39 The  Municipal  Structures  Act  (1998)–defines  the  categories  and  types  of  municipalities  to  be 
instituted throughout South Africa and the local government electoral system.
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whole the federation presented a positive outlook on the prospects of local government 
in the final stage of the transition process.
The final stage was reached on 5 December 2000 after municipal elections were held 
in the 284 new municipalities. The ANC won the municipal elections with a majority 
vote of 59%, notwithstanding the low voter turnout of 48% (ANC homepage). Soon 
after  elections,  a  new local  government  system was  established  and  various  local 
government  programmes  were  developed  to  create  a  more  efficient,  effective 
structured local government. 
After the final  stage of local government development,  government continued with 
plans to further develop local government. In February 2001, President Thabo Mbeki 
broadcast the Urban Renewal Programme (URP) and the Integrated Sustainable Rural 
Development  Programme  (ISRDP)  which  are  aimed  at  conducting  a  “sustained 
campaign  against  rural  and  urban  poverty  and  underdevelopment,  bringing  in  the 
resources of all three spheres of government in a coordinated manner” (Department of 
Provincial  and  Local  Government  homepage).  The  Local  Economic  Development 
(LED) programme was introduced soon after “to maximize the economic potential of 
all municipal localities throughout the country, and to enhance the resilience of the 
macro-economic  growth  through  increased  local  economic  growth,  employment 
creation and development initiatives within the context of sustainable development” 
(Department  of  Provincial  and  Local  Government  homepage).  In  2000/1,  the 
Integrated  Development  Plan40 (IDP)  was  instituted  as  a  plan for  municipalities  to 
encourage the integration and balance of social,  economic and ecological pillars of 
sustainability. The municipalities prepare five-year strategic plans, which are reviewed 
annually in consultation with stakeholders and communities (Department of Provincial 
and Local Government homepage). The outcomes of the various programmes have 
varied in degree and success. 
4.6 Changing state of relations between SAMWU and government
Pre-1994,  SAMWU reacted to undemocratic local  authorities using massive protest 
action, at times with the support of the Alliance partners. In March 1993, the NP went 
40 The IDP is a process for municipalities whereby municipalities prepare five-year strategic plans which 
are reviewed annually in consultation with stakeholders and communities (www.dplg.gov.za). 
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on to formally adopt a neo-liberal programme called the Normative Economic Model 
(NEM). Some elements of the programme included creating efficient market structures 
to enhance competition in labour and product markets, as well as wage restraints; fiscal 
discipline to reduce government spending and manage macroeconomic stability; a tax 
relief  system for  companies  and individuals  to  encourage  the  release  of  funds  for 
investment by the private  sector;  and ending exchange controls  (Central  Economic 
Advisory Services,  1993; also Van Driel,  2003). The NEM was not fully executed 
because the National Party lost the 1994 elections soon after the implementation of the 
programme. However, the NEM set in motion significant processes in policy that have 
had spin-offs in the present approach by government to policy on the restructuring of 
the State.
SAMWU  challenged  government  on  the  negative  consequences  of  the  NEM.  In 
August  1993,  SAMWU  embarked  on  a  national  strike  following  national  wage 
negotiation deadlocks. Strike activity by municipal workers was illegal at the time but 
SAMWU went ahead with the strike, in the face of threats by employers to dismiss 
striking workers and to use court interdicts.  The inability of SAMWU to challenge 
employers on their applications to use court interdicts against the strikes frustrated the 
activities of SAMWU. Several municipal workers were dismissed for participating in 
the strikes or failing to return to work by an appointed time. In the Cape Province, for 
instance, 2 000 workers were dismissed at about twenty-five municipalities for failing 
to return to work on a set date41. SAMWU criticised this behaviour by employers as 
unacceptable  “union-bashing”  (Daily  Dispatch,  1993c:2)  and  managed  to  gain  the 
sympathy of other organisations during the strike.
The ANC and COSATU showed their support for the concerted effort by SAMWU to 
challenge the unreasonable actions of undemocratic local authorities and improve the 
lives of workers through decent wages. Pending the 1993 national municipal workers 
strike over wages, the ANC released a statement on its concern at “the intransigence of 
the  municipal  employers  in  dealing with the  legitimate  demands of  the  SAMWU” 
(ANC,  1993).   The  ANC  expressed  that  it  would  join  all  community  and  other 
organisations,  as well  as the Public Service International,  “in giving its unqualified 
support to the municipal workers demands for an end to unilateral restructuring and 
41 The reinstatement of some of these workers was negotiated at a later stage. 
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rationalisation; a living wage for municipal workers; [and] an end to intimidation of 
workers”  (ANC, 1993).  The party  called for  “an end to union bashing  tactics”  by 
municipal  employers  (ANC,  1993).  Similarly,  COSATU  resolved  to  mobilise 
resources behind SAMWU in its efforts to resolve the dispute between the employer 
organisations and SAMWU (Daily Dispatch, 1993b:5). These expressions of support 
for  SAMWU  by  both  organisations  indicated  a  significant  degree  of  cooperation 
between the organisations prior to elections. 
Between  1994  and  2000  SAMWU engaged  with  a  transforming  local  government 
during  the  democratic  transition.  The  transitional  period  introduced  a  number  of 
legislative and policy changes that eventually fed into changes at local government 
level.  After the first democratic elections in April 1994 until February 1997, South 
Africa  was  governed  in  terms  of  the  Interim  Constitution  of  the  country  (Daily 
Dispatch, 1993a:1). Clause 88 of the Interim Constitution provided for the GNU.  New 
policies were introduced in line with the new Constitution and the new government 
had to deal with addressing the legacy of apartheid while incorporating the country 
into the  global  economy.  Many of the early  post-1994 policies  were based on the 
objectives  of  the  election  programme  of  the  ANC,  the  RDP.  The  RDP  was  an 
audacious programme aimed at linking development with economic growth. It placed 
government at the head of the development process. With regard to SOEs, the RDP 
ambiguously read:
The  process  of  commercialisation  and  privatisation  of  parastatals  must  be 
reviewed, to the extent that such processes are not in the public interest. This 
will require the elaboration of more appropriate business plans, and publication 
of  those  plans  for  open  debate.  The  democratic  government  will  reverse 
privatisation  programmes  that  are  contrary  to  the  public  interest (Clause 
4.4.4.3).
The issue of “public interest” and interpretations of parts of the RDP created numerous 
debates in the country. Many of these debates continue today and privatisation has 
remained a notably important issue (Hassen, 2004b).   
In 1995, government refocused on reducing the state sector. Government published 
The Restructuring of State Assets in July 1995, in which parastatals were grouped into 
the following types for reform: State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with a patent role in 
providing basic needs; non-essential SOEs with a public role; and SOEs with no role in 
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matching basic needs (Van Driel, 2003). In December 1995, then Deputy President 
Thabo Mbeki announced the complete sale of Sun Air and six radio stations within the 
South African  Broadcasting Corporation and the  partial  sale  of  Telkom and South 
African Airways. In response, COSATU took to the streets on 16 December 1995 and 
threatened a national stay-away on 16 January 1996. The stay-away was suspended 
once  negotiations  with  government  began.  In  that  same  period,  preparations  for 
municipal elections were under way and COSATU purposed to encourage its affiliates 
to assist the ANC secure a majority in local authorities. COSATU affiliates including 
SAMWU  gave  their  support  despite  the  apparent  brewing  tensions  between  the 
Alliance  partners  over  national  economic  policy.  The ANC won the  majority  vote 
(67%)  at  local  government  elections  in  1995.  The  labour  movement  hoped that  a 
stronger presence of ANC membership at both national and local government levels 
would produce democratic changes and increase sympathy for the working class via 
the contributions of the Alliance relationship. 
In February 1996, the National Framework Agreement on the Restructuring of State 
Assets (NFA) was signed between the three union federations (COSATU, FEDUSA 
and  NACTU)  and  the  GNU.  This  consultative  agreement  provided  the  plan  for 
restructuring  particular  state  assets  (SAFCOL,  Telkom  and  Sun  Air)  within  the 
mandate of NEDLAC (Department of Public Enterprises, 1996). SAMWU opposed the 
endorsement  of  the  NFA at  the  COSATU Executive  Committee  on  the  basis  that 
SAMWU had not been awarded a chance to present the matter to its membership. In 
addition, the NFA did not “reject privatisation as a tool for restructuring” (SAMWU 
1996:12).  SAMWU  remained  resistant  to  the  NFA  and  took  a  perspective  that 
privatisation  forms “part  of  globalisation  and  is  capital’s  response  to  the  crisis  of 
profitability internationally” (Van Driel, 2003:74). 
Soon after signing the NFA, government introduced the GEAR policy, which placed 
further strain on government relations with SAMWU. GEAR, amongst other things, 
escalated  restructuring  which  was  argued  to  have  impacted  on  service  delivery 
(McDonald,  2002).  Neither  COSATU  nor  the  Alliance  was  able  to  engage  with 
government  in  a  comprehensive  manner  over  GEAR  and  restructuring.  SAMWU 
actively  dealt  with  escalating  privatisation  at  an  enterprise  level  with  the  aim  of 
slowing  down the  privatisation  process.  SAMWU sometimes  took  action  with  the 
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support of COSATU, however, Van Driel (2003) notes that after the introduction of 
the  NFA,  SAMWU and  COSATU pursued  the  privatisation  matter  from different 
positions.  This created perceptions, by some workers, of disunity among COSATU 
affiliates  (Interview:  Mr.  Patho).  COSATU was  reproached  for  always  threatening 
protest action as a method to coerce the ANC-led government to the negotiating table 
and  then  suspending  the  threat  once  that  objective  has  been  achieved.  COSATU 
adopted this tactic in 1996 around the issue of the NFA, in 1998 when it planned a 
national strike against privatisation of water in the Nelspruit area and later in 2002 
when COSATU threatened to strike against continuing privatisation by government 
(Van Driel, 2003). Conversely, SAMWU consistently challenged privatisation matters 
through  numerous  campaigns  using  different  strategies.  These  strategies  may  be 
summed up as achieving public opinion through informing members (at workplaces) 
and communities, embarking on alternative ways of improving service delivery and 
developing plans for the transformation of services (Pape, 2001; Van Driel, 2003). 
The second general  election held in June  1999 ended the period of  the  GNU and 
brought more changes and challenges for relations between SAMWU and government. 
At the end of a three day National Congress in 2000, SAMWU resolved to accelerate 
union action against GEAR and support COSATU in all its campaigns for demands for 
a new policy framework (Sapa, 2000). SAMWU was against GEAR and restructuring 
plans that imposed privatisation methods. In a press statement on housing in Gauteng, 
SAMWU stated:
Government needs to take this opportunity to move away from its reliance on 
the private sector, developers and bank with regard to housing … It is one of 
the realities brought about by the government’s GEAR policy that millions of 
people are without jobs, homes or access to services … The very same GEAR 
policy has made sure that townships have remained populated with shacks and 
devoid of greenery and park areas (SAMWU, 2001).
In December 2000, SAMWU members  at  the ANC-led Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Council  went on strike in  collaboration with IMATU workers  against  privatisation 
plans in the Igoli 2002. The unions had not been consulted on the plan and felt that the 
Igoli 2002 Plan, which planned for privatisation, would threaten job security. SAMWU 
devoted an entire section on their website called Anti-Igoli 2002, in which it expressed 
disapproval of the plans. The President of SAMWU, Mr. Petrus Mashishi, remarked 
“Running local government on business principles will only benefit the rich, and the 
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poor will suffer. Business principles imply that profit must be made from services” 
(Woza News, 2000). The strike gained the support of other organisations, such as, the 
South African Students’ Congress (SASCO) and South African Council of Churches 
(SACC) (Financial  Mail,  2000:9).  The support  SAMWU received from community 
organisations  indicated  a  strengthening  relationship  between  SAMWU  and 
community-based social  movements  in confronting government. Resistance to Igoli 
2002 escalated but the leadership of the Alliance endorsed Igoli 2002. The Alliance 
attempted  to  contain  the  growing  resistance  to  Igoli  2002  politically  and 
organisationally. The struggles eventually led to the formation of the APF with some 
former SAMWU officials,  (for example, Anna Weeks) and former members of the 
SACP (for example, Dale McKinley) and ANC (for example, Trevor Ngwane) as APF 
representatives. During this period, the relationship SAMWU had with the APF was 
embryonic but cooperation continued as the social movement grew in significance. 
Lier and Stokke (2006) note that new social movement unionism such as that pursued 
by SAMWU faces the new obstacles due to political relations between the state, trade 
unions and civil society. There is a growing gap between ANC aligned organisations 
and  oppositional groups. The majority of the labour movement that is aligned to the 
ANC faces the difficulty of aligning itself with social movements that mobilise, for 
example,  around  the  impacts  of  cost  recovery.  They  face  the  challenge  of  being 
categorised  as  “constructive  and  collaborationist  unions  and  civics”  or  “disruptive 
‘ultra-left’ forces” by the ANC (Lier and Stokke, 2006:2).  Nevertheless, “attempts to 
forge alliances between trade unions and social movements in South Africa can be 
seen  as  an  attempt  to  bridge  this  political  gap,  while  addressing  their  concrete 
differences  in  terms of  interests,  organisational  characteristics  and political  tactics” 
(Lier and Stokke, 2006:2) and therefore necessary. SAMWU continues to work with 
social movements even though this has at times caused tensions between the union and 
government.
4.7 SAMWU and the South African Local Government Bargaining Council 
(SALGBC)
The South African Local Government Bargaining Council (SALGBC) was formed in 
March  2001.  The  SALGBC  constitutes  SAMWU,  IMATU  and  SALGA 
representatives. The revised South African Constitution established a new system of 
76
local government by providing differentiated powers, functions and structures for the 
previously  diverse  categories  of  metropolitan,  urban  and  rural  governments.  The 
SALGBC is the prime bargaining institution for local government and it replaced the 
preceding numerous Industrial Councils. The SALGBC operates at a national level and 
some  of  its  functions  include:  administering,  supervising  and  enforcing  said 
agreements; performing dispute resolution functions referred to in section 5142 of the 
LRA;  seeking  to  reach  agreement  on  forms  of  consultative  committees,  including 
workplace forums, to be established in municipalities and to confer on such forums or 
committees additional issues for consultation; and delegating any of its powers and 
functions  to  divisions,  committees  or  employees  through  collective  agreement 
(SALGBC  constitution,  2001).  The  SALGBC  has  4  sub-structures:  Central 
Committee43, Executive Committee44, Bargaining Committee45 and Working Groups46. 
Each  has  different  functions  and  contributes  to  the  handling  of  local  government 
bargaining. 
Local or municipal level bargaining structures called Local Labour Forums were also 
instituted  for  various  municipalities  under  the  Organisational  Rights  Agreement47 
(ORA). These structures handle matters at the workplace and have equal representation 
from the employer and trade unions at meetings. The workplace representatives consist 
42 Section 51 of the LRA provides the dispute resolution functions of council.
 
43 The  Central  Committee  has  sixty  seats  equally  divided  between  SALGA  and  labour.  Its 
responsibilities include handling the finances of the council and dealing with negotiations and disputes 
within its registered scope. This committee meets at least three times a year.
44 The Executive Committee was set up after an amendment to the SALGBC constitution, to deal with 
the day-to-day matters of the council.
45 The Bargaining Committee has a primary function to collectively bargain wage and salary increases, 
conditions of service and so on. This was formerly a function of the CC but was handed down because 
of the number of delegates involved was too large.
46 Working groups include a total of eight working groups and committees that deal with matters that 
arise  for  the local  government  sector:  Employee  Benefits  Working Groups,  Data  Working Groups, 
Services  Working  Groups,  Essential  Services  Working  Groups,  Occupational  Health,  Safety  and 
Environment  Working  Groups,  Job  Evaluation  Working  Groups,  Finance  Committees,  Human 
Resources Committees and Technical Advisory Committees. These groups and committees comprise 
delegates from SALGA, SAMWU and IMATU (ORA, 2005).
47 The Organisational Rights Agreement (first signed in May 2001 then again in May 2005) sets out the 
standards to be applied at municipalities with regard to organisational rights, trade union subscriptions, 
time off, rights and duties of shop stewards, the Local Labour Forum, trade union meetings and facilities 
and representation on statutory and other bodies (www.salgbc.org.za).
77
of  councillors  (provided  they  make  up  less  than  one-third  of  the  delegation)  and 
management  (usually  including  the  Human  Resource  manager).  Trade  union 
representation  is  divided  in  proportion  to  respective  union  membership  in  the 
workplace. Up to two trade union officials or office bearers and SALGA officials may 
attend the meetings,  as long as prior notice is given to the other side.  Overall,  the 
number of employer and union representatives should not consist of less than three or 
more than twelve representatives in proportion to the members at the workplace (ORA, 
2005). Meetings are meant to be held at least once a month (ORA, 2005). A LLF may 
set up sub-committees (Human Resources Development Committees48, Workplace and 
Services restructuring Committees49 and Basic Conditions Committees50).
A number of issues have been disputed since the inception of the SALGBC. Table 4.3 
reveals  national disputes between 2001 and 2005. Many of the disputes have been 
referred to the SALGBC by SAMWU.
48 Human Resources  Development  Committees  would be responsible  for  consultation  and technical 
preparatory work in education, training, employment policy and other Human Resources related issues 
(ORA, 2005).
49 Workplace and Services Restructuring Committees deal with any proposed changes related to service 
restructuring,  for  example,  the  introduction  of  new technology,  privatisation  proposal  or  alternative 
service delivery methods (ORA, 2005).
50 Basic Conditions Committees deal with other affairs related to working conditions, health and safety 
proposal and working hour arrangements (ORA, 2005).
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Table 4.   5  : National SALGBC disputes 2001-2005  
Date 
referral 
received
Referral 
party
Respondent Status  of 
dispute
Nature of dispute
27/3/2001 SAMWU IMATU Arbitrator 
ruled on 
jurisdiction
Number of divisions- SAMWU 
wanted to reduce number of 
divisions from 13 to 9. 
3/6/2002 SAMWU SALGA Matter 
withdrawn
Restructuring- employer alleged 
to have failed to follow 
procedures laid down in an 
earlier correspondence with the 
union.
13/6/2002 SAMWU eThekwini 
municipality
Closed Pension fund- employer failed to 
abide by a collective agreement 
that prevents employer from a) 
transferring between funds and 
b) the introduction of any new 
retirement funds. 
13/8/2003 SAMWU 
/IMATU
SALGA Case 
finalised- 
employer to 
deduct 
required 
monies
Alleged breach of ORA Clause 
4.151- SALGA did not give 
notice of intention to continue 
making deductions in favour of 
trade union initiated micro loan 
schemes and terminated stop 
order facilities in respect of trade 
union initiated micro loans.
13/5/2004 SAMWU 
+IMATU
SALGA Open Outstanding matter of micro 
lending in Organisational Rights 
dispute.
13/5/2004 IMATU Saldanha Bay 
municipality
Open Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement- conditions 
of service.
1/4/2005 IMATU 
obo  Fraiser 
and others
Tshwane 
municipality
Open Failure by the City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality to 
comply with National Collective 
Agreement on conditions of 
service.
5/10/2005 IMATU Molemole 
municipality
Open Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement- working 
hours.
14/6/2005 IMATU 
+SAMWU
SALGA Closed Accrued leave.
30/6/2005 IMATU City of 
Johannesburg
Pending Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement- medical 
aid.
51 Clause provides that workplaces shall deduct trade union initiated schemes from the salary/wages of 
trade union members for whom it holds written authority in favour of the trade union concerned and 
should not levy any charges for such deductions.
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20/7/2005 SAMWU 
+IMATU 
SALGA Open Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement- section 57.
16/9/2005 SAMWU Govan Mbeki 
municipality
Open Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement-employer 
not complying with disciplinary 
procedure clause 652.
26/10/2005 SAMWU City of Cape 
Town
Open Interpretation/Application of 
collective agreement- medical 
aid.
27/10/2005 SAMWU 
+IMATU
SALGA Open Mutual interest- the inclusion of 
employees appointed in terms of 
S57 of the Municipal Systems 
Act.
Source: SALGBC homepage 
Institutionalised  bargaining  has  not  always  been  an  easy  process.  During  times  of 
dispute, there has been evidence of tensions between union representatives and ANC 
representatives.
At  the  6th SAMWU Congress  in  2000,  before  the  establishment  of  the  SALGBC, 
SAMWU addressed a concern by its members of growing tensions and contradictions 
between SAMWU and ANC councillors because SAMWU was perceived as being in 
alliance with the employers (SAMWU, 2000). This allegation implicated SAMWU as 
being  in  agreement  with  emerging  employer  policy,  which  largely  favoured 
privatisation. Seeing the difficulties in its relation to the ANC and the need to make a 
clear position on privatisation matters, SAMWU 6th Congress resolutions concurrently 
articulated support for anti-privatisation forums and the Alliance. SAMWU resolved to 
continue to work with COSATU in the anti-Igoli campaign, and in building solidarity 
action  for  workers  being victimised  and seek appropriate  political  solutions  to  the 
current problems including engagement within the Alliance (SAMWU 6th Congress 
resolutions, section 24.5,7). Similar resolutions were made at the 7th Congress, except 
by this  time the SALGBC had been instituted.  The establishment  of the SALGBC 
meant  that  SAMWU would  challenge  the  employer  directly.  The  establishment  of 
local  government  bargaining  structures  increased  complexities  for  the  relationship 
between SAMWU and government. 
52 Clause 6 of Disciplinary Procedure collective agreement sets out procedures to be followed in the case 
of misconduct of an employee. 
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In April 2001, a month after the registration of the SALGBC, annual wage talks with 
the  employer,  SALGA,  deadlocked.  The  two  unions  involved  in  the  bargaining, 
SAMWU  and  IMATU,  wanted  a  10%  or  R300  across  the  board  pay  increase, 
including a minimum wage of R1 900, but the offer by government was 5% (Mail and 
Guardian, 2001). A SAMWU branch in Mpumalanga Province said in a letter to Father 
Smangaliso Mkhatshwa53, chair of SALGA and an ANC official:
You are now becoming a threat to the workers, even the community itself. The 
5% is promoting poverty to the people. We were busy convincing people to 
cast their vote for the ANC, so that the ANC can end poverty. Now it seems 
like the person at the top forgets about other people … we all worked hard to 
ensure this council is a majority ANC one, it’s the only one in the southern 
Cape.  Now  workers  are  feeling  betrayed.  What  is  the  difference  between 
having  voted  for  the  ANC  instead  of  the  Democratic  Alliance?  (Mail  and 
Guardian, 2001).
The statement revealed that strikes were a platform to address workplace and political 
grievances.  It  showed  dissatisfaction  amongst  SAMWU  members  with  the 
performance of some ANC members participating in local government management. 
The singling out of ANC individuals and mentioning of political matters during strikes 
seems  to  be  a  consequence  of  the  Alliance  relationship  which  exists  beyond  the 
workplace. One can especially attribute this to the shifting of individuals from union 
into  government  positions.  A  number  of  ministers  and  high  profile  government 
officials  have  trade  union  backgrounds  or  were  involved  in  the  labour  movement 
during  the  struggle  for  democracy.  For  instance,  the  Minister  of  Labour,  Mr. 
Membathisi Mdladlana, was once the National President of the Democratic Teachers’ 
Union (1990-1994). The Minister of Provincial and Local Government, Mr. Sydney 
Mufamadi, was a founder member of COSATU (1985) and was General Secretary of 
the General and Allied Workers Union (1982 and 1984). The consequences of shared 
political and trade union backgrounds between trade union and government officials 
have not been easy to predict in every circumstance. It has often been during industrial 
disputes that SAMWU’s political and organisational relations have been challenged. 
In July 2002, SAMWU took to the streets in one of the biggest strikes ever against 
SALGA. The strike lasted three weeks and the public was directly  exposed to the 
53 In 1994, he was elected to Parliament as an ANC MP and from 1994 to 1996 he was Chairperson of 
Committees in the National Assembly. He was the mayor (ANC member) of the City of Tshwane from 
2000 to 2006. 
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strike as many towns and cities were trashed and streets flooded with striking workers. 
In a press statement, ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama asserted:
The ANC condemns in the strongest possible terms the trashing of our cities 
across  the  country  in  the  mayhem  that  characterized  the  strike  action  by 
municipal workers, under the banner of the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU) … For this mayhem, the nation is owned an apology and the 
leadership  of  SAMWU  should  come  out  openly  in  condemnation  of  these 
unforgivable acts of vandalism (Ngonyama, 2002).
The strike itself was arguably about much more than SALGA acceding to the demands 
of SAMWU for a 9% wage increase. On the surface, SAMWU would appear to have 
been propelled by membership interests. However, an article by the APF interpreted 
the strike as being “against the ANC government” (APF, 2002:29). This comment and 
the strong positions of the APF placed SAMWU in a  difficult  position because of 
SAMWU’s affiliation to the ANC via the Alliance. By this time, the APF was growing 
in influence and SAMWU had to balance relations between its political ally the ANC 
and the social movement.  SAMWU has continued its relationship with the APF even 
though the APF has come across as antagonistic to the ANC led government. 
Relations between government and SAMWU continued to experience tension after the 
establishment of the SALGBC. In a press statement before the SAMWU 7th Congress 
in 2003, SAMWU recognised the “obstructive nature of SALGA”, at that time, as a 
key  problem facing  SAMWU in  decision-making  within  the  SALGBC (SAMWU, 
2003b).  In  the  same  press  statement,  SAMWU  expressed  that  SALGA  tended 
“towards unilateral action by municipalities that entrenches disregard for the views of 
labour  and  communities”  (SAMWU,  2003b).  In  July  2005,  SAMWU  went  on  a 
national strike.  
Siyayinyova ngeSALGA, siyayinyova ngeSALGA, siyayinyova ngeSALGA, 
batyebile oswayni iziso zingaka, batyebile oswayni iziso zingaka. Sibulalwe 
yiSALGA54.
These were the chants of over a hundred fervid, discontent Makana Local Municipality 
SAMWU and IMATU members in Grahamstown participating in a national strike after 
a wage dispute with SALGA in July 2005. SAMWU and IMATU demanded a 9% or 
54 “We go against/resist SALGA [three times], they have developed huge bellies like pigs, they have 
developed huge bellies like pigs, SALGA is killing us” (loose translation). Strike in Grahamstown 12 
and 13 July 2005.
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R400 increase and a minimum wage of R3 000 per month and SALGA offered a 6% 
wage increase. SAMWU boasted that there was an overwhelming membership turnout 
across the country at the strikes. Many of the strikes were characterised by several 
incidents of violence, mainly in the Johannesburg and Cape Town areas. The police 
interrupted  several  of  the  strikes  using  teargas  and  rubber  bullets  where  workers 
behaved unruly and many strikers were either injured or arrested in the process (Mail 
and Guardian, 2005b). 
The episodes of the 2005 municipal strikes mirrored the public sector strike activity of 
the volatile early 1990s period, except, the municipal workers were challenging a new 
government, one with an ANC-majority. In Johannesburg, fifty workers were arrested 
after a day of violence for contravening the Gatherings Act. Leaders included in the 
arrests  were  SAMWU  provincial  organiser  Mr.  Sonnyboy  Sekaledi,  SAMWU 
Johannesburg  branch  chairperson  Mr.  Essawu  Mbele,  SAMWU  Johannesburg 
secretary general Mr. Dumisani Langa and Johannesburg branch treasurer Ms. Paulina 
Sekaledi. The leadership of SAMWU condemned the police action publicly (Mail and 
Guardian,  2005b).  During  the  same  period,  a  national  SAMWU  representative 
disclosed that relations between SAMWU and SALGA at that point were “very tense” 
but had never been very good at a national level because according to him, SALGA 
was accustomed to “unilateral” decision-making (Interview: Danny Farmer).
SAMWU  and  IMATU  received  support  for  their  demands  from  different 
organisations. Speaking in Cape Town, COSATU Western Cape secretary Mr. Tony 
Ehrenreich remarked to a crowd of striking municipal workers “We can’t allow the 
apartheid gap to continue” (Mail and Guardian, 2005a). COSATU general secretary, 
Mr. Zwelinzima Vavi, remarked that the SAMWU strike was “a warning shot” for 
SALGA, and that many more strikes could be expected from SAMWU from July 2005 
to February 2006 if  SALGA did not “make more progress” in  its  offer  (Mail  and 
Guardian, 2005c). The APF released a press statement in support of the strike and its 
position was that “SAMWU’s strike [was] part of a much larger working class struggle 
for  a  living  wage,  against  poverty  and  managerial  arrogance/greed  and  against 
capitalist barbarism” (APF, 2005).
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Incidentally, the threatened period of strikes covered the same period that preparation 
for local government elections (1 March 2006) would take place. Mr. Themba Mana55, 
a  provincial  SALGA  representative,  identified  the  threatening  of  strike  activity 
towards election time as a union strategy to “leverage” at negotiations. He inferred:
The fact that they [SAMWU] are part of the broader Tripartite Alliance through 
COSATU gives them [SAMWU] an edge,  in  terms of  seeking to influence 
SALGA politicians towards their favour (Interview: Mr. Mana).
When commenting on the relationship between SAMWU and SALGA at a national 
level,  Mr.  Danny  Farmer56,  a  national  SAMWU  representative,  described  the 
employment  relationship between SAMWU and SALGA as being “a very difficult 
relationship” (Interview: Danny Farmer) over the years. He described the bargaining 
approach  of  SALGA  over  the  years  as  increasingly  unilateral  despite  the  dispute 
resolution mechanisms in place. He accused SALGA of, at  times, undermining the 
bargaining processes.  Mr. Mana, a SALGA Eastern Cape provincial  representative, 
expressed a different viewpoint. He described relations at SALGBC as “quite good” 
and “sound”, although he recognised some points of difference, especially over salary 
increments  (Interview:  Mr.  Mana).  In  response  to  strike  actions  by  SAMWU,  he 
insisted that SALGA could not “simply produce popular decisions that do not have a 
sound business sense at the end of the day” (Interview: Mr. Mana).
A SAMWU Eastern Cape provincial representative, Mr. Tali Bester57, acknowledged 
that  since the formation of the SALGBC, the presence of many ANC members  in 
SALGA had been a positive characteristic of the bargaining structure at a provincial 
level. He remarked:
If  we [SAMWU representatives]  have got  something  that  we want  to  push 
within the structure of SALGA, [we] caucus with those ANC members who are 
members of SALGA. We caucus with them [pause] secretly, then perhaps we 
… agree that they are going to assist us because not all, for instance, not all 
members of SALGA are members of the ANC, although the majority of them 
are  … if  they have got  no problem with  assisting  us,  they do assist  us  … 
sometimes  …  [certain]  problems  [hinder]  members  of  the  ANC  who  are 
willing to assist us [SAMWU representatives] (Interview: Mr. Bester).
 
55 Pseudo name.
56 Pseudo name.
57 Pseudo name.
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Mr. Bester’s statement pointed to the response of some SAMWU representative to the 
new  bargaining  situation  which  is  characterised  by  predominantly  ANC  aligned 
SALGA members. He went on to locate the general response of SAMWU to SALGA 
by commenting that:
If SALGA is doing well, we [SAMWU representatives] praise them, but if they 
are doing anything that will affect the workers lives, we’ll protect our workers 
from that kind of exploitation (Interview: Mr. Bester). 
4.8 SAMWU and the ANC
The 2004 COSATU Worker Survey revealed that there is a generally high support for 
the  ANC  amongst  workers.  In  confronting  SALGA  during  industrial  disputes, 
SAMWU has inadvertently brought to light contradictions in its own relationship with 
the ANC party. In a discussion document, the ANC commented:
Governance  has  added many new possibilities  and also  complexities  to  the 
tasks  facing  the  ANC,  it  has  also  brought  new  challenges  to  the  broader 
alliance. As members of a governing party, for instance, leading ANC cadres 
now  find  themselves  playing  the  role  of  managers/employers  of  tens  of 
thousands  of  ANC  members/supporters,  and  also  of  organised  COSATU 
affiliated public sector unions. The inevitable tensions in these new realities do 
not have to become irresolvable contradictions … [T]hese kind of challenges 
underline the need for an effective Alliance that is able to manage and negotiate 
sectoral  perspectives  and  interests  within  the  wider  context  of  a  common 
national democratic transformation struggle (ANC, 2005).
Since 1994, the new government has consisted of a number of ANC members, SACP 
members  and former unionists  that  were involved in the liberation  struggle.  These 
members sit on various influential committees and participate on consultative bodies 
with labour. When the ANC came to power, COSATU and the SACP were no longer 
simply a part of a liberation movement but part of a “governing coalition” (McKinley, 
2003). Since then the extent of involvement by COSATU and SACP in the “governing 
coalition” was questioned. COSATU was argued to play an increasingly marginalised 
role (Southall, 2001a). In a document, COSATU complained that: 
The balance of forces in the Alliance today favours those who want only a 
limited role for the Alliance and indeed the ANC itself…Once elections are 
over, we [COSATU] go back into the painful reality of being sidelined… we 
are routinely told that ‘government must govern, there is no dual power, there 
is  no  co-determination,  and  COSATU  must  not  treat  the  Alliance  as  a 
bargaining chamber’ (COSATU, 2003c).
85
Despite this, it is certain that COSATU continues to encourage its members to bolster 
the ANC and SACP as a “strategic buy-in” to ensure “participation by the organized 
working class in the ‘people’s government’ (ANC-led) and the ‘people’s movement’ 
(the Alliance) and provide the best means to achieve the political and socio-economic 
transformation promised by the RDP as the programmatic  embodiment  of working 
class struggles” (McKinley, 2003:46). 
SAMWU has consistently expressed support for the ANC at national and municipal 
elections as part of its resolutions since 1994. At its 7th National Congress in 2003, 
SAMWU  resolved  that  it  would  make  resources  available  for  national  election 
campaigns (April 2004) including the release of officials to campaign for the ANC 
(SAMWU, 2003). In 2004, SAMWU pledged its support to the ANC manifesto for 
national government elections and one would never have supposed that two years prior 
to that, SAMWU had taken to the streets in one of the biggest strikes in its history 
against SALGA. Nevertheless, in 2006, SAMWU pledged support for the ANC during 
municipal elections.
In his support for the ANC as a party, Mr. Gordon Sithole58, a Makana Municipality 
SAMWU shop steward in Grahamstown stated, “We [SAMWU representatives] will 
always urge our members to support the ANC because we do not want to be led by any 
other government but the ANC” (Interview: Mr. Sithole). He further proclaimed “We, 
as  SAMWU,  will  always  support  the  ANC-led  government  irrespective  of  the 
disagreements that we have because we agree to disagree. There’ll always be problems 
in politics” (Interview: Mr. Sithole). He did not support the ANC in denial of visible 
problems  with  the  ANC  as  a  party.  Some  SAMWU  members  perceive  certain 
individuals within the ANC as pursuing personal interests, instead of living up to the 
ideals of the organisation. Mr. Sithole stressed:
I think people [in the ANC] these days are not actually in politics because they 
want to develop the communities. They are in politics as a stepping ladder to 
better life for them. Yes, the ANC is saying better life for all but when you look 
at  issues,  you’ll  find  it’s  not  better  life  for  all,  it’s  better  life  for  certain 
individuals (Interview: Mr. Sithole).
These perceptions have apparently led to some discussions of the SACP as an option to 
the ANC. As the SACP does not run for elections, support for the SACP can only be 
58 Pseudo name.
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judged on the basis of articulated backing. Mr. Sithole commented:
I believe that the SACP is a very strong organisation and also it has a strong 
following among the working class because it is a vanguard of the working 
class … if [the SACP ran for local government elections] I believe they might 
take local government somewhere (Interview: Mr. Sithole). 
Representatives of the SACP frequently contribute to SAMWU congresses and branch 
meetings.  As the “political  vanguard” of the working class, the SACP seems to be 
accepted as a mouthpiece to drive and represent a broadly desired socialist agenda. In 
2004, there were perceptions of a potential separation of the SACP from the Alliance. 
In  an  attempt  to  rectify  perceptions  of  a  strained  ANC-SACP  relationship, 
representatives  of  the ANC and SACP met  to  renew organisational  “vows” to the 
Tripartite Alliance in August 2004 (Sowetan, 2004a). SACP veteran, Brian Bunting 
remarked that the Alliance at times “saved the ANC from destroying itself” (Sowetan, 
2004a:4). 
Despite  that,  the  perceptions  of  problems  within  the  ANC do  not  appear  to  have 
constituted a big enough threat to the immediate general support of the ANC by the 
leadership  and  membership  of  SAMWU.  Some  SAMWU  members  perceive  the 
continual  support  of  the  ANC  as  an  important  venture  to  building  a  significant 
Tripartite Alliance. A Makana Municipality SAMWU member, Ms. Barbara Hash59, 
commented: 
It [the Alliance] is an organic alliance … cemented with blood and there’s no 
papers signed saying that ‘this is an alliance’. I know people are saying … the 
Alliance will break away, but that is not my feeling (Interview: Barbara Hash).
Ms.  Hash  suggested  that  there  was  no  formal  agreement  that  bound  the  Alliance 
however this is inaccurate. After a meeting between SACTU and COSATU in March 
1990,  it  was  resolved  that  SACTU  be  absorbed  into  COSATU  with  the  aim  of 
achieving a one country one union federation situation. Following this meeting, in May 
1990 the COSATU  CEC debated the Tripartite Alliance and at a meeting the ANC, 
SACP and COSATU formally constituted the Tripartite Alliance under the leadership 
of the ANC (COSATU homepage). 
59 Pseudo name.
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There is historic rhetoric of this term “organic alliance”. In early 1950 the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party warned against adopting a "dogmatic hostility to 
nationalism" and called for an “organic alliance” with the ANC (Vadi,  1995).  The 
Communist  Party  anticipated  that  by  allowing  the  relationship  with  the  national 
movement to develop naturally during the struggle against apartheid, new possibilities 
of  developing  class  consciousness  were  possible.  In  pursuit  of  national 
consciousness60, the ANC would facilitate class consciousness as there was a strong 
link between national and class struggles during that period (Vadi, 1995). Ms. Hash’s 
statement suggested that she perceived the Alliance as a natural rather than officially 
existing and hence her perception of a never-ending Alliance. 
Mr. Bester proclaimed:
We believe that our Alliance is not just an alliance that has been established 
only to look at the question of trying to overcome or oppose other political 
parties … we are fighting for … our [SAMWU] resolution … therefore the 
Alliance is still necessary (Interview: Mr. Bester).
Mr.  Sam  Patho61,  a  SAMWU  Eastern  Cape  provincial  representative  and  former 
Umkhonto we Sizwe member commented:
Because most of them (SAMWU members) are members of the ANC, they end 
up supporting the question of the Alliance … there are some members who 
believe that we should not have an alliance with the ANC, but the majority of 
our members [agree] to that kind of alliance (Interview: Mr. Patho). 
In 2003, the SAMWU Congress,  however,  criticized the Alliance for only existing 
“when nearing elections and when it is convenient for the ANC” (SAMWU, 2003). To 
deal with this SAMWU resolved to encourage SAMWU members to “participate in all 
structures  of  the Alliance … to join those structures  so as  to be able  to influence 
positions  and  build  the  ANC,  SACP,  COSATU  and  SANCO”  (SAMWU,  2003). 
Consequently, it is acceptable that many SAMWU members be actively involved in 
these organisations, although not necessarily at a leadership level. Membership within 
the  ANC  seems  to  be  highly  favoured  despite  the  complications.  One  SAMWU 
representative reasoned:
We believe that if members of SAMWU per se are also members of the ANC 
and participating effectively within the structures of the ANC, they will be able 
to influence those people within the structures of the ANC or within the rank 
60 National consciousness is the collective consciousness of individuals of a nation.
61 Pseudo name.
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and  file  of  the  ANC  …  if  members  of  SAMWU  in  their  majority  are 
participating in the structures of the ANC and they become majorities  over 
those members of the ANC who support capitalism … we must be there in the 
ANC  with  the  objective  of  influencing  our  direction  towards  socialism 
(Interview: Mr. Bester). 
After the 8th Congress in 2006, SAMWU noted that “the Alliance was strategically 
entered  into  because  it  was  argued  that  it  was  a  necessary  vehicle  to  advance 
socialism” (SAMWU, 2006). Noting this, SAMWU took a position that that debate of 
“whether the Alliance should continue to exist or not must constantly be evaluated 
against its ongoing value as a vehicle to fight for socialism” (SAMWU, 2006).
4.9 Conclusion
The environment within which relations between SAMWU and government exists has 
shifted over time. As local government has transformed to meet social and economic 
demands, the relationship between SAMWU and government has met with difficulties. 
In response, SAMWU has fairly consistently coordinated activities to put pressure on 
government  and  businesses  to  desist  with  liberalisation.  Government  has  a  broad 
responsibility to meet the varied demands of different groups within the nation. With 
an ANC majority in government, the existence of the Alliance has placed strain on 
SAMWU  relations  with  government.  While  historically  SAMWU  and  the  ANC 
collaborated  as  allies  against  the  apartheid  system,  a  common  enemy,  such  an 
association meets with difficulties under the present democratic political and economic 
environment. Distinctions between the ANC in government and the ANC as an ally 
have become difficult.  The next chapter  presents the background of Makana Local 
Municipality.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BACKGROUND TO MAKANA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
5.1 Introduction
The  previous  chapters  have  pointed  to  a  range  of  emerging  contradictions  and 
industrial relations difficulties because of the relationship between SAMWU and the 
ANC via the Alliance. This chapter introduces early political and municipal changes 
during the transition to democracy that have contributed to the character of the present 
Makana Local  Municipality.  The rest  of  the chapter  provides  a  background to  the 
structures and key features of the municipality before moving on to chapter six where 
the dynamics of the employment relationship are explored in the case study.
5.2 Early municipal government developments 
Historic municipal developments of Makana Municipality were largely influenced by 
national events as South Africa experienced social, economic and political changes. 
From  the  1980s,  independent  municipalities  were  established  in  Grahamstown: 
Grahamstown City Council  (governed White  areas),  Rhini  City  Council  (governed 
African areas) and the Coloured Management Committee (governed Coloured areas). 
Councillors and committee members were elected for a period of two years and were 
given  a  stipend.  The  Progressive  Federal  Party  (PFP)  and  the  NP  were  the  main 
political  parties  until  the  launching  of  the  ANC  Grahamstown  branch  in  1990 
(Grocott’s  Mail,  1990d:2).  During  the  pre-interim  phase  of  local  government 
developments, a Local Government Negotiating Forum (LGNF) was set up in 1993. It 
consisted of members of the Grahamstown City Council, the Rhini City Council, the 
Coloured Management Committee, political parties, SANCO, labour organisations and 
the Grahamstown Civic Association (GRACA). This forum was set up to negotiate the 
appointment  of temporary councils  which would regulate  until  the 1995 municipal 
elections.
Noteworthy  political  developments  began  to  take  place  after  the  1994  national 
elections and 1995 municipal elections. A significant development from 1994 was the 
consistent electoral victory of the ANC. In 1994, the ANC won the majority vote in the 
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national elections in the former Albany Magisterial District area62. The overwhelming 
victory of the ANC in the area revealed that there was strong support for the ANC in 
the area. 
Table 5.   1  :   1994 Election results: Albany Magisterial District  
National Assembly
Party Number 
of votes
Percentage 
of votes
ANC 34 847 75.8
NP 6 657 14.5
DP 2 258 4.9
PAC 734 1.6
ACDP 327
FF 298
AMCP 74
FP 43
DPSA 24
SOCCER 22
WRPP 31
KISS 17
WLP 16
ADM 15
MF 13
LUSAP 3
XPP 4
AMP 4
Provincial Assembly
Party Votes Percentage
ANC 34 819 75.9
NP 5 605 12.2
DP 3 437 7.5
PAC 800 1.7
ACDP 401
FF 311
IFP 141
ADM 54
MP 25
Source: Grocott’s Mail
After the 1994 elections, plans for a transitional council took place. The Grahamstown 
Transitional Local Council was set up from 1 January 1995. This Transitional Local 
Council functioned from 1995 to 2000. In November 1995, Grahamstown had the first 
62 Grahamstown was the seat of the District. New municipal boundaries were drawn by 2000.
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democratic local government elections. 22 086 people out of 32 016 registered voters 
voted at  these elections.  The ANC gained 13 out of 20 seats on the Grahamstown 
Transitional Local Council, the DP secured five seats and the last two seats went to 
independents  put  forward  by  GRACA.  Table  5.2  shows  the  composition  of  the 
Grahamstown Transitional Local Council after the 1995 elections. It reveals that ANC 
councillors were a majority on the council.
Table 5.   2  :   1995 Grahamstown Transitional Local Council 
Party Area Councillor name
ANC Ward 1 Mr. Vuyani Kolisi
ANC Ward 2 Mr. Zolile Makile
ANC Ward 3 Mr. Colley Draai
ANC Ward 4 Mr. Dala Manakali
ANC Ward 5 Ms. Nosipho Plaatjie
ANC Ward 6 Mr. Xanti Nojoko
DP Ward 7 Mr. John Porter
DP Ward 8 Ms. Mary Allen
IND63 Ward 9 Mr. Gerald Accom
IND Ward 10 Mr. John Walton
DP Ward 11 Mr. Leslie Reynolds
DP Ward 12 Mr. Michael Whisson
ANC PR64 Mr. Mzukisi Mpahlwa
ANC PR Ms. Nontuthuzelo Faku
ANC PR Mr. Charles Wessels
ANC PR Ms. Phumla Ntsunguzi
ANC PR Mr. Mbali Mzizi
ANC PR Ms. Nosipho Mango
ANC PR Mr. Mvuleni Booi
DP PR Mr. Izak Smuts
Source: Grocott’s Mail
During the transitional phase a new integrated system of local government was put in 
place.  Within  the  Transitional  Council,  councillors  worked  together  to  deal  with 
problems such as slow service delivery, complaints by residents about poor services, 
failure of residents to pay for services and other administrative matters.
In 1999, municipal national and provincial elections took place. Once again, the ANC 
won the majority vote at these elections.
63 IND – Independent.
64 PR – Proportional Representation. 
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Table 5.   3  : 1999 Municipal national and provincial election results: Grahamstown   
Transitional Local Council
Municipal 
national 
election
Municipal 
provincial 
election 
Party name Number of 
votes
Percentage
of votes
Number of 
votes
Percentage
of votes
ACDP 413 1.34 409 1.33
AEB 26 0.08 22 0.07
AITUP 12 0.04
ANC 23 687 76.88 23 798 77.39
AZAPO 294 0.95
DP 4 187 13.59 4 242 13.79
FA 33 0.11 35 0.11
FF 42 0.14 35 0.11
GPGP 65 0.21
IFP 71 0.23 70 0.23
MF 18 0.06
NNP 546 1.77 473 1.54
PAC 403 1.31 483 1.57
SPA 11 0.04
UCDP 19 0.06
UDM 983 3.19 1 185 3.85
Total 30 810 100 30 752 100
National and provincial election 
voter turnout percentage
N/A
Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage 
Municipal elections were held in 2000 and this marked the end of the interim phase of 
local government developments. Table 5.4 reveals that the ANC gained a majority vote 
after the 2000 municipal elections. This translated into an ANC majority municipal 
council. The ANC won 11 out of 20 seats on the council. Table 5.5 shows the list of 
council members and highlights the significant presence of ANC representatives on the 
council.
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Table 5.   4  : 2000 Municipal election results: Makana Local Municipality  
Party name Number of 
votes
Percentage 
of votes
ACDP 892 2.02
ANC 36 291 82.01
DA 6 181 13.97
UDM 889 2.00
Total 44 253 100
Voter turnout percentage65 57.66
Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage 
Table 5.   5  : 2000 Makana Local Municipality council members  
Party Area Councillor name
ANC Ward 1 Mr. Zamuxolo J. Peter
ANC Ward 2 Mr. Buyisile B. Maloni
ANC Ward 3 Mr. Mbabli  Mzizi
ANC Ward 4 Mr. Ndumiso D. Madinda
ANC Ward 5 Mr. Khululikhaya C. Mfecane
ANC Ward 6 Mr. Xolela Yili
DA Ward 7 Mr. Leslie Reynolds
ANC Ward 8 Mr. Ben Dlukulu
ANC Ward 9 Mr. Mxolisi P. Ntshiba66
ANC Ward 10 Mr. Reggie Waldick
ANC Ward 11 Ms. Ruth Plaatjie
ANC Ward 12 Mr. Mvuleni J. Booi
ANC PR Mr. Gerald Accom
ANC PR Ms. N.V. Kepe
ANC PR Ms. Elaine Louw
ANC PR Mr. Vumile Lwana
ANC PR Mr. Zolile B. Makile
ANC PR Mr. Phumla G. Matyumza
ANC PR Ms. Nozipho Mpahlwa
ANC PR Ms. Julia Wells
ACDP PR Mr. Stifani Louw
65 Voter turnout percentage is the percentage of registered voters that actually voted.
66 He was deputy-secretary of SANCO in 1995.
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DA PR Mr. Xolani Madyo
DA PR Mr. Michael Whisson
Source: Grocott’s Mail
After  the  2000 municipal  elections,  the  racially  based  Rhini  City  Council  and the 
Coloured Management Committee and Grahamstown City Council were completely 
dissolved  and the  TLC ended.  Following the  results,  new municipal  borders  were 
drawn and a municipality name was selected. Grahamstown was joined with Alicedale 
and Riebeeck East to establish Makana Local Municipality according to the Municipal 
Structures Act (1998). Since 2000, Makana Municipality has incorporated the towns of 
Grahamstown and the surrounding towns of Alicedale, Fort Brown, Carlisle Bridge, 
Sidbury, Salem and Riebeeck East. Grahamstown was established as the seat of the 
Municipal Council of Makana Municipality in 2000. In terms of the present municipal 
demarcations,  Makana  Municipality  belongs  to  category  B  and  is  situated  in  the 
Eastern Cape Province67 under the Cacadu District municipality. Makana Municipality 
has 12 wards. Figure 2 shows the location of the different wards.
Figure   2  : Makana Local Municipality wards  68  
67 The Eastern  Cape  Province  is  divided into  one metropolitan  municipality (Nelson Mandela),  six 
district municipalities (Cacadu, Amatole, Chris Hani, Ukhahlamba, O.R. Tambo and Alfred Nzo) and 
thirty-eight local municipalities (Camdeboo, Blue Crane Route, Ikwezi, Baviaans, Kouga, Kou-Kamma, 
Makana,  Ndlambe,  Sunday’s  River  Valley,  Mbashe,  Mnquma,  Great  Kei,  Amahlati,  Buffalo  City, 
Ngqushwa,  Nkonkobe,  Nxuba,  Inxuba  Yethemba,  Tsolwana,  Inkwanca,  Lukanji,  Intsika  Yethu, 
Emalahleni,  Engcobo,  Sakhisizwe,  Elundini,  Senqu,  Malethswai,  Gariep,  Mbizana,  Ntabankulu, 
Ingquza, Port St John’s, Nyandeni, Mhlontlo, King Sabata Dalindyebo, Umzimkulu and Umzimvubu) 
(www.dplg.co.za). 
68 Wards 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 not shown in the map are situated within Grahamstown. 
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Source: Demarcation Board homepage
Since 2000, the Municipal Council69 of Makana Municipality has had council members 
comprising the Mayor, Municipal Manager, municipal officials and ward councillors70. 
The Mayor is elected by the council to coordinate the work of the council and is the 
political head of the council. The Municipal Manager/Chief Executive Officer is the 
head  of  the  administration  of  the  council.  The  municipal  officials  work  for  the 
administration (for example, Department Directors or Assistant Directors). The ward 
councillors  are  elected  representatives  who  represent  the  local  community  on  the 
Municipal Council and at council meetings. Ward councillors are also part of Ward 
Committees, which are advisory committees that make recommendations on matters 
affecting their wards. The Committees are made up of ward councillors (who chair the 
meetings)  and  a  maximum  of  ten  people  from  the  community.  They  have  been 
established  to  allow  better  participation  from  the  community  in  the  council  and 
effective  communication  between  the  council  and  the  community.  In  sum,  the 
aforementioned  council  members  (the  management  component)  have  the  overall 
69 Municipal councils are set out in terms of sections 158-160 of the South African constitution (1996).
70 Councillors are elected for a term of five years.
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responsibility of ensuring the efficient execution of services to the communities of the 
demarcated areas (Municipal Systems Act no. 32 of 2000).  
5.3 Political party presence at Makana Local Municipality
The  ANC  has  progressively  won  the  majority  vote  at  national,  provincial  and 
municipal elections at Makana Municipality. It is worthwhile to note that according to 
a survey by the Human Sciences Research Council (2006), national voter turnout for 
national  and  provincial  elections  has  been  fairly  high  over  the  years  while  voter 
turnout for municipal elections has been low. Despite often low voter turnout, evidence 
reveals  that  the  ANC has  generally  had overwhelming  election  victory at  Makana 
Municipality.
Table  5.6 reveals  that  the ANC won the 2004 national  and provincial  elections at 
Makana Municipality. This revealed that the ANC held the most support in this area. 
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Table 5.   6  : 2004 National and Provincial election results: Makana Local   
Municipality
National 
election
Provincial 
election
Party name Number of 
votes 
Percentage 
of votes
Number of 
votes
Percentage 
of votes
ACDP 504 1.46 561 1.63
ANC 27 577 79.88 27 633 80.36
AZAPO 317 0.92 310 0.90
CDP 23 0.07
DA 3 772 10.93 3 732 10.85
EMSA 20 0.06
ID 715 2.07 549 1.60
IFP 54 0.16 42 0.12
KISS 16 0.05
MF 12 0.03
NA 15 0.04 22 0.06
NLP 6 0.02
NNP 134 0.39 112 0.33
OP 11 0.03
PAC 345 1.00 346 1.01
PJC 16 0.05
SPA 27 0.08 34 0.10
UCDP 26 0.08 42 0.12
UDM 865 2.51 956 2.78
UF 8 0.02
FFP 62 0.18 49 0.14
Total 34 525 100 34 388 100
National election voter 
turnout percentage
81.05
Provincial election voter 
turnout percentage
80.53
Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage 
Table 5.7 reveals the 2006 municipal election results at Makana Municipality. It  is 
worth noting that the ANC received fewer votes in 2006 than in 2000 and that voter 
turnout went down by 5.29%. Despite the lower voter turnout, the ANC won 11 out of 
12 seats on council. Table 5.8 shows that the majority of councillors on council after 
the 2006 municipal elections were ANC councillors. 
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Table 5.   7  : 2006 Municipal election results: Makana Local Municipality  
Party name Number of 
votes
Percentage 
of votes
ACDP 622 1.40
ANC 35 958 80.90
AZAPO 487 1.10
DA 6 272 14.11
ID 166 0.37
IPa 59 0.13
PAC 442 0.99
UDM 442 0.99
Total 44 448 100
Voter turnout percentage 52.37
Source: Independent Electoral Commission homepage 
Table 5.   8  : 2006 Makana Local Municipality council members  
Party Area Councillor name
ANC Ward 1 Ms. Boniwe Bonani
ANC Ward 2 Ms. Misiswe Madinda
ANC Ward 3 Mr. Zamuxolo J. Peter
ANC Ward 4 Mr. Melikaya Phongolo
ANC Ward 5 Mr. Luyanda Nase
ANC Ward 6 Mr. Zonwabele Mantla
ANC Ward 7 Ms. Nomhle S. Gaga
ANC Ward 8 Ms. Nomazwi J. Fuku
ANC Ward 9 Mr. Mxolisi P. Ntshiba
ANC Ward 10 Mr. Xolani G. Simakuhle
DA Ward 11 Ms. Lena C. May
ANC Ward 12 Mr. Ntsikelelo G. Stamper
ANC PR Ms. Thandeka J.P. Veliti
ANC PR Ms. Thuleka Ngeleza
ANC PR Ms. Nosipho C. Faltein
ANC PR Ms. Nonzameko C. Tyantsula
ANC PR Ms. Nomnqwewo J. Mshubeki
ANC PR Ms. Nombulelo C. Masoma
ANC PR Mr. Monwabisi E. Fulani
ANC PR Ms. Julia Wells
DA PR Mr. Leslie M. Reynolds
DA PR Mr. Michael Whisson
Source: Grocott’s Mail
Election results since 2000 reveal that there has been a significant degree of support 
for  the  ANC  at  Makana  Municipality  despite  low  percentage  of  voter  turnout  as 
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revealed in the tables. Also, since 2000 the majority of Makana Municipality council 
members have been ANC councillors. 
In addition, since 1994 the mayors in council have been ANC representatives. From 
1994 to 2000 mayors under the Grahamstown Transitional Local Council were ANC 
representatives and from 2000 to 2006 under Makana Municipality the mayors were 
ANC representatives.  Table  5.9  is  a  list  of  mayors  from 1994  to  2006  and  their 
political party membership.
Table 5.   9  : Municipality mayors (1994-2006)  
Year(s) Mayor name Political 
party
 membership
1994-1997 Mr. Mzukisi 
Mpahlwa
ANC
1997-1999 Ms. Nontuthuzelo 
Faku71
ANC
1999-2000 Mr. Likhaya 
Ngqezana72
ANC
Sep 2000-Dec 
2000
Mr. N. Vilakazi ANC
2000-2005 Mr. Vumile Lwana ANC
2005-2006 Mr. Phumelelo Kate ANC
Source: Grocott’s Mail
In 2005, the chairpersons of various municipal committees were ANC councillors and 
many  municipal  officials  had  ANC  memberships.  Table  5.10  shows  these 
chairpersons.  Table  5.11  reveals  the  political  and  other  memberships  of  some 
municipal officials at Makana Municipality in 2005. Many of these municipal officials 
were responsible over some workers that shared their ANC or union memberships.
71 She was also involved in the ANC Women’s League during her mayorship.
72 He was president of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) in 1995 and ANC councillor in 
2000.
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Table 5.   10  : 2005 Municipal Council committee chairpersons and their political   
affiliation
Councillor Position on Council
ANC Chairperson:  Environment,  Disaster  Management  and  Heritage 
Committee
ANC Chairperson: Finance and Service Delivery Committee
ANC Chairperson: Social Services and Empowerment Committee
ANC Chairperson: Land Housing and Infrastructural Development Committee
ANC Chairperson: Social Services and Community Empowerment Committee
ANC Chairperson: Tender Committee
ANC Chairperson: Human Resources and Administration Committee
Source: Makana municipality homepage
Table 5.   11  : 2005 Political party and other memberships of some municipal   
officials
Political party and other membership Position
ANC member + SACP member Director: Corporate Services
ANC member Director: Technical and 
Infrastructural Services
ANC member + former SAMWU shop steward Director: Social and Community 
Services
ANC member + former IMATU member Director: Financial Services
ANC  member  +  SACP  member  +  SAMWU 
member
Assistant Director: Human 
Resources Manager
SAMWU member Assistant Director: Fire 
Department
ANC  member  +  SACP  member  +  former 
SAMWU member
Assistant Director: Electricity 
Department
Source: Field notes (2005, 2006)
Figure 3 shows the macrostructure of Makana Municipality in 2005. It reveals that the 
municipal  officials  with ANC memberships had a responsibility of managing some 
workers  in  a  number  of  departments  and  divisions73 that  shared  their  ANC 
membership.             
73 Access to the precise number of workers was limited.
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Figure   3  : 2005 Makana Local Municipality: macro structure   
Source: Municipality macrostructure document
Directorate: Corporate Services
Director: Corporate Services [ANC and SACP member]
Divisions- Human Resources; Information Technology; Administration; 
Alicedale Administrative Unit; Riebeek-East Administrative Unit
Support clerks
Special Programmes 
Officer
Directorate: Technical and Infrastructural Services
Director: Technical and Infrastructure Services [ANC and SACP member]
Departments- Infrastructural Services; Planning and Land use; Technical 
Services 
Divisions- Design; Estates and Housing Management
Directorate: Financial Services
Director: Financial Services [ANC member]
Departments- Revenue; Expenditure
Directorate: Community and Social Services
Director: Community and Social Services [ANC member]
Divisions- Fire and Rescue; Library Services; Parks and recreation; Traffic 
Services; Primary Health Care; Environmental Health and Cleansing
Office of the Municipal manager
Municipal Manager
Office of the Executive 
mayor
Mayor [ANC member]
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5.4 SAMWU at Makana Local Municipality
SAMWU and IMATU have been the representative unions at Makana Municipality 
since 2001. In 2005, out of approximately 600 full-time employees SAMWU had a 
membership of 487 and eight shop stewards and IMATU had a membership of 74 and 
two shop stewards. SAMWU and IMATU have significantly different traditions and 
histories. SAMWU was very involved in liberation movement politics as an affiliate 
of COSATU and had a strong following amongst Black semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. SAMWU is a non-racial union but consists of a chiefly Black membership 
at  Makana  Municipality.  At  Makana  Municipality  the  predominant  Black  worker 
membership was very evident at general meetings observed in August and November 
2005. IMATU was a formation of a merger between two main unions,  the South 
African Association of Municipal Employees (SAAME) and the South African Local 
Authorities  Workers’  Union  (SALAWU)  and  became  an  affiliate  of  the  non-
politically  aligned  FEDUSA.  The  two  unions  that  merged  formerly  represented 
White, professional municipal employees.  As a result,  the membership of IMATU 
has predominantly been made up of White, professional municipal workers although 
it is presently a non-racial union. In an interview in 2005, Mr. Stewart, an IMATU 
shop  steward,  disclosed  that  IMATU  had  experienced  difficulties  appealing  to 
workers  in  the  area  and  securing  membership.  He  observed  that  IMATU  was 
perceived as a “Whites only union” (Interview: Mr. Stewart). SAMWU on the other 
hand had experienced gradual growth (Interview: Mr. Patho). 
 
Table 5.12 provides information of the leadership of the SAMWU local branch. The 
research revealed that most of the leaders of the local branch held ANC memberships 
and some were involved in the SACP and other organisations.
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Table 5.   12  : SAMWU local branch leadership since 2005/6  
Position Name Involvement
Chairperson Mr. Ndamase - SAMWU member since 
1997
- SAMWU shop steward 
since 2001
- Young Communists 
League member since 
2003
- ANC League member 
since 1989
- SACP member since 
1991 
Deputy chairperson Ms. Zono - SAMWU member since 
1997
- ANC member since 1995
Secretary Mr. Siphiwo Kate - SAMWU member  since 
1999
- ANC member 1994-1996
- ANC Fingo Village 
branch chairperson 1997-
1999
- Ward 8 ANC branch 
chairperson since 2001
- SACP member since 
1999
- SAMWU branch deputy 
chairperson in 2000
- COSATU local secretary 
in 2005
Shop steward Mr. Moneli - SAMWU member since 
1999
- ANC member since 1992
-SAMWU shop steward 
since 2004
Shop steward Mr. Kiti * Unavailable
Shop steward Mr. Luvuyo Sizane - ANC member since 
1990s
- ANC branch deputy 
chairperson in 2006
Shop steward Mr. Edward Vayo - SANCO member since 
1986
- ANC member since 
1990s
- SACP member
- SAMWU shop steward 
since 2000
Shop steward Mr. Zondani * Unavailable
 
Source: Grocott’s Mail and interviews
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5.5 The Local Labour Forum
Makana Municipality established a LLF in 2001 in accordance with the provisions of 
the  Organisational  Rights  Agreement  (2000,  2005).  The  members  to  this  forum 
include  SALGA,  SAMWU  and  IMATU  representatives.  SALGA  representatives 
comprise councillors and municipal officials. A typical LLF meeting may consist of 
up  to  twelve  persons.  The  LLF  is  the  primary  forum  where  the  unions  and 
management  debate  and  settle  matters  such  as  human  resources  related  issues, 
alternative  service  delivery  methods,  privatisation  proposals  and  other  workplace 
matters of mutual concern. According to Mr. Tiza Sape74, a SALGA representative on 
the LLF, relations between the different partners had been “generally very sound” 
since  the  establishment  of  the  forum (Interview:  Mr.  Sape).  Both  SAMWU  and 
IMATU shop stewards held similar  sentiments  about “sound” relations within the 
forum.
The LLF convened at least once a month or as agreed by the parties. The municipality 
has other committees for the effective running of the municipality, for instance the 
Recruitment  and  Selection  Committee  but  involvement  by  labour  on  these 
committees  is  less  direct  than  on  the  LLF.  Union  representatives  held  observer 
statuses on other committees. Out of ten to twelve persons attending LLF meetings, 
not  less  than five  of  these  tended to  be  members  of  the  ANC. ANC councillors 
constituted  a  majority  at  Makana  Municipality  and  were  a  majority  at  meetings, 
although  their  attendance  of  the  meetings  was  not  based  on  political  affiliation. 
Oftentimes attendance was dependent on availability (Interview: Mr. Sithole). 
5.6 Organisational transformation at Makana Local Municipality 
From 1994 to 2006, Makana Municipality has gone through important political as 
well  as  organisational  changes.  The  organisational  changes  have  mostly  been  an 
outcome of changes in macro and micro economic policy to redistribute municipal 
resources and redress the legacy of apartheid at municipalities. Since 2000, Makana 
Municipality has embarked on administrative restructuring to redress the imbalances 
and  inadequacies  left  from  the  former  local  government  system.  The  Municipal 
74 Pseudo name.
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Systems Act 32 of 2000 requires that the municipality annually monitor and evaluate 
its developmental performance. 
During April 2002, an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) was internally set up for 
the municipality and approved by the Makana Council. The rationale behind the IDP 
is “to ensure the allocation of the resources available to the municipality to those 
projects and programmes that will address specific development priorities” (Makana 
IDP  Review,  2004).  The  projects  have  been  categorised  into  technical  and 
infrastructure,  community  and  social  service,  local  economic  development  and 
finance  projects.  As  of  April  2002,  the  municipality  identified  its  development 
priorities  as  the  provision  of:  portable  water,  sanitation,  roads,  health  care 
(HIV/AIDS,  tuberculosis  and  access  to  care),  education  and  training,  land 
redistribution,  housing  and  safety,  electricity  and  communication,  local  economic 
development  (job creation and poverty alleviation),  emergency services (including 
disaster management) and transport (rail, taxis, bus and air) (Makana IDP Review, 
2004). A number of donors have contributed to assisting the transformation of the 
municipality. These include Rhodes University,  the Department of Housing, Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
the Provincial  Housing Board,  the Department  of Land Affairs,  the Public Works 
Board,  the  Cacadu  District  Municipality,  the  Municipal  Infrastructure  Grant,  the 
Integrated  Development  Plan,  the  Development  Bank of  Southern  Africa  and the 
Municipal Income Grant. 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 give a breakdown of the Makana Municipality 2003/4, 2004/5 
budgets,  respectively,  compiled  based  on  the  IDP.  The  incomes,  expenditures, 
surpluses and deficits of the different directorates are given. The tables reveal how 
the budgets have been distributed in light of the IDP to facilitate social development. 
The  tables  reveal  that  the  municipality  budgeted  for  technical  and  infrastructural 
services the most. In 2003/4 and 2004/5, the Technical and Infrastructural Services 
(housing),  Corporate  Services  and  Community  and  Social  Services  directorates 
experienced deficits, meaning that there was more expenditure than budgeted income. 
The  budgets  show  the  financial  constraints  facing  reform  at  the  municipality. 
Financial limitations restrict maximised implementation of reform plans. The budget 
is only one indicator of the reform situation at the municipality and other factors, such 
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as,  tangible  evidence  of  reform outputs  (buildings,  sewerage  systems,  roads)  and 
community perspectives on reform would need to be considered for a more accurate 
picture of the state of reform.
Table 5.   13  : Makana Local Municipality budget compilation 2003/4  
Directorate Income 2003/4 Expenditure 2003/4 Surplus (+)/
Deficit (-)
Community and Social 
Services
10 969 120 25 388 530 - 14 419 410
Corporate Services 3 484 390 13 214 890 - 9 730 500
Dog tax 31 420 29 500 +1 920
Executive Mayor 849 830 - 849 830
Financial Services 19 893 510 2 235 640 + 17 657 870
Municipal Manager 200 000 1 965 380 - 1 765 380
Parking areas 21 760 53 450 -31 690
Technical and infrastructural 
services
10 435 240 13 218 770 - 2 783 530
Technical and infrastructural 
services (electricity)
31 819 330 24 367 590 +7 451 740
Technical and infrastructural 
services (housing)
161 100 202 800 - 41 700
Technical and infrastructural 
services (water)
13 731 360 9 190 920 +4 540 440
Total 90 747 230 90 717 300 + 29 930
Source: Makana municipality homepage
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Table 5.   14  : Makana Local Municipality budget compilation 2004/5  
Directorate Income 2004/5 Expenditure 2004/5 Surplus (+)/
Deficit (-)
Community and Social 
Services
13 171 850 27 774 500 - 14 602 650
Corporate Services 4 383 390 12 855 970 - 8 472 580
Dog tax 38 920 27 500 +11 420
Executive Mayor 910 370 - 910 370
Financial Services 23 617 710 2 740 310 + 20 877 400
Municipal Manager 1 592 320 - 1 592 320
Parking areas 1 860 +1 860
Technical and infrastructural 
services
8 856 060 16 435 370 - 7 579 310
Technical and infrastructural 
services (electricity)
33 618 620 25 673 190 +7 945 430
Technical and infrastructural 
services (housing)
162 000 208 890 - 46 890
Technical and infrastructural 
services (water)
13 166 300 8 705 680 + 4 460 620
Total 97 016 710 96 924 100 + 92 610
Source: Makana municipality homepage 
5.7 Conclusion
Significant  municipal  and  political  developments  took place  during  the  transition 
phase. Since 1994, the ANC consistently won at national, provisional and municipal 
elections. After Makana Municipality was established in 2000, the municipal council 
was  characterised  by  predominantly  ANC  councillors  and  the  municipality  was 
characterised  by  a  number  of  ANC  members.  With  regard  to  union  presence, 
SAMWU had  the  greatest  membership  at  the  municipality  as  of  2005.  In  effect, 
employment  relations  at  the  municipality  was  characterised  by  shared  ANC 
membership between workers and managers.
The next chapter explores the dynamics of labour relations at the municipality when 
workers and managers share memberships and political histories.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE EXPLORATION OF THE DYNAMICS OF LABOUR 
RELATIONS AT MAKANA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the dynamics of labour relations at the case study. It shows the 
contemporary dynamics of labour relations at Makana Local Municipality within the 
context of the Alliance. This chapter presents the dynamics of labour relations based 
on  the  information  generated  from a  case  study framework  which  applied  direct 
observations, interviews and content analysis. 
6.2 Post-1994 Labour Relations Challenges at Makana Local Municipality
Historic  municipal  employment  relations  were governed largely by common laws 
because  there  was  no  legislation  that  provided  for  local  government  bargaining 
systems (Botes et. al., 1992). Important changes to municipalities occurred from the 
late 1980s as more unions challenged undemocratic  municipalities  and battled for 
improved conditions of employment. Post-1994, the Labour Relations Act of 1995 
and  the  Municipal  Systems  Act  became  the  primary  legislation  governing  post-
apartheid  employment  relations  at  municipalities.  Management  and  union 
representatives revealed that relations between workers and management had been 
“good” since 2000. In an interview, SAMWU shop-steward Mr. Sithole identified 
that  Makana  Municipality  faced  a  number  of  challenges  while  it  transformed  its 
departments  as  required  by  municipal  policy  and  delivered  services  with  limited 
resources. He revealed that alleged corruption and alleged political appointments had 
been contemporary challenges for labour relations since the municipality has been 
ANC dominated (Interview: Mr. Sithole).  Some municipal  workers also identified 
these  two  issues  as  factors  that  have  caused  difficulties  for  relations  between 
management and unions. 
6.2.1 Corruption
SAMWU has led demonstrations against alleged corruption by some individuals at 
the municipality. In 2003, municipal workers at the Makana Municipality alleged that 
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there was corruption within the electricity department and presented the matter  to 
SAMWU. In September 2003, SAMWU alleged that there was misuse of funds at the 
municipality electricity department. In March 2004, discontented municipal workers 
picketed outside Makana municipal  offices in Grahamstown demanding an end to 
corruption and the resignation of the Municipal Manager, Mr. Pravine Naidoo and the 
mayor  Mr.  Vumile  Lwana because  they  apparently  had not  met  with  workers  to 
discuss their grievances over the alleged corruption case. A month after the picket, 
SAMWU provincial organiser Ten-Ten Ndyalivani gave a statement to the Grocott’s 
Mail, a local newspaper, that there was prima facie evidence of corruption by certain 
individuals at the municipality (Grocott’s Mail, 2004a:3). SAMWU gained support 
from  its  alliance  partner  the  SACP  and  also  the  local  UDM  for  pursuing  the 
corruption allegations.  The SACP accused the  municipality  of  being “a  centre  of 
corruption” with “poor administration” and “lacking internal audit measures”.
In April 2004, Mr. Lungile Mxube75, then director of corporate services (also an ANC 
member),  was dismissed for gross insubordination towards the municipal manager 
after  did not  submit  a  report  on the allegations  in  the  electricity  department.  Mr. 
Mxube  alleged  that  he  was  dismissed  because  he  had  recommended  that  the 
Municipal Manager be suspended because he had not acted on proof of corruption in 
the electricity department (Grocott’s  Mail,  2004d:1).  COSATU, SAMWU and the 
SACP  expressed  support  for  Mr.  Mxube  during  this  period  and  demanded  his 
reinstatement (Grocott’s Mail, 2004b:3). In May 2004, the auditor general’s office in 
Port  Elizabeth  revealed  that  the  municipality  had  accrued  electricity  distribution 
losses of R2.3 million that it  could not justify (Grocott’s  Mail,  2004d:1).  In June 
2004, the Scorpions and a Joint Anti-Corruption Team investigated the allegations of 
fraud  and  corruption  at  the  municipality.  In  September  2005,  the  Joint  Anti-
Corruption Team spokesperson Mr. Mzukisi  Fatyela,  revealed that  four municipal 
officials would face charges of fraud and corruption (Grocott’s Mail, 2005:1). The 
Scorpions  and  Joint  Anti-Corruption  Team  presented  a  document  to  the  public 
prosecutor  at  the end of 2005. At the end of 2006, the report  on the outcome of 
corruption investigations was in possession of the public prosecutor and the case had 
not yet been concluded. 
75 Mr. Mxube became the district secretary of the SACP Cacadu branch from 2005.
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6.2.2 Appointments
During  the  interim phase  between  1995 and 2000,  the  Grahamstown TLC had a 
majority  of  ANC councillors.  These councillors  were involved in the handling of 
municipal affairs and participated in the selection process of municipal employees. In 
1996 the Grahamstown TLC appointed Mr. Mbekela as Human Resources manager 
ahead  of  another  candidate.  In  response  to  this  appointment,  the  candidate  not 
appointed  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Grocott’s  Mail  alleging  that  the  appointment  was 
“purely a political appointment” because Mr. Mbekela was an ex-ANC councillor. 
Mr. Cridland, Chief Executive at the TLC, responded to the letter via Grocott’s Mail 
and emphasised that the process had been fair. He revealed that there was a panel of 
twenty-one members including council members, representatives of three union and 
two  senior  officials.  Incidentally,  most  of  the  council  members  were  ANC 
representatives and SAMWU was a union represented. The case of alleged unfair 
labour practice was not pursued and Mr. Mbekela kept his post until  resigning in 
2000 during an appointment dispute of Mr. Charles Wessels, a former Grahamstown 
deputy mayor.
Ms.  Betty  Banda76,  a  councillor  from  1997  to  1999,  revealed  that  during  the 
transitional  period  councillors  faced  a  dilemma  of  being  part  of  municipal 
management and acting as elected politicians. They often lacked knowledge on how 
to deal  with operational  matters  and often ran the risk of taking politically based 
actions  on  the  council.  She  disclosed  that  this  was  particularly  true  during 
appointments (Interview: Ms. Banda). In February 2000, the Grahamstown TLC was 
accused of unfair labour practice after appointing a political associate of local ANC 
leaders, Mr. Charles Wessels, ahead of Mr. Kaiser Nxamleko, the candidate who won 
the council  selection  committee’s  vote.  At  the time,  Mr.  Wessels  worked for  the 
provincial arts and culture department in Port Elizabeth and Mr. Nxamleko was a 
senior administrative officer. Council policy gave preference to internal candidates 
but  in  this  case  Mr.  Wessels  was  appointed to  the  post  of  deputy  city  secretary. 
IMATU,  the  union  Mr.  Nxamleko  belonged  to,  declared  a  dispute  against  the 
Grahamstown TLC for the appointment of Mr. Wessels. In March 2000 SAMWU 
issued a statement supporting the appointment. Mr. Howard Skweza, then secretary 
of  the  SAMWU  local  branch,  said  that  SAMWU  had  short-listed  Mr.  Wessels 
76 Pseudo name.
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because they “believed that  his  abilities,  potential  and his experience as a former 
deputy mayor  of  Grahamstown made him the best  possible  candidate”  (Grocott’s 
Mail, 2000:2). Mr. Skweza concluded his statement by adding:
 “When we (SAMWU) question ourselves as to why the DP is fighting for  
someone (Mr. Nxamleko) from a previously disadvantaged community, we  
arrive at the conclusion that DP is fighting against Mr. Wessels, who is also 
from a previously disadvantaged community, because he used to give them a 
tough time while he was an ANC councillor and deputy mayor of this town” 
(Grocott’s Mail, 2000:2).
Mr. Nxamleko was appointed as deputy city secretary instead. 
In 2005, a municipal official and SALGA representative, Mr. Tiza Sape77, noted that 
the  issue  of  appointments  was  potentially  “fertile  ground for  dissent”  at  Makana 
(Interview:  Mr.  Sape)  but  highlighted  that  discussions  with  union  representatives 
prior  to  selections  had  aided  the  decision-making  process.  He  commented  that 
SAMWU  union  representatives  had  occasionally  attempted  to  persuade  internal 
appointments:
Towards  the  direction  of  their  members  … despite  the  fact  that  in  many 
instances, the [union] members [did] not necessarily possess the same kind of 
skills or competencies required for the post (Interview: Mr. Sape). 
He explained the tendency of SAMWU representatives to recommend members to 
various posts they might not qualify as “an issue of loyalty” (Interview: Mr. Sape). 
He  supposed  that  SAMWU  representatives  would  endeavour  to  assist  as  many 
suitable  SAMWU members  as possible  into municipal  positions.  Recognising this 
possibility,  Mr.  Sape  stressed  that  the  responsibility  of  management  was  to 
continually ensure that the best decisions on recruitment and selection were arrived at 
in  an  amicable  manner.  On  the  other  hand,  SAMWU  shop  steward  Mr.  Sithole 
commented that management did not consistently address appointment matters at the 
municipality although union supported applicants were qualified. He argued:
77 Pseudo name. 
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Some of our members are not being appointed to senior posts that they are 
applying  for  and  end  up  having  disputes  …  some  of  our  members  have 
applied  for  senior  positions  but  have  not  been  appointed  …  one  of  our 
members applied for a post and it was not given to her for reasons which to us 
were discriminatory78 (Interview: Mr. Sithole).
Mr. Dally Monza79, a Makana municipal official and member of the ANC and SACP, 
acknowledged that, from a management perspective, employment relations at Makana 
Municipality had been “good” over years (Interview: Mr. Monza). He noted that the 
case of the promotion of a worker, Mrs. Landiwe Mantla had strained relations at the 
municipality.  In  October  2003,  Mrs.  Mantla,  applied  for  the  position  of  senior 
foreman in the Community and Social Directorate. She was recommended for the 
post by a selection panel which included the municipal manager and the head of the 
directorate but the mayor, Mr. Vumile Lwana, refused the appointment. He argued 
that the candidates were not asked questions in compliance with the job description. 
Mrs.  Mantla  approached  SAMWU,  her  union,  and  SAMWU  lodged  a  formal 
grievance with the municipality. In June 2004, an arbitrator ruled that the interference 
by  the  Mayor  in  the  appointment  was  an  unfair  labour  practice  and  that  the 
complainant be promoted. An advocate to the case pointed out that an interpretation 
of  the  Municipal  Systems  Act  and  Recruitment  and  Selection  Policy  gave  the 
Municipal  Manager  the  responsibility  of  staff  appointments  and  not  the  Mayor 
(Grocott’s Mail, 2004c). The dispute was taken to the bargaining council and won 
SAMWU. This outcome was challenged by the Mayor. The matter was taken to the 
Labour Court and a settlement was reached that the top three candidates, including 
Mrs. Mantla, be re-interviewed. Another candidate was selected for the post. 
According to Mr. Wally Gray80 an ANC and SACP Cacadu district representative 
who was a Makana municipal official from 2001 to 2004, workers often alleged that 
appointments at the municipality took place on the basis of political connections to 
ANC councillors or personal connections to ANC councillors. In September 2006, the 
brother of Mayor Phumelelo Kate, Mr. Siphiwo Kate (also a SAMWU representative) 
was promoted from a cleaner and messenger at the local library to personnel clerk in 
78 This  case  was  previously  referred  to  and  had  been  initially  deemed  unfair  labour  practice.  A 
resolution  later  passed  resulted  in  the  re-advertising  of  the  post  and  the  worker  lost  the  position 
(Interview: Wally Gray).
79 Pseudo name.
80 Pseudo name.
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the Human Resources division. This appointment was questioned by workers at the 
municipality (Grocott’s Mail, 2006:3) but the appointment was not disputed.
6.3 Management at Makana Local municipality 
The research revealed that the management at Makana Municipality consisted of two 
main entities: municipal officials and councillors. Management balanced a wide range 
of  community,  organisational,  economic  and  political  interests  at  Makana 
Municipality. Mr. Monza81, a municipal official (also member of ANC and SACP), 
emphasised that management needed to attain a “balance” between diverse interests 
from the community and workers in order to maintain  “good” workplace relations at 
the municipality  (Interview:  Mr.  Monza).  Since the  first  democratic  elections,  the 
numerous  relevant  social,  economic  and  political  developments  have  meant  that 
management ensures that all decisions made are in line with national and municipal 
objectives.  
In his capacity as a municipal official, Mr. Sape (a member of the ANC, SACP and 
SAMWU)  indicated  that  managing  interests  at  the  municipality  was  at  times 
complicated by shared political membership. The history of South Africa’s liberation 
struggle  entrenched  loyalties  between  individuals  and  organisations  and  created 
bonds  of  solidarity  (Buhlungu  and  Psoulis,  1999).  Post-apartheid,  managers  at 
Makana  Municipality  revealed  that  these  loyalties  existed  and  affected  their 
management roles. Mr. Sape remarked:
You, as a manager … are expected to be driven by some ethical code that will 
say to you that [at negotiations] you represent the employer … but sometimes 
loyalty, because of [political] affiliation [makes you] sympathetic [to workers] 
… but  at  the  end,  you  … have  to  find  a  way  which  cannot  actually  be 
misconstrued to be or which may not actually compromise your professional 
integrity because at the end you choose where your loyalty [lies]  … You [a 
manager] are appointed to take particular decisions,  which sometimes may 
contradict with your own conscience … but if the institution says do this, you 
just have to – it’s a challenge (Interview: Mr. Sape).
His  statement  highlighted  the  predicament  for  some  managers  in  executing  their 
duties because of shared political affiliation as some municipal workers. Mr. Sape 
emphasised that the goals of the “institution” were the primary goals for municipal 
81 Pseudo name. Mr. Monza was involved in the Provincial Executive Council  of the ANC Youth 
League and worked as a provincial research coordinator for the ANC in the Eastern Cape Province 
before he joined the municipality.
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officials  to  pursue  despite  the  possibility  of  managers  acting  contrary  to  their 
“conscience”. 
Mr. Monza, a municipal official and ANC and SACP member, recognised that the 
dominance  of  the  ANC  at  a  national  level  had  affected  the  direction  of  policy 
developments by government and at a local level ANC dominance had affected how 
managers implemented these policies. Mr. Monza indicated that the decisions made 
by management were influenced by the policies of the majority party, in this case, the 
ANC irrespective of whether managers supported the ANC or not. Mr. Monza stated: 
there is no way that management of any government institution may ignore 
the  policies  of  the  party  in  the  majority  …  therefore  decisions  that  we 
[managers]  find ourselves implementing will take the form of decisions  [of] 
the majority party … So directly or indirectly, whether you are a member or 
not you are influenced by those decisions by the majority party, regardless of 
whether you embrace them or not (Interview: Mr. Monza).
While he recognised that a party majority influenced how policies were implemented 
he  noted  that  his  particular  background  with  the  ANC  had  been  beneficial.  Mr. 
Monza stated:
Being part of the organisation [ANC] outside the institutional arrangement  
[that is, the workplace] definitely shapes your approach because it makes it  
easier for you to interpret and understand those policies because you are part 
of those forums where such policies are discussed and I would imagine with 
[my] experience … I would know all the [ANC] policies … what I might be 
required to do is to interpret that within the context of Makana Municipality 
guided by the Council …we at a management level don’t behave as politicians 
because we are not, we’re only employed … we must embrace all people  
regardless of their political affiliation … we service the community … but as 
a manager I would know what the ANC wants because I’ve participated in its 
structures  and  I  continue  to  participate  in  my  own  right  (Interview:  Mr.  
Monza).
Mr. Monza highlighted that his involvement in the ANC allowed him to interpret 
ANC policies well when these were implemented at the municipality. He recognised 
that he was not an ANC politician but acknowledged that his experience with the 
party gave him valuable insight the objectives of the ANC led government policies at 
the municipality.
Since  1994,  councillors  formed  part  of  management  at  Makana  Municipality  as 
political representatives and not major administrative decision makers. They shared 
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the responsibility of “balancing” organisational, community and political interests at 
Makana  Municipality,  although  their  political  roles  were  central.  These  elected 
representatives represented the interests of their constituencies within the Municipal 
Council. They acted as a bridge between their constituencies and the municipality. 
Different  councillors  represented  the  interests  of  their  constituencies  on  different 
portfolio committees82. From 1994 to 2006, ANC councillors have had the greatest 
representation on the municipal council and within portfolio committees.  Portfolio 
committees  discuss,  for  instance,  the  building  or  closure  of  roads.  If  there  is  a 
disagreement on a matter within the portfolio committee, this is discussed within the 
committee and a recommendation is then forwarded to the Executive Committee and 
Executive  Mayoral  Committee  which  makes  a  final  decision  (IDASA,  2006). 
Generally  speaking,  the  decisions  finalised  at  the  municipality  form  part  of  the 
recommendations  made  by  the  portfolio  committees  and  have  a  bearing  on 
development of areas that fall under Makana.
Mr. Ben Mandla83, an ANC councillor, a representative on the LLF and a member of 
the Corporate Services Portfolio Committee, expressed delight at an ANC majority 
within management at Makana Municipality. He acknowledged that an ANC majority 
had given members of the ANC the greatest representation in the municipal council 
and therefore the greatest vote on matters discussed and decided in the council. Mr. 
Mandla reasoned:
82 The  portfolio  committees  include:  the  Human  Resources  and  Administration  Committee;  the 
Community Tender Committee; the Environment, Disaster Management and Heritage Committee; the 
Economic Development and Tourism Committee; the Service Delivery and Community Empowerment 
Committee; the Executive Committee; the Social Services and Employment Committee; the Finance 
and Service Delivery Committee; the Executive Mayor Committee; the Land House and Infrastructure 
Committee;  the  Delivery  Committee;  the  Local  Economic  Development  and  Tourism  Portfolio 
Committee; the Land, Housing and Infrastructural Development Committee; the Mayoral Committee; 
the Grahamstown Diocesan Council Committee; the Grahamstown Cathedral Council Committee; the 
College  of  Transfiguration  Committee;  the  Gkhwezi  Women’s  Economic  Development  Project 
Committee; and the Aesthetics Committee (www.makana.gov.za/council.asp).  
83 Pseudo name.
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The  reason  why  we  campaign  at  elections  [is]  so  that  we  have  more 
representation  in  council  to  put  in  our  [ANC]  manifesto  … in  the  Local 
Labour Forum we’ve only one person who’s not an ANC councillor … he’s 
DA … he puts his views in and … we discuss things … [but] you find you [do 
not  see]  he’s  opposition  kind of  element  … we take the lead in terms of 
discussions and influence (Interview: Mr. Mandla). 
Mr. Tom Litteley84, a DA councillor and representative on the LLF, observed that 
over the years the growing support for the ANC at the municipality had been well 
received by the  majority  of  workers  at  Makana Municipality.  As  a  participant  in 
management, he observed:
Now that the ANC now control nearly all senior official positions, as well as 
the elected council positions, there is probably a greater sense of unity and 
common purpose … there is probably a sense that the ANC councillors are on 
the side of the workers, which generates a less confrontational approach [by 
workers]…there is probably greater goodwill between the ANC councillors 
and labour as Alliance partners … Until the departure of the senior White staff 
… the White officials could be blamed as being the cause of disputes and 
misunderstanding  …  they  [ANC  and  SAMWU  representatives]  speak  the 
same political language and … there is a sense of common purpose, which 
works to the benefit of human relations, but I’m not sure that it works to the 
benefit  of  the  efficiency  of  the  organisation  [that  is,  the  municipality] 
(Interview: Mr. Litteley).
Mr.  Litteley’s  statement  highlighted  that  loyalties  between  ANC  and  SAMWU 
representatives  had  continued  post-apartheid  as  a  result  of  the  Alliance  and  had 
influenced  employment  relations  at  the  municipality.  Mr.  Litteley,  however, 
questioned the impact of the ANC majority on the “efficiency” of the management at 
the municipality.  The sense  of  “common purpose”  between ANC councillors  and 
SAMWU members provided by the Alliance provided no guarantee that decisions 
made for the sake of unity would be in the best interests of the municipality. Speaking 
“the same political language” could not guarantee an efficiently run organisation.
Mr. Jim Marks85, an IMATU shop steward at Makana Municipality (no political party 
membership) observed:
84 Pseudo name.
85 Pseudo name.
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Political  influence  in  the  workers’  sphere  is  not  always  a  good  thing  … 
SAMWU  [representatives]  are  swayed  by  political  opinion  and  not  by 
workers’  opinion  …  there  is  the  perception  that  they  [SAMWU 
representatives] always have information before us [IMATU representatives], 
obviously because they [SAMWU and ANC councillors] move around in [the 
same] political sphere and things that normally come down to the ground level 
are discussed there first … not that you could put your finger on it but … [the 
Alliance]  has  … an  influence  [at  the  municipality]  some  way  or  another 
(Interview: Mr. Marks).
The observations made by Mr. Marks and Mr. Litteley suggested that management 
had to an extent been shaped by an ANC majority and the existence of the Alliance. 
They indicated there appeared to be cooperation between some ANC councillors and 
SAMWU  representatives  based  on  political  affiliation.  This  apparently  gave 
SAMWU  representatives  a  comparative  advantage  when  bargaining  with 
management over shop-floor matters.
Mr. Sape stated:
the majority of the councillors at the municipality are ANC councillors and 
the  majority  union  …  is  SAMWU,  so,  it  is  very  easy  [for  both  these  
representatives] to find one another on almost all aspects … the majority of 
the councillors actually come from the Alliance tradition, which means that  
they come from the ANC and they also appreciate the fact that SAMWU is an 
affiliate of COSATU, which is part of the Tripartite Alliance. So, in that way, 
you would actually find situations where there [is] no open questioning, [by 
SAMWU] as it were … because the councillors [are] from that [Alliance] … 
[the  Alliance]  has  helped  in  many  ways  … it  was  a  great  relief  to  …  
employees who are largely members of SAMWU … it [the Alliance] [has  
been]  able  to  assist  in  …  influencing  relations  between  ourselves  
[management and employees] because there [is] that acceptance between the 
parties  (Interview: Mr. Sape).
Mr. Dave Stewart86, an IMATU shop steward, emphasised that managers with ANC 
membership had to show impartiality when performing their duties and especially 
when  they  interacted  with  SAMWU  members  at  the  workplace  (Interview:  Mr. 
Stewart). 
Mr. Sape emphasised that despite the overlap of ANC membership between some 
managers and some SAMWU members and loyalty to the Alliance, managers had to 
prioritise the objectives of the municipality. He stated: 
86 Pseudo name.
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we [managers] have to balance … [expectations] … with a general interest of 
the organisation … that’s been the challenge … you [a municipal  official] 
represent the employer and you are not elected by the [ANC] membership to 
represent them … you are appointed to take particular decisions (Interview: 
Mr. Sape). 
Similarly, Mr. Monza stated:
We [municipal officials] … at management level, don’t behave as politicians 
because we are not, we’re only employed … there is a difference from us as 
managers, we [municipal officials] must embrace all the people regardless of 
their  political  affiliation  … we service  the  community  that  is  not  defined 
along political lines … but as a manager, I know what the majority party want 
because I’ve participated in its structures and I continue to participate in my 
own right as a member of [the ANC] … we know what the requirements of 
our  professions  are  …  we  have  a  strong  appreciation  of  work  ethics  … 
[performance]  is  checked … we are managing employees  who come from 
different political histories … we should be beyond reproach … we can’t be 
party politicians internally … that’s how we exercise and create the distinction 
… I practice my political affiliation outside [that is, the workplace]. I don’t 
practice it  here … because … I would have to take responsibility of those 
[actions] (Interview: Mr. Monza).
In effect, municipal officials ensured that even though party politics was a dimension 
to  local  government,  politically  motivated  actions  could  only  be  taken  up  by 
councillors.  Policies  and  performance  assessments  were  important  measures  in 
restricting political behaviour at the workplace. 
The general perception amongst several municipal workers was that it was “right” to 
have an ANC majority in  management  to lead municipal  changes.  Ten municipal 
workers  during  a  strike  in  Grahamstown  (2005)  expressed  their  content  with  the 
dominance of the ANC nationally and at the municipality.  They felt that the ANC 
was  in  the  “right  place”,  that  is,  maintaining  a  majority  membership  within 
government and at Makana. Some of these municipal workers had ANC and SACP 
membership and perceived an ANC majority in management as an “advantage” for 
workers. They felt that as most municipal workers were members of the ANC there 
was a greater possibility that managers would pay attention to their concerns. Other 
municipal workers with ANC/SACP membership did not share these sentiments of an 
“advantage”.  Instead,  some  felt  that  shared  ANC/SACP  membership  with 
management  had  little  significance  in  terms  of  how  they  were  treated  by 
management. Ms. Nancy Noluza87, a SAMWU member at Makana Municipality and 
87 Pseudo name. 
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a member of the SACP and ANC, remarked that while the ANC had a majority at the 
municipality, this had not led to a privileged section of workers. She noted that even 
though there were municipal officials known to hold ANC membership, they did not 
give “special treatment” to any workers (Interview: Ms. Noluza).
6.4 Relations between SAMWU and management
Both representatives of SAMWU and management described their relations over the 
years as being “good”. Mr. Sithole88, a SAMWU shop steward and member of the 
LLF, emphasised that management had handled most municipal disputes well. Where 
there were points  of  difference,  for  example over  appointments,  management  and 
SAMWU were able to “find one another” in most cases (Interview: Mr. Sithole). At a 
SAMWU general meeting on 8 August 2005, after a protracted89 strike over wages by 
SAMWU and IMATU in July 2005, SAMWU shop stewards gave members feedback 
on the strike. According to a shop steward, management resolved to deduct two days 
of pay from the eight day strike. This information was well received by the entire 
SAMWU  membership  present  at  the  meeting.  Many  stood  and  applauded  upon 
hearing the news. This applause was acclamation of management at that time. One 
SAMWU shop steward named a municipal  official  (an ANC and SACP member) 
who had assisted the negotiation process of this moderate pay deduction. The shop 
steward  went  on  to  reassure  the  membership  of  SAMWU  that  there  were  some 
managers  who are “cooperating”  with SAMWU. Two specific  municipal  officials 
were  mentioned.  Both  were  members  of  the  ANC  and  SACP.  This  additional 
information  of  persons  involved  in  the  negotiation  process  created  a  positive 
impression of persons in management with ANC and SACP memberships amongst 
SAMWU members at the meeting. 
Mr.  Monza,  a  municipal  official  with  ANC and SACP memberships,  admitted  to 
attending90 SAMWU  meetings  when  available  although  he  was  not  a  SAMWU 
member  (Interview:  Mr.  Monza).  On 15  November  2005  he  addressed  SAMWU 
members  at  a general  meeting on matters  of concern at  the municipality,  namely, 
88 Pseudo name. 
89 The strike went on for about three weeks.
 
90 The municipal official had not yet attended an IMATU meeting before August 2005.
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changes in local government policy affecting the municipality, alcohol abuse by some 
workers, the appointment of casual workers and the processes of filling job posts. He 
was given a  few minutes  to  address  the  SAMWU members  at  their  meeting  and 
during his presentation he repeatedly addressed the assembly as “maqabane91”. This 
term was often used by SAMWU representatives when addressing members at the 
general meeting. After the address by the municipal official, SAMWU representatives 
reiterated  the  need  to  give  attention  to  the  concerns  expressed  by this  municipal 
official.  They  emphasised  that  management  was  generally  “cooperating”  with 
SAMWU, particularly on the LLF and that workers should cooperate too. 
Mr. Patho drew attention to the difficulty SAMWU representatives had because most 
SAMWU  representatives  were  ANC  members  and  many  managers  were  ANC 
representatives  too.  According  to  Mr.  Patho,  some  SAMWU  members  did  no 
welcome  what  they  claimed  as  a  seemingly  cooperative  relationship  between 
SAMWU  representatives  and  some  managers  because  of  the  shared  ANC/SACP 
affiliation. He disclosed:
As SAMWU, we have got members who don’t belong to the ANC. How do 
you [a SAMWU representative] begin to accommodate [these members] … 
sometimes  we  [SAMWU  representatives]  are  alleged  to  …  compromise92 
[when bargaining] simply because the people on the other side, the employers, 
are  also  members  of  the  ANC.  As  negotiators  of  SAMWU  we  are  also 
members of the ANC … [Some SAMWU members] complain…that we do 
sacrifice  or  easily  compromise  because  these  [the  managers  with  ANC 
membership]  are  our  brothers  and  sisters  …  we  have  to  convince  our 
members that, no, it’s not the case (Interview: Mr. Patho).
The  details  of  what  proportion  of  SAMWU  members  felt  that  some  SAMWU 
representatives  were  “compromising”  was  not  pursued  but  Mr.  Patho’s  statement 
revealed  that  he  recognised  that  shared  political  affiliation  between  worker  and 
employer  representatives  was  not  always  perceived  as  beneficial  for  workers  by 
SAMWU members. 
 
One found that relations between SAMWU representatives and councillors appeared 
different  from relations between SAMWU representatives and municipal  officials. 
91 Translation: “comrades”
92 Due to time constraints the details of which SAMWU members alleged the compromises and 
references to specific cases of compromise was not possible.
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ANC councillors  formed  large  proportion  of  members  on  the  municipal  council. 
According to Mr. Sape:
the majority of the councillors at the municipality are ANC councillors and 
the  majority  union  …  is  SAMWU,  so,  it  is  very  easy  [for  both  these 
representatives] to find one another on almost all aspects … the majority of 
the councillors actually come from the Alliance tradition, which means that 
they come from the ANC and they also appreciate the fact that SAMWU is an 
affiliate of COSATU, which is part of the Tripartite Alliance. So, in that way, 
you would actually find situations where there [is] no open questioning, [by 
SAMWU] as it were … because the councillors [are] from that [Alliance] … 
[the  Alliance]  has  helped  in  many  ways  …  it  was  a  great  relief  to  … 
employees  who are largely members of SAMWU … it  [the Alliance] [has 
been]  able  to  assist  in  …  influencing  relations  between  ourselves 
[management and employees] because there [is] that acceptance between the 
parties  (Interview: Mr. Sape).
The  ANC  councillors  are  elected  by  their  communities  and  account  to  their 
constituencies for their decisions. Relations between SAMWU and ANC councillors, 
in particular, were perceived by some SAMWU representatives as less pleasant over 
the years. Mr. Patho stated that relations between SAMWU and ANC councillors had 
“not always been very good” (Interview: Mr. Patho). He attributed this to “personal 
problems” between some SAMWU members and some ANC councillors disguised as 
“political problems” (Interview: Mr. Patho). Mr. Patho suggested:
They [the problems] are political in a sense but if you check them, if you  
analyse  them,  they  are  personal  … the  relationship  was  not  so  good  …  
because we once revealed the corruption that took place in the Electricity  
department  …  ever  since  we  had  marches  against  the  municipality  and  
councillors  …  then  the  relationship  between  ourselves  [SAMWU]  and  
themselves [ANC councillors] has been very sour … people are camouflaging 
to say it’s a political problem but when you check it directly, it is a personal 
issue (Interview: Mr. Patho).
His statement suggested that the problems were an outcome of a specific case and 
were between individuals and not necessarily caused by organisational difficulties 
between  SAMWU  and  the  ANC.  He  added  that  many  SAWMU  members  had 
difficulty in distinguishing between ANC councillors as “comrades” via the Alliance 
and bosses when part of management. Mr. Patho stated:
In our meetings, for instance, Alliance meetings, it is difficult to talk to your 
comrades as your comrade, to talk to the mayor as your mayor … you’ll find 
that also people [SAMWU members] are divided … members on the ground 
are divided because they are following a certain person in a certain direction, 
not the organisation because of lack of understanding (Interview: Mr. Patho). 
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Mr.  Mandla,  an  ANC  councillor,  argued  that  ANC  councillors  were  elected  to 
represent the political interests of their constituency and they had a responsibility to 
execute organisational tasks guided by ANC principles when acting as managers. He 
emphasised that the role of councillors was not to compromise the interests of the 
community (workers included). After acknowledging that SAMWU had the greatest 
membership  at  Makana Municipality  and that  SAMWU representatives  and ANC 
councillors interacted at LLF negotiations, he stated:
Labour will remain labour … we stand for the ANC and … are making sure 
that we don’t merely take what SAMWU is saying but everything is taken into 
consideration.  Yes  of  course  there  are  times  when  we  [ANC councillors] 
conflict with SAMWU … it’s a situation we cannot avoid … we’re making 
sure that we don’t compromise the interests of the workers and the people 
[community] at  large … there is  an issue … about corruption [that]  made 
relations between ourselves [ANC councillors] and SAMWU [representatives] 
not good but we [SAMWU representatives and ANC councillors]…  sat down 
[and  discussed]  that  this  should  not  be  something  that  should  strain  our 
relations but it’s something that has to be looked at [through] legal processes 
(Interview: Mr. Mandla).
Mr.  Mandla perceived SAMWU members  as  an interest  group like  other  interest 
groups at the municipality. In his view, SAMWU members did not hold a privileged 
position over other interest groups. He accepted that conflict was inevitable between 
SAMWU and ANC councillors and he pointed to the use of bi-lateral discussions to 
resolve conflict.
Outside  the  workplace,  SAMWU  members  addressed  ANC  councillors  at  ward 
meetings over workplace issues as ANC members. According to ANC councillors, 
worker issues would often be placed on ward meeting agendas. Municipal councillors 
oversee ward meetings and a range of matters concerning members of those wards are 
discussed.
6.5 Relations between SAMWU and IMATU at Makana Local Municipality
During a strike (July 2005) some IMATU and SAMWU members commented that 
relations  between  the  two  unions  at  Makana  Municipality  were  “good”. 
Representatives of both IMATU and SAMWU also described relations between the 
unions at the municipality as relatively “good”. IMATU shop stewards Mr. Marks 
and  Mr.  Stewart  argued  that  the  two  unions  shared  similar  worker  interests,  for 
example,  disciplinary actions and training. Representatives of both unions claimed 
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that SAMWU and IMATU shared similar worker concerns at the municipality. Mr. 
Marks did, however, note that “when it comes to negotiations obviously there is a 
difference  in  approach”  (Interview:  Mr.  Marks).  SAMWU  used  a  more 
confrontational  approach  to  confronting  the  municipality  compared  to  IMATU. 
According to SAMWU representatives, SAMWU members often took to the streets 
when there was a dispute with the municipality. IMATU, on the other hand, had not 
declared a dispute with Makana Municipality since 2000. Mr. Stewart, an IMATU 
shop steward, admitted that:
[SAMWU members] are the guys that physically go on strike … they toyi-
toyi and down tools…but IMATU guys basically just sort of sit around and 
wait to see what happens and the result at the end of the day benefits [are] 
enjoyed  by  both  unions…it  has  been  said  that  when  these  [SAMWU 
members] guys go on strike against salary increases they [IMATU members] 
don’t participate and they’re [SAMWU] sort of fine with that (Interview: Mr. 
Stewart).
This  less  confrontational  approach taken by IMATU created perceptions  amongst 
some municipal  workers  that  IMATU was  not  a  “serious  union” (Interview:  Mr. 
Sithole).  Mr.  Monza  described  the  involvement  of  IMATU  representatives  in 
committees as “inconsistent” compared to SAMWU (Interview: Mr.  Monza).  One 
could argue that the size of SAMWU compared to IMATU allowed more consistent 
participation by SAMWU at Makana Municipality. In 2005, SAMWU had four times 
more shop stewards than IMATU.
According to Mr. Marks the political affiliation of SAMWU to the ANC and SACP 
was  a  distinguishing  feature  between  the  two  unions.  This  political  affiliation 
influenced the relations between SAMWU and IMATU. IMATU shop steward Mr. 
Marks remarked:
There  is  the  perception  that  they  [SAMWU  representatives]  always  have 
information  before  us  [IMATU  representatives],  obviously  because  they 
[SAMWU and ANC councillors] move around in [the same] political sphere 
and things that normally come down to the ground level are discussed there 
first … IMATU is a non-political union. So we do not get involved in the 
politics. We are purely there for the worker. We don’t have political parties 
prescribing  as  to  how we should  treat  our  membership.  I  think that’s  the 
biggest  difference  [between  the  SAMWU  and  IMATU]…the  union 
[SAMWU] tends to sway in the direction of its political party [the ANC] so if 
the political party feels strongly about a particular issue, I get the feeling that 
they [SAMWU representatives] would sway towards that feeling instead of 
towards what they really feel and they…persuade their membership to vote or 
sway towards political suggestion (Interview: Mr. Marks).
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Mr.  Marks  indirectly  identified  political  affiliation  as  a  factor  affecting  relations 
between  the  two  unions  and  his  statement  suggested  some  discontent  over  the 
possibility  that  some  SAMWU  representatives  had  access  to  ANC  councillors 
because of political affiliation. When commenting in the influence of the Alliance on 
relations between the two unions and the influence of the Alliance on employment 
relations at the municipality, Mr. Marks remarked:
We’ve [IMATU and SAMWU] always had a good relationship but obviously 
it [the Alliance] does make a difference because it seems as though SAMWU 
are swayed by political opinion and not by workers opinion … Not that you 
could put your finger on it but … it [the Alliance] has … an influence some 
way or another (Interview: Mr. Marks).
Mr. Stewart also noted that the Alliance had an influence on employment relations at 
the municipality and stated:
The Makana council … have to show impartiality and be unbiased towards 
any situation you know. They [the council] must be seen not to take sides so 
to speak with SAMWU because SAMWU is sort of mainly ANC …They [the 
council] also have to be seen to treat SAMWU as just another trade union like 
IMATU … basically they must be seen to be in the middle and not take sides. 
That’s what I reckon (Interview: Mr. Stewart).
Mr. Stewart emphasised the responsibility of the municipal council to ensure that it 
treated both unions fairly. The presence of an ANC majority and the existence of the 
Alliance had created a situation that warranted evidence of an explicitly fair 
municipal council.
6.6 SAMWU and the Tripartite Alliance    
Makana  Municipality  has  branches  of  the  ANC,  SACP  and  COSATU93.  The 
relationship between the three organisations was described by their representatives as 
“good”. Representatives of these three organisations stated that representatives from 
the other organisations often attended their branch meetings as a sign of solidarity 
between the different organisations. Representatives of the ANC and SACP revealed 
that worker issues were often placed on their agendas and discussed at their branch 
meetings94.  According  to  Mr.  Gray,  an  SACP and ANC representative,  industrial 
matters were discussed at ANC and SACP branch meetings and often representatives 
93 All the shop stewards of COSATU union affiliates (including SAMWU) meet weekly as the 
COSATU local and any resolutions taken there are taken as COSATU decisions and not individual 
union decisions.
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of  these  organisations  encouraged  workers  to  resolve  any  disputes  amicably.  He 
emphasised  that  ANC  and  SACP  representatives  were  primarily  political 
representatives but because of the Alliance they could not ignore industrial matters. 
He stated that worker issues could not be separated from worker issues and if these 
organisations wanted to receive the continual support of workers they would have to 
give some attention to worker issues. Ms. Banda, a former councillor claimed that 
“councillors  sometimes  acted  like  shop  stewards”  (Interview:  Ms.  Banda)  in  the 
manner in which they addressed worker issues. 
The  2004  COSATU  worker  survey revealed  that  recent  support  for  the  Alliance 
amongst COSATU workers has been high (Cherry and Southall, 2006). At Makana 
municipality, representatives of SAMWU revealed that ANC, SACP and COSATU 
representatives often attended SAMWU general meetings and sometimes addressed 
SAMWU  members  at  these  meetings.  Mr.  Sithole,  a  SAMWU  shop  steward, 
explained this was common practice and observed that the attendance by the ANC, 
SACP and COSATU representatives was overtly a political gesture. He noted that it 
was  necessary  for  SAMWU  members  with  memberships  in  those  organisations 
within to “see” that the Alliance was “still strong” and relevant. The Alliance partner 
representatives  attended  the  meetings  and  even  addressed  members  yet  some 
SAMWU members probably did not belong to the ANC or SACP.
At SAMWU general meetings in August and November 2005, SACP and COSATU 
representatives were introduced at the start  of  the meetings.  They sat  at  the front 
facing the SAMWU members  and participated in the singing of songs during the 
meeting.
Viva ANC viva! Viva SACP viva! Viva COSATU viva! Viva ANC Women’s 
League Viva! Viva SANCO Viva! Viva ANC Youth League Viva! Amandla 
ngawethu! Gcina umsebenzi gcina95!
94 The details of worker issues discussed at branch meetings could not be explored due to time 
constraints.
95 “Long live ANC long live! Long live SACP long live! Long live COSATU long live! Long live 
ANC Women’s League long live! Long live SANCO long live! Long live ANC league long live! The 
power is ours! Keep/retain your job, keep it!” (loose English translation).
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These  were  the  chants  of  SAMWU  representatives  at  the  beginning  of  general 
meetings observed in August and November 2005. These representatives combined 
political discourse with workplace discourse and received a positive response from 
SAMWU  members.  The  shouts  were  echoed  by  a  room  of  over  one  hundred 
SAMWU members.  There  were  possibly  some SAMWU members  that  were  not 
members  of  the ANC, SACP,  ANC Women’s  League,  SANCO and ANC Youth 
League. Nonetheless, most of the SAMWU members repeated the exclamations in 
support of the Alliance organisations. According to a SAMWU member the use of 
political  speech  was  common  at  union  meetings  and  especially  during  election 
periods. The echoes seemed to show that there was strong general support for the 
Tripartite Alliance amongst many SAMWU members at those meetings. According to 
a few municipal workers at the meetings, a significant number of municipal workers 
were members  of the ANC and/or  the SACP and a  union affiliate  of COSATU96 
(mainly SAMWU). 
According to SAMWU representatives, many SAMWU members at the municipality 
supported  the  Alliance  and  possessed  memberships  in  the  ANC and  SACP.  Mr. 
Sithole stated  that  even though some SAMWU members  were not  “card-carrying 
members”  of  the  ANC  and/or  SACP,  many  supported  one  of  the  two  parties 
(Interview:  Mr.  Sithole).  He  also  stated  that  many  SAMWU  members  and 
representatives actively participated or had participated in the branches of the ANC, 
SACP, ANC Women’s League, ANC Youth League and the SACP Youth League. 
He added that SAWMU had contributed to the recruitment of SAMWU members to 
the Alliance organisations by encouraging members to join the ANC and SACP. At a 
general meeting in August 2005, SACP registration forms were circulated before the 
meeting  to  encourage  SAMWU  members  to  join  the  organisation.  These  were 
collected at the general meeting in November 2005. 
SAMWU  representatives  at  Makana  actively  bolstered  support  for  the  Alliance 
organisations and encouraged members to vote for the ANC during elections. They 
did this in fulfilment  of SAMWU resolutions to support  the ANC during election 
time. Mr. Patho admitted the process of convincing SAMWU members to support the 
96 Some municipal  workers  also  belong  to  the  Democratic  Nursing  Organisation  of  South  Africa 
(DENOSA).
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ANC was  a  difficult  process  because  SAMWU had members  belonging  to  other 
political parties. Mr. Patho explained:
It’s easy to mobilise members … when you speak about wages and conditions 
of  service,  it  has  got  no  political  content  … it’s  easy  to  mobilise  people 
around those issues. But, when you mobilise people for elections [pause] then 
it’s  a  different  scenario.  You  are  forced  to  stand  in  front  of  the  people 
knowing very well that you’ve got different members, people who belong to 
the UDM, or whatever  … but we [SAMWU representatives] are forced to 
stand in front of them again [and again] because we are part of the Alliance 
and say, ‘Please can you vote ANC because one, two, three’ (Interview: Mr. 
Patho).
Even though campaigning for the ANC had been a “difficult”  process,  Mr. Patho 
argued that it had taken place fairly successfully. He emphasised that the ANC was 
generally “on the correct track” and that ANC councillors could expect to have the 
support of SAMWU at elections in the near future (Interview: Mr. Patho). Similarly, 
Mr.  Sithole  asserted  that  despite  problems  with  local  government,  SAMWU 
representatives would continue to urge members to vote for the ANC because they 
“do not  want  to  be  led  by  any other  government  but  the  ANC” (Interview:  Mr. 
Sithole).
When asked whether ANC councillors at Makana expected support from COSATU 
affiliates  (including  SAMWU)  during  the  2006  elections,  ANC  councillor  Mr. 
Mandla was very optimistic that they would receive support. He disclosed that the 
Alliance had been an advantageous relationship for votes. He maintained:
Members of COSATU are members of the ANC … we believe we will get 
support  from  COSATU  affiliates  ...  [The]  Alliance  is  long  lived  …  The 
Alliance  is  not  just  an  alliance  which  was  formed  without  proper 
consideration. It … was formed a long time ago … [and] is here to live for a 
long time … there [are] problem[s] but … I believe in it. I believe [in] this 
movement. We’ll not do better … if this Alliance was abolished (Interview: 
Mr. Mandla).
The  Alliance  gave  ANC  councillors  some  certainty  of  electoral  support  from 
SAMWU  members  during  elections.  Mr.  Bob  Matutu,  an  ANC  councillor  and 
member  of  the  Community  Development  Portfolio  Committee,  similarly 
acknowledged the general significance of the Alliance. He stated:
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[The Alliance is] a revolutionary alliance cemented by the historical events of 
the Alliance. It is there to stay. It is going to be there for quite a long time. 
There is no point that [the organisations] actually disengage from each other. 
The Tripartite Alliance … has to be strengthened and consolidated … it has a 
progressive  impact  [at  Makana  Municipality]  in  terms  of  actually 
understanding the components of the workers [COSATU affiliates] and the 
vanguard of the workers, that is the South African Communist Party ... and the 
African National Congress. [It has an impact] in actually understanding each 
other on issues that have to be deliberated [but] when you’re an employer and 
an employee,  there will be … disagreement around particular issues at  the 
workplace (Interview: Mr. Matutu).
  
Mr. Matutu indicated that mutual support for the Alliance amongst some workers and 
some managers had facilitated good employment relations at Makana Municipality. 
He accepted that “disagreements” or disputes could be expected in the employment 
relationship whether the Alliance was present or not.
SAMWU members seemed to have differing opinions about the Alliance. Mr. Joseph 
Mantu97, a SAMWU member, was supportive of the Alliance. He acknowledged its 
historic relevance and argued:
If you look at the development of this Alliance, there was no conference that 
the SACP, the ANC and COSATU sat down and said now we are going to 
form an alliance. It’s an organic alliance. It’s cemented with blood and there’s 
no papers signed saying that ‘This is an alliance’. I know people are saying 
‘No, this is not a Muslim marriage98, somewhere somehow the Alliance will 
break  away’,  but  that  is  not  my  feeling  …  You  must  also  respect  the  
independency  of  each  organisation  in  the  Alliance.  Sometimes  you  get  
conflicting views. It’s like a family. There will be sour days within the family 
but  the  Alliance  has  one  strategy  in  perspective  which  is  the  National  
Democratic Revolution that guides it … it’s an organic alliance (Interview:  
Mr. Mantu).
Mr. Mantu held similar sentiment to that of Ms. Hash of the Alliance as an “organic 
alliance” and the same misconception of an absence of formal agreement between the 
organisations. Mr. Mantu confirmed the perspective held by other COSATU workers 
of the Alliance as an “organic family relationship” (Buhlungu et al., 2006:206). Mr. 
Mantu  suggested  that  the  Alliance  relationship  went  beyond  the  formalised 
relationship. The liberation struggle had “cemented” the relationship “with blood” in 
his view the Alliance. He strongly believed that the Alliance was not going to split, it 
was  worth  maintaining.  Cherry  and  Southall  (2006)  noted  that  some  COSATU 
97 Pseudo name.
98 Muslim marriages are revered and are not often characterised by divorce.
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workers  were  becoming  disillusioned  with  the  ANC  and  COSATU’s  close 
relationship to the party through the Alliance.
In contrast to Mr. Manti, Ms. Noluza acknowledged:
The bond between the Alliance was very strong in the past years but these  
years [presently] it seems as if the bond is not like the way it used to be  
because some of the ANC members are taking things this way and the other 
members of the SACP are taking things that way but it’s supposed to have  
collective decisions and whatever activities that are taking place, they [the  
Alliance partners] are supposed  to  take  them  collectively  (Interview:  Ms.  
Noluza).
Ms. Noluza was not as optimistic about the Alliance as Mr. Mantu and she identified 
differences in action taken by the ANC and SACP as reasons why she believed the 
strength  of  the  Alliance  was  deteriorating.  With  reference  to  the  impact  of  the 
Alliance at Makana Municipality, she observed:
SAMWU is not benefiting from the Tripartite  Alliance.  Yes COSATU is  
fighting  for  the  rights  of  the  union  but  unfortunately  we  have  got  a  
management that does not listen, that is not working for the benefit of workers 
(Interview: Ms. Noluza).
 
According to Ms.  Noluza’s  observations the Alliance had not benefited SAMWU 
members at the municipality.
When  asked  their  opinions  of  the  Tripartite  Alliance,  Mr.  Sape  and  Mr.  Monza, 
(municipal officials with ANC and SACP memberships) expressed their support for 
the Alliance. Speaking in his personal capacity, Mr. Monza said that he “understood” 
the relationship and therefore  appreciated  its  existence.  Mr.  Sape and Mr.  Monza 
noted  that  as  long  as  the  Alliance  existed,  government  would  continue  to  face 
challenges when “harmonising various class interests” that exist in the country.
6.7 Conclusion
The evidence presented from the case study shows that  Makana Municipality  has 
gone through significant socio-economic and political changes. These changes have 
occurred as local government has been transformed. The dominance of the ANC at 
the  municipality  has  been  an  outcome  of  political  change.  This  fed  into  the 
employment relationship at the municipality. Evidence revealed that the municipality 
was  characterised  by  shared  political  memberships  between  employers  and 
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employees.  The next  and final  chapter  concludes the findings of the research and 
suggests recommendations based on the findings. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Introduction
This  chapter  provides  the  conclusions of the research.  The research  questions are 
evaluated  and  the  findings  of  the  research  study  are  discussed.  The  information 
obtained through the content and discourse analysis  and the case study brought to 
light  a  range  of  issues.  The  research  began  with  a  presentation  of  literature  on 
Industrial  Relations  theory  to  show  how  relations  between  management  and 
employees have been portrayed in theory. This presentation led to questions around 
how  industrial  relations  in  the  South  African  public  sector  are  played  out  when 
management representatives and union members share political membership. At the 
end of the chapter, some recommendations for further research are discussed.
7.2 Political alliances and industrial relations
Orthodox literature on industrial relations depicts management and union entities as 
separate and distinct. According to Flanders (1965:10) “unstructured” relationships 
do not feature in the rule making process of industrial relations systems. They lie 
“outside the scope” of industrial relations. However, public sector industrial relations 
have a distinctly political nature which influences the character of industrial relations. 
As  Ferner  (1985:68)  notes  “political  calculations  are  an  inherent  rather  than  a 
contingent characteristic” of the public enterprise and therefore have a bearing on 
industrial relations.
Since 1994, the Tripartite Alliance has been the most significant political alliance in 
South  Africa  although  COSATU  has  been  argued  to  play  an  increasingly 
marginalised  role  within  it  (Southall,  2001a).  The 2004 COSATU worker  survey 
revealed that the Alliance and the ANC continue to enjoy a high level of support 
amongst COSATU workers. According to McKinley (2003) the Alliance has bound 
the  working  class  to  “institutionalised,  politically  based  class  compromise  and 
electoral  loyalty”.  From 1994,  COSATU has  pledged  its  electoral  support  to  the 
ANC. In this research, an assessment of political  party dominance at  the national 
level revealed that the ANC had attained the greatest voter support in the country 
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over the years. At Makana Municipality, the ANC won the 2000 municipal elections 
with 82.01% of the votes, the 2004 national elections with 79.88% of the votes and 
the 2006 municipal elections with 80.90% of the votes. The statistics revealed that the 
ANC had consistently held the greatest voter support at the Makana municipal area. 
In addition to high voter support, the research revealed that there was strong support 
for  the ANC amongst  workers  at  the  Makana Municipality  and many workers  at 
Makana Municipality were members of the ANC. The investigation revealed that a 
significant number of municipal  officials,  for example,  directors  held ANC/SACP 
membership  and  were  involved  in  important  decision-making  structures  with 
workers, for example, the co-determinist LLF. 
According  to  Turner  (1991:27)  the  manner  in  which  union  influence  is 
institutionalised in the Industrial  Relations System is a fundamental  variable.  The 
introduction of corporatist and co-determinist structures institutionalised the working 
class struggle and created a compromise between capital and labour at the workplace. 
At  the  Makana  Municipality,  the  dominance  of  the  ANC  and  existence  of  the 
Alliance  resulted  in  shared  ANC/SACP  membership  between  management  and 
SAMWU members  at  the  workplace.  Municipal  council  members  were  found  to 
comprise a considerable number of ANC members.  Some of the managers  in the 
municipality hold or have held memberships  in SAMWU and IMATU like many 
workers at the municipality. The dominant ANC membership meant that management 
frequently dealt with workers and negotiated with worker representatives that shared 
political party membership with them.  
Wellington and Winter (1971) argued that unions in the public service existed as an 
interest group with a “privileged position”. The study found that SAMWU had some 
“privilege” during negotiations. A SAMWU Eastern Cape provincial representative, 
Mr. Tali Bester, acknowledged that the presence of many ANC members in SALGA 
had been a positive aspect of bargaining at a provincial level. He noted that at times 
some  SAMWU  representatives  were  able  to  secretly  “caucus”  with  some  ANC 
members in SALGA (Interview: Mr. Bester). At the Makana Municipality, SAMWU 
and  ANC  representatives  acknowledged  that  their  relations  were  good  and  that 
sharing political membership contributed to “good” relations as it became “very easy 
133
[for  both  these  representatives]  to  find  one  another  on  almost  all  aspects”  of 
workplace negotiations (Interview: Mr. Sape). 
Figure 4 illustrates an overlap created between management and labour components 
of  the  employment  relationship  when  political  party  membership  is  shared.  The 
overlap is an area of shared membership and various industrial relations and political 
opportunities  and challenges  may be created  for  both municipal  management  and 
labour. 
Figure   4  : A diagrammatic representation of management and labour   
components when ANC/SACP membership is shared
                              Interaction
This  overlap  creates  a  sphere  for  interaction  between  members  with  shared 
membership of political parties.  It exists at the workplace but is not confined to the 
workplace  as  social  relations  are  not  fixed to  one  area.  Kochan et  al.,  (1994:13) 
emphasised that industrial relations processes and outcomes would be “determined by 
continuously  evolving  interaction  of  environmental  pressures  and  organisational 
responses” along with the strategic choices and values of managers, union leaders, 
workers  and public  policy makers.  One could argue  that  at  Makana Municipality 
those affected by shared ANC/SACP membership may use opportunities to further 
their interests (political, work, organisational or social) by making “strategic choices” 
(Kochan et al., 1994). The decision of a two day pay deduction instead of eight days 
after  a  strike and the attendance  of  SAMWU meetings  by municipal  official  Mr. 
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Monza are examples of such “strategic  choices” facilitated by shared ANC/SACP 
membership.  It  was  discovered  that  at  times  SAMWU “strategically”  used  strike 
action  as  leverage  during  bargaining  “to  influence  SALGA  politicians  [in]  their 
favour”  (Interview:  Mr.  Mana).  Strike  action  in  the  lead  up  to  elections  was 
considered  as  a  strategic  choice  by  SAMWU.  During  strikes  some  SAMWU 
representatives took opportunities to address political issues by addressing specific 
ANC politicians,  for example, in 2001 when the Mpumalanga Province SAMWU 
branch wrote a letter to Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa (Mail and Guardian, 2001).
Some  representatives  of  local  government  management  were  given  the  status  of 
“brothers and sisters” and “comrade” amongst SAMWU members (Interview: Mr. 
Patho). At a SAMWU general meeting at Makana Municipality, SAMWU members 
applauded  two  managers  with  ANC  membership  after  they  were  identified  by 
SAMWU representatives as “cooperating” with SAMWU during a wage dispute. This 
indicated  that  shared  membership  could  improve  the  workers  perspective  of 
management. Also, their shared political party membership with some workers gave 
them legitimacy to implement unpopular decisions. The two managers were provided 
with an opportunity  to  gain the trust  of  workers  through the  efforts  of  SAMWU 
representatives. SAMWU representatives were presented with a similar opportunity 
to gain the trust of management by facilitating a positive portrayal of management to 
the SAMWU membership. 
With regard to workplace negotiations,  one could argue that  the sphere of shared 
membership formed as a result of ANC dominance contributed to relatively “good” 
bargaining relations at the municipality.  However, one cannot conclude that shared 
ANC membership of persons involved in bargaining as the only factor facilitating 
“good” relations. There were workers at the municipality that are neither members of 
the ANC nor  SAMWU. Other  factors  such as  a  supportive  management  or  good 
communication channels between workers and managers may have facilitated “good” 
relations at Makana Municipality. Nevertheless, based on the findings of this study, 
the dominance of the ANC made a mostly positive impact on local level bargaining. 
One  may  expect  a  different  scenario  if  another  political  party  were  dominant  at 
Makana Municipality.
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Laffin (1989) identified a series of strategies available to municipal management and 
union.  According  to  Laffin  (1989),  management  and  unions  may  choose 
incorporation  or  cooptation,  collaboration,  conciliation  or  confrontation  strategies. 
What  is  clear  from the  findings  is  that  both  management  and unions  at  Makana 
Municipality  used  conciliatory  strategies.  Management  has  the  responsibility  of 
balancing  community,  political  party  and  worker  interests.  Management  would 
choose this strategy in “recognition of the legitimate role of unions as partners in 
bargaining with an emphasis on trust” (Laffin, 1989:36). Unions would select this 
strategy in order to maintain “a balance between the extremes of collaboration and 
confrontation” (Laffin, 1989:62) with management. Laffin (1989) also observed that 
rules and institutions relative to other factors were important for guiding rule making 
at the level of the municipality.
With reference to the South African case, Mtolo (2004) suggested that the Alliance 
exerts influence on public sector employment relations. She argued that “one would 
be  stupid  in  failing  to  speculate  how  the  [employment]  relationship  is  managed 
between  Alliance  members…the  Alliance  does  play  a  role  in  facilitating  an 
agreement” (Mtolo, 2004: 55).  The research revealed that some municipal officials 
were members of the Alliance and were aware of the distinctions between their roles 
and the roles of councillors. When questioned on the role ANC membership had on 
the  execution  of  decisions,  Mr.  Sape,  a  municipal  official,  said  his  shared  ANC 
membership  with  other  workers  led  him to  be  “sympathetic”  towards  workers  at 
times. Nonetheless, his organisational role was more important at the workplace than 
his  loyalty  to  the  ANC.  He  recognised  that  even  though  at  times  he  faced  the 
challenge of making decisions that were contrary to his “conscience”, he ultimately 
could not “compromise” his “professional integrity” (Interview: Mr. Sape). Pursuing 
overtly political agendas would jeopardise the position of municipal  officials.  Mr. 
Sape recognised that the appropriate place for municipal officials to act politically 
was at political party meetings and not the workplace. 
Industrial  relations systems and political  systems are not separate (Dunlop, 1958). 
Industrial relations systems and political systems overlap and the external factors in 
wider society affect the environmental factors that impinge directly on the actors of 
the  industrial  relations  system  (Dunlop,  1958).  At  Makana  Municipality,  ANC 
councillors  recognised  their  political  responsibilities  to  their  constituents  and  the 
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community. Some ANC councillors interacted with SAMWU representatives at the 
workplace and beyond the workplace.  Mr.  Mandla distinguished that  “labour will 
remain labour” despite any political affiliation and recognised that representing the 
broad  interests  of  the  community,  of  which  labour  was  a  part,  were  primary  to 
political  affiliation.  As  an  ANC  councillor,  he  identified  his  responsibility  to  a 
broader base (the community) rather than SAMWU (a political ally). However, Ms. 
Banda noted that  ANC councillors  sometimes  lacked  experience  to  manage  their 
organisational duties at the municipality (Interview: Ms. Banda). She argued that they 
often ran the risk of acting politically within the municipality because of difficulties 
some councillors experienced in distinguishing between their industrial and political 
roles. 
What is clear from the findings is that “unstructured” relationships do play a role in 
public  sector  industrial  relations.  The  Alliance  has  especially  had  an  effect  on 
industrial relations at Makana Municipality. Considering the evidence above, as the 
Alliance persists, it can be expected that industrial relations at municipalities will be 
characterised  by  contradictions.  Management  and  unions  cannot  be  perceived  as 
separate entities if the Alliance and loyalty to the Alliance continue.
7.3 Role of SAMWU representatives in the context of political affiliation
A prominent feature of post-apartheid politics in South Africa has been the presence 
of the Tripartite Alliance. Since 1994, COSATU affiliates have supported the ANC at 
elections and the SACP as an Alliance partner.  As a result,  many affiliated union 
representatives wear “two hats” (union and political). SAMWU has been aligned to 
the  Alliance  via  its  affiliation  to  COSATU for  many  years.  SAMWU has  given 
organisational  and  human  resource  support  to  the  ANC  and  other  Alliance 
organisations since the Alliance was formalised. SAMWU has continually resolved to 
support  the  ANC  at  elections.  A  major  implication  of  this  is  that  SAMWU 
representatives  have fulfilled their  union roles  while  also fulfilling political  roles. 
These SAMWU representatives have acted as unelected political representatives of 
the ANC and SACP via the Alliance when they have bolstered support for the ANC 
and  SACP  amongst  SAMWU  members.  When  a  SAMWU  member  becomes  a 
SAMWU representative, it is mandatory that s/he will be at some point be involved in 
campaigning for the ANC during election time before a SAMWU membership with 
137
diverse  political  party  membership.  SAMWU  representatives  maintain  a  constant 
balance between union and political roles.
The literature on industrial relations generally concentrates on the workplace role of 
unions while the literature on public sector industrial relations accepts the political 
aspects of the role of public sector unions. Troy (1994:22) defined a public sector 
union as  “a  continuous  association  of  salaried  and  wage  employees  organised  to 
redistribute income from public employers to their employees through political and 
economic means; and to redistribute income from the private to the public economy”. 
Inevitably, these “political means” would vary depending on the characteristics of the 
political system. When observing the South African public sector industrial relations, 
Garson  (2000:226)  found  that  relationships  between  former  SADTU  officials  in 
government  and  SADTU  had  increased  member  suspicions  that  the  union  was 
“cuddling up to government” and that “the closer its officials are to the corridors of 
power, the less interest they have in ordinary teachers’ working conditions”. 
At Makana Municipality, SAMWU representatives were sometimes accused of being 
on the “side” of management because they encouraged SAMWU members to support 
the  ANC  and  SACP  yet  bargained  with  the  management  which  had  many 
ANC/SACP representatives. They often had to reassure members that they were not 
on  the  “side”  of  management.  Some SAMWU members  at  Makana Municipality 
criticised  their  leaders  for  sacrificing  member  benefits.  According  to  Mr.  Patho, 
SAMWU representatives attempted to convince SAMWU members that they were 
not conceding to the demands of management against member interests when they 
were met with criticisms (Interview: Mr. Patho).
Much therefore depends on the ability of SAMWU representatives to manage their 
“two  hats”.  Union  membership  interests  vary  and  SAMWU  members  comprise 
persons  with  different  political  party  preferences.  Not  all  SAMWU  members  at 
Makana  Municipality  were  members  of  the  ANC or  SACP.  Whenever  SAMWU 
representatives encouraged support for the ANC or SACP or the Tripartite Alliance, 
they faced the challenge of losing the trust of some members who were not members 
of  these  organisations.  While  Mr.  Patho  recognised  this  risk,  he  disclosed  that 
SAMWU representatives continued to rally support for the ANC and the Alliance 
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because  it  was  their  “mandate”  (Interview:  Mr.  Patho).  Some  SAMWU 
representatives may be said to have benefited from fulfilling their political mandate. 
During  negotiations,  SAMWU  representatives  who  “spoke”  the  “same  political 
language”  (Interview:  Mr.  Litteley)  with  some  managers  with  ANC  membership 
could lobby at negotiations over municipal decisions. In exchange, ANC councillors 
seemed  to  rely  on  the  support  of  SAMWU  representatives  at  election  time.  At 
Makana, during election time in particular, representatives of the ANC, SACP and 
SAMWU representatives of these organisations visibly interacted with each other.
By  and  large,  SAMWU  representatives  distinguished  their  roles  as  union 
representatives and ANC and SACP lobbyists. Keeping their union and political roles 
separate  has  been a  challenge  because  in  fulfilling  their  political  roles  they were 
exposed to criticisms from members. Nevertheless, political affiliation has facilitated 
strategic choices by SAMWU, for instance, the use of political affiliation to lobby at 
negotiations over industrial or workplace matters. 
7.4 SAMWU mobilisation against municipalities
According to Buhlungu (2003), the South African labour movement faces a modified 
political economy. The labour movement “has had, consequently, to revise notions of 
‘the  enemy’  and ‘the  oppressor’  and to  modify  its  attitude  to  both  the  State  and 
employers”  (Buhlungu,  2003:186).  Pre-1994,  public  sector  unions  confronted  an 
authoritarian government (Posel, 2000). Post-1994, public sector unions confront a 
government  that  comprises  many  “former  comrades”  (SALB,  2003).  This  has 
especially  created difficulties  for public sector  unions when they have confronted 
their employers on conditions of employment.
Pre-1994,  SAMWU  mobilised  its  union  members  around  political  and  industrial 
matters.  During  this  time,  SAMWU  formed  bonds  of  solidarity  (Buhlungu  and 
Psoulis, 1999) with the ANC and SACP through the struggle. SAMWU often aided 
these organisations during campaigns and SAMWU gained their support in return. 
Municipality boundaries were poorly defined and local government structures were 
largely illegitimate. Post-1994, municipal boundaries became more distinguished and 
legitimate  local  government  bargaining  structures  were  put  in  place  at  national, 
provincial  and local  levels.  Bargaining disputes  by SAMWU at  times highlighted 
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dissatisfaction  amongst  SAMWU  members  with  the  performance  of  some  ANC 
members involved management. For instance, during a strike, a SAMWU branch in 
Mpumalanga  Province  alleged  that  workers  were  “feeling  betrayed”  by  Father 
Smangaliso Mkhatshwa,  a chair  of SALGA and an ANC official  because he was 
neglecting working class interests (Mail and Guardian, 2001). 
The research found that SAMWU actively mobilised members around a number of 
industrial,  social  and  economic  matters  that  affect  workers.  SAMWU  has  a 
particularly strong position against privatisation and has actively sought alternatives 
and engaged government about the privatisation of state assets. The evidence showed 
that SAMWU had taken a strong position on privatisation despite the fact that the 
Alliance had not articulated a strong stance on privatisation. 
At Makana Municipality, SAMWU was identified as more involved than IMATU. 
SAMWU would often publicly challenge management. SAMWU did this despite the 
dominant  membership  of  the  ANC  in  the  area.  With  regard  to  mobilisation  of 
members, Mr. Patho noted that “It’s easy to mobilise members … when you speak 
about wages and conditions of service” (Interview: Mr. Patho).
7.5 Support for the Alliance
Buhlungu and Psoulis (1999) found that participants of the liberation struggle shared 
common interests and developed strong bonds of solidarity through their activities. 
These  factors  have  been used  to  explain  the  persistence  of  the  Alliance.  A 2004 
survey of COSATU workers revealed that there had been a decline in support for the 
Alliance over the years,  however,  most workers believed that the Alliance should 
remain (Cherry, 2006:155). Generally speaking, most literature on the Alliance has 
noted the tensions within the Alliance and reflected high support  for the Alliance 
amongst workers.
At  Makana  Municipality,  many  workers  expressed  their  support  for  the  Alliance 
despite differences between COSATU and the ANC that have been noted over the 
years (Buhlungu et al., 2006). Most of these workers were members of the Alliance. 
Some SALGA representatives with ANC/SACP membership supported the Alliance. 
These  representatives  supported  the  Alliance  in  their  personal  capacities.  Some 
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SALGA representatives  with  ANC membership  were able  to  draw on their  ANC 
membership to “caucus” (Interview: Mr. Bester) with SAMWU representatives that 
had  ANC  membership.  Mr.  Monza  stated  that  although  he  was  a  SALGA 
representative  for  Makana Municipality  he was  able  to  “understand” the  Alliance 
relationship and appreciate its existence through his membership in the ANC. 
While the Alliance had facilitated good employment relations at Makana, Mr. Mandla 
emphasised  that  SALGA representatives  would not  merely  accept  what  SAMWU 
representatives proposed at negotiations simply because of the shared connection to 
the Alliance some representatives had (Interview: Mr. Mandla). Mr. Mandla stressed 
that SALGA representatives would consider all things as they represent the interests 
of workers and the broader community. For the most part, SALGA did not respond to 
SAMWU  considerably  differently  because  of  the  Alliance.  However,  political 
affiliation enabled some SALGA representatives to “caucus” with SAMWU. 
Despite  the generally high level  of support  for the Alliance not all  workers  were 
optimistic about the Alliance. Pillay (2006) notes that support for the Alliance had 
declined in 2004 compared to previous years. At Makana Municipality, Ms. Noluza 
argued that  SAMWU had not  benefited from the Alliance.  She observed that  the 
different directions taken by the organisations over the years had been a problem for 
the  Alliance.  Her  pessimism “perhaps  reflects  the  tensions  around policy  debates 
filtering down to shop-floor level,  and the criticisms of the Alliance by COSATU 
leadership similarly being reflected in worker attitudes” (Cherry, 2006:155).
In conclusion, orthodox theories on Industrial Relations have depicted the players to 
the labour relationship as separate entities pursing distinct but mutually dependent 
industrial  interests.  The  research  reveals  that  the  Alliance  and  the  shared  ANC 
membership  and  political  histories  between  management  representatives  and 
SAMWU  representatives  has  resulted  in  the  pursuing  of  distinct  but  mutually 
dependent industrial and political interests at the workplace. SAMWU has been able 
to use the Alliance relationship to mobilise workers behind the ANC as a party and as 
a lobbying tool when bargaining with SALGA. The Alliance has offered SAMWU 
opportunities to extend the benefits of political affiliation in political and industrial 
spheres (the industrial sphere being the most important).  A benefit  of drawing on 
political  affiliation  in  the  political  arena  has  been  that  SAMWU has  fulfilled  its 
141
mandate of strengthening the Alliance and Alliance objectives. However, a challenge 
is presented when one considers that the Alliance may not be a permanent feature. In 
the industrial sphere, new channels of reaching consensus have been created by the 
Alliance but a number of contradictions remain as employers and employees engage 
in  the  employment  relationship  within  the  context  of  an  Alliance.  Tensions  and 
contradictions are likely to continue as long as the Alliance remains. Social, industrial 
and political relations are dynamic and SAMWU’s challenge at the workplace will be 
to maintain a member-driven focus when dealing with matters.
7.6 Further research
This research explored a range of topics around a principal research question. The 
findings  of  the  research  make  a  contribution  to  understanding  micro-level  public 
sector labour relations in South Africa post-apartheid.  The state of these relations 
invariably  has  a  bearing  on  service  delivery.  The  breadth  of  a  master’s  level 
dissertation  cannot  afford  adequate  time  and  resources  to  capture  an  inclusive 
investigation of the research topics and this level of research may not have captured 
all the details of the research area. Also, further investigations into contract labour, 
personal versus political issues and details of ANC/SACP branch meetings were not 
possible  due  to  time  constraints  and  changes  in  administration  after  the  local 
government elections. Nonetheless, there are implications of this research in the area 
of public sector industrial  relations.  It  has contributed to discussions on where to 
situate political affiliations and their effects in public sector employment relations. 
One would recommend that research further explore the perspectives and workplace 
experiences  of  municipal  workers  that  do  not  belong  Alliance  organisations,  the 
workplace experiences of political affiliation to the Alliance at municipalities without 
ANC  dominance,  workplace  relations  and  political  affiliations  at  district  and 
metropolitan municipalities, power dynamics between unions, management and the 
Alliance and workplace relations when there is shared membership of a dominant 
non-political  organisations.  In  addition,  ways  of  analysing  the  dynamics  of 
employment and political relations in a rapidly changing South African public sector 
can further be explored.
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APPENDIX I
SAMWU MEMBERSHIP AT METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITIES AS AT 
JULY 2005
Eastern Cape Province Membership
Amathole Branch 3 929
Chris Hani Branch 2 046
Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality
3 637
O.R. Tambo Branch 1 582
Pinky Ntsangana Branch 1 981
Total 13 175
Free State Province Membership
Lejweleputswa Branch 2 406
Mongwame Branch 1 777
S.M. Pule Branch 2 904
Thabo Mafutsanyana 2 199
Total 9 286
Gauteng Province Membership
East Rand Extended 
Branch
7 608
Greater Johannesburg 
Branch
15 712
Greater Pretoria Branch 6 226
Greater Vaal Extended 
Branch
4 310
West Rand Branch 1 580
Total 35 436
Mpumalanga Province Membership
Eastern Highveld Branch 1 126
Highveld Branch 2 091
Highveld Ridge Branch 1 776
Lowveld Branch 1 691
Total 6 684
KwaZulu-Natal Province Membership
Durban Metropolitan 
Branch
7 923
Newcastle Branch 1 612
North Coast Branch 1 804
Pietermaritzburg Branch 3 365
South Coast Branch 1 923
Total 16 627
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North West Province Membership
Mafikeng 2 704
Northern Branch 1 770
Southern Branch 2 039
Total 6 513
Northern Cape Province Membership
De-Carna Branch 742
Kim-Kuru Branch 1 977
Up-Nama Branch 1 310
Total 4 029
Northern Province Membership
Far North Branch 1 237
Northern Branch 2 769
Southern Branch 1 671
Total 5 677
Western Cape Province Membership
Boland 3 965
Cape Metropolitan Branch 11 027
Garden Route-Karoo 
Branch
2 607
North West Branch 1 606
Total 19 205
Grand total: 116 632
Source: SAMWU research office
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